A valence-specific lateral bias for discriminating emotional facial expressions in free field

Findings from subjects with unilateral brain damage, as well as from normal subjects studied with tachistoscopic paradigms, argue that emotion is processed differently by each brain hemisphere. An open question concerns the extent to which such lateralised processing might occur under natural, freeviewing conditions. To explore this issue, we asked 28 normal subjects to discriminate emotions expressed by pairs of faces shown side-by-side, with no time or viewing constraints. Images of neutral expressions were shown paired with morphed images of very faint emotional expressions (happiness, surprise, disgust, fear, anger, or sadness). We found a surprising and robust laterality effect: When discriminating negative emotional expressions, subjects performed significantly better when the emotional face was to the left of the neutral face; conversely, when discriminating positive expressions, subjects performed better when the emotional face was to the right. We interpret this valence-specific laterality effect as consistent with the idea that the right hemisphere is specialised to process negative emotions, whereas the left is specialised to process positive emotions. The findings have important implications for how humans perceive facial emotion under natural conditions.     

Unpicking the semantic impairment in Alzheimer's disease: qualitative changes with disease severity

Despite a vast literature examining semantic impairment in Alzheimer's disease (AD), consensus regarding the nature of the deficit remains elusive. We re-considered this issue in the context of a framework that assumes semantic cognition can break down in two ways: (1) core semantic representations can degrade or (2) cognitive control mechanisms can become impaired. We hypothesised and confirmed that the nature of semantic impairment in AD changes with disease severity. Patients at mild or severe stages of the disorder exhibited impairment across various semantic tasks but the nature of those deficits differed qualitatively for the two groups. Commensurate with early dysfunction of the cognitive control, temporoparietal-frontal-cingulate network, characteristics of deregulated semantic cognition were exhibited by the mild AD cases. In contrast, the severe AD group reproduced features of additional degradation of core semantic representations. These results suggest that spread of pathology into lateral anterior temporal lobes in later stage AD produces degradation of semantic representations, exacerbating the already deregulated system. Moreover, the dual nature of severe patients' impairment was highlighted by disproportionately poor performance on tasks placing high demand on both conceptual knowledge and control processes--e.g., category fluency.     

How do people judge risks: Availability heuristic, affect heuristic, or both?

How does the public reckon which risks to be concerned about? The availability heuristic and the affect heuristic are key accounts of how laypeople judge risks. Yet, these two accounts have never been systematically tested against each other, nor have their predictive powers been examined across different measures of the public's risk perception. In two studies, we gauged risk perception in student samples by employing three measures (frequency, value of a statistical life, and perceived risk) and by using a homogeneous (cancer) and a classic set of heterogeneous causes of death. Based on these judgments of risk, we tested precise models of the availability heuristic and the affect heuristic and different definitions of availability and affect. Overall, availability-by-recall, a heuristic that exploits people's direct experience of occurrences of risks in their social network, conformed to people's responses best. We also found direct experience to carry a high degree of ecological validity (and one that clearly surpasses that of affective information). However, the relative impact of affective information (as compared to availability) proved more pronounced in value-of-a-statistical-life and perceived-risk judgments than in risk-frequency judgments. Encounters with risks in the media, in contrast, played a negligible role in people's judgments. Going beyond the assumption of exclusive reliance on either availability or affect, we also found evidence for mechanisms that combine both, either sequentially or in a composite fashion. We conclude with a discussion of policy implications of our results, including how to foster people's risk calibration and the success of education campaigns. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Biological Indeterminacy

Reductionist explanations in biology generally assume that biological mechanisms are highly deterministic and basically similar between individuals. A contrasting view has emerged recently that takes into account the degeneracy of biological processes??the ability to arrive at a given endpoint by a variety of available paths, even within the same individual. This perspective casts significant doubt on the prospects for the ability to predict behavior accurately based on brain imaging or genotyping, and on the ability of neuroscience to stipulate ethics.     

Real Analysis in Paraconsistent Logic

This paper begins an analysis of the real line using an inconsistency-tolerant (paraconsistent) logic. We show that basic field and compactness properties hold, by way of novel proofs that make no use of consistency-reliant inferences; some techniques from constructive analysis are used instead. While no inconsistencies are found in the algebraic operations on the real number field, prospects for other non-trivializing contradictions are left open.     

Eternalism and Propositional Multitasking: in defence of the Operator Argument

It is widely held that propositions perform a plethora of theoretical roles. They are believed to be the semantic values of sentences in contexts, the objects of attitudes, the contents of illocutionary acts, the referents of ??that??-clauses, and the primary bearers of truth. This assumption is often combined with the claim that propositions have their truth-values eternally. Following Kaplan??s and Lewis??s Operator Argument, I argue that the compositional semantic values of sentences do not correspond to eternal propositions. Therefore, we cannot hold on to both assumptions at the same time: either we regard the non-eternal entities that realize the compositional role of propositions as fulfilling the remaining theoretical roles, or we abandon the assumption that there is a unique realizer. The Operator Argument has recently come under attack, mainly for its intensional assumptions. However, rejecting these assumptions is not a sufficient defense of eternal propositions as compositional semantic values of sentences. Firstly, we can give a generalized version of the Operator Argument that seems independent of the contested assumptions. Secondly, the extensional alternative to the intensional framework does not allow us to retain eternal propositions as unique semantic values either.