Post-retinal storage? Some further observations on Parks’ camel as seen through the eye of a needle

Parks recently reported observations with an apparatus in which successive slices of a stimulus figure could be entered on the same retinal locus. He reported that when this was done, a visual percept of the figure appeared, but one that appeared condensed in length. From this he argued that the slices, differing only in time of arrival, must be stored post-retinally and then reconstructed spatially to form the coherent figure again. In attempting to replicate this important conclusion, we found, contrary to Parks, that the appearance of the percept occurred only when the slices were spread out over the retina, and not when they were entered on the same spot. Thus, the percept is probably due to much more understandable poor temporal resolution, rather than spatial integration. Shape distortions were found corresponding to Parks’ reports, but only in the absence of any visual percepts. In spite of the failure to support all of Parks’ conclusions, the effects are seen as very intriguing ones, and may have critical theoretical ramifications.     

Scoring weighted multiple keyed tests on the IBM counting sorter

Tests or personal inventories with differential item response weights may be scored by means of punch card equipment. Detailed instructions are given for preparing the cards and scoring the forms. The scoring speed is approximately four to eight times that attained by manual scoring.The author is indebted to H. M. Cox, University of Nebraska, for certain suggestions on the columnar coding and the method of checking herein presented.     

Disentangling boundary extension and normalization of view memory for scenes

Boundary extension (BE) is a memory error for close-up views of scenes in which participants tend to remember a picture of a scene as depicting a more wide-angle view than what was actually displayed. However, some experiments have yielded data that indicate a normalized memory of the views depicted in a set of scenes, suggesting that memory for the previously studied scenes has become drawn toward the average view in the image set. In previous studies, normalization is only found when the retention interval is very long or when the stimuli no longer appear to represent a spatial expanse. In Experiment 1, we examine whether normalization can influence results for scenes depicting a partial view of space and when the memory test occurs immediately following the study block by manipulating the degree of difference between studied close-up and wide-angle scenes. In Experiment 2, normalization is induced in a set of scenes by creating conditions expected to lead to memory interference, suggesting that this may be the cause of view normalization. Based on the multi-source model of BE, these scenes should be extended during perception (Intraub, H. (2010). Rethinking scene perception: A multisource model. Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 52, 231–265). In Experiment 3, we show that BE is indeed observable if the same scenes are tested differently, supporting the notion that BE is primarily a perceptual phenomenon while normalization is a memory effect.     

The ‘conjunction fallacy’ revisited: how intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors

Findings in recent research on the ‘conjunction fallacy’ have been taken as evidence that our minds are not designed to work by the rules of probability. This conclusion springs from the idea that norms should be content‐blind—in the present case, the assumption that sound reasoning requires following the conjunction rule of probability theory. But content‐blind norms overlook some of the intelligent ways in which humans deal with uncertainty, for instance, when drawing semantic and pragmatic inferences. In a series of studies, we first show that people infer nonmathematical meanings of the polysemous term ‘probability’ in the classic Linda conjunction problem. We then demonstrate that one can design contexts in which people infer mathematical meanings of the term and are therefore more likely to conform to the conjunction rule. Finally, we report evidence that the term ‘frequency’ narrows the spectrum of possible interpretations of ‘probability’ down to its mathematical meanings, and that this fact—rather than the presence or absence of ‘extensional cues’—accounts for the low proportion of violations of the conjunction rule when people are asked for frequency judgments. We conclude that a failure to recognize the human capacity for semantic and pragmatic inference can lead rational responses to be misclassified as fallacies. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Coerced or nonvoluntary confessions

Police may engage in deceptive and coercive interrogations to obtain confessions. When a confession is later retracted, judges and juries must assess the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession, including the interrogation techniques used and the effects of these tactics on the particular defendant. A suspect who is vulnerable and confused or who is given false evidence by a coercive interrogator may produce a false confession. Expert testimony may be necessary to help jurors understand the circumstances that lead to nonvoluntary confessions. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The God Mysticism Scale: a Brief Version

Pastoral Psychology - This paper presents two studies concerned with developing a brief version of the 32-item God Mysticism Scale (GMS; Hood Jr. and Williamson Journal of Psychology and...     

Too good to be true? Psychological responses to uncommon options in risk–reward environments

Risks and rewards, or payoffs and probabilities, are inversely related in many choice environments. We investigated people's psychological responses to uncommon combinations of risk and reward that deviate from learned regularities (e.g., options that offer a high payoff with an unusually high probability) as they evaluated risky options. In two experiments (N = 183), participants first priced monetary gambles drawn from environments in which risks and rewards were negatively correlated, positively correlated, or uncorrelated. In later trials, they evaluated gambles with uncommon combinations of risk and reward—that is, options that deviated from the respective environment's risk–reward structure. Pricing, response times, and (in Experiment 2) pupil dilation were recorded. In both experiments, participants took more time when responding to uncommon compared to foreseeable options or when the same options were presented in an uncorrelated risk–reward environment. This result was most pronounced when the uncommon gambles offered higher expected values compared to the other gambles in the set. Moreover, these uncommon, high‐value options were associated with an increase in pupil size. These results suggest that people's evaluations of risky options are based not only on the options' payoffs and probabilities but also on the extent to which they fit the risk–reward structure of the environment.     

Information structuring improves recall of emergency discharge information: a randomized clinical trial

This article examines the extent to which structuring Emergency Department discharge information improves the ability to recall that information, and whether such benefits interact with relevant prior knowledge. Using three samples of students with different levels of prior medical knowledge, we investigated the amount of information recalled after structured vs. non-structured presentation of information. Across all student samples, the structured discharge information led to a relative increase in recalled items of 17% compared to non-structured discharge information (M = 9.70, SD = 4.96 vs. M = 8.31, SD = 4.93). In the sample with least medical knowledge, however, the structured discharge information resulted in a relative increase in recall by 42% (M = 8.12 vs. M = 5.71). These results suggest that structuring discharge information can be a useful tool to improve recall of information and is likely to be most beneficial for patient populations with lower levels of medical knowledge.     

How the threat of losses makes people <Emphasis Type="Italic">explore</Emphasis> more than the promise of gains

Until recently, loss aversion has been inferred exclusively from choice asymmetries in the loss and gain domains. This study examines the impact of the prospect of losses on exploratory search in a situation in which exploration is costly. Taking advantage of the largest available data set of decisions from experience, analyses showed that most people explore payoff distributions more under the threat of a loss than under the promise of a gain. This behavioral regularity thus occurs in both costly search and cost-free search (see Lejarraga, Hertwig, & Gonzalez, Cognition, 124, 334–342, 2012). Furthermore, a model comparison identified the simple win-stay-lose-shift heuristic as a likely candidate mechanism behind the loss–gain exploration asymmetry observed. In contrast, models assuming loss aversion failed to reproduce the asymmetry. Moreover, the asymmetry was not simply a precursor of loss aversion but a phenomenon separate from it. These findings are consistent with the recently proposed notion of intensified vigilance in the face of potential losses.