Relevance differently affects the truth,acceptability, and probability evaluations of “and”, “but”, “therefore”, and “if–then”

In this study, we investigate the influence of reason-relation readings of indicative conditionals and “and”/“but”/“therefore” sentences on various cognitive assessments. According to the Frege–Grice tradition, a dissociation is expected. Specifically, differences in the reason-relation reading of these sentences should affect participants’ evaluations of their acceptability but not of their truth value. In two experiments we tested this assumption by introducing a relevance manipulation into the truth-table task as well as in other tasks assessing the participants’ acceptability and probability evaluations. Across the two experiments, a strong dissociation was found. The reason-relation reading of all four sentences strongly affected their probability and acceptability evaluations, but hardly affected their respective truth evaluations. Implications of this result for recent work on indicative conditionals are discussed.     

The sources of normativity: young children's awareness of the normative structure of games

In two studies, the authors investigated 2- and 3-year-old children's awareness of the normative structure of conventional games. In the target conditions, an experimenter showed a child how to play a simple rule game. After the child and the experimenter had played for a while, a puppet came (controlled by a 2nd experimenter), asked to join in, and then performed an action that constituted a mistake in the game. In control conditions, the puppet performed the exact same action as in the experimental conditions, but the context was different such that this act did not constitute a mistake. Children's normative responses to the puppet's acts (e.g., protest, critique, or teaching) were scored. Both age groups performed more normative responses in the target than in the control conditions, but the 3-year-olds did so on a more explicit level. These studies demonstrate in a particularly strong way that even very young children have some grasp of the normative structure of conventional activities.     

Beliefs in conditionals vs. conditional beliefs

On the basis of impossibility results on probability, belief revision, and conditionals, it is argued that conditional beliefs differ from beliefs in conditionals qua mental states. Once this is established, it will be pointed out in what sense conditional beliefs are still conditional, even though they may lack conditional contents, and why it is permissible to still regard them as beliefs, although they are not beliefs in conditionals. Along the way, the main logical, dispositional, representational, and normative properties of conditional beliefs are studied, and it is explained how the failure of not distinguishing conditional beliefs from beliefs in conditionals can lead philosophical and empirical theories astray.

Online response preparation in a rapid serial visual search task

Online response preparation was assessed in a visual search task using rapid serial visual presentation. In each trial, a series of letters was presented sequentially, and participants were instructed to make a target-present response if a prespecified target letter was presented or a target-absent response if it was not. Measurements of response preparation using both probe reaction time and the lateralized readiness potential indicated that preparation of the target-absent response increased near the end of the sequence. Most of the increase appeared to be due to direct priming of the target-absent response by nontarget letters, but part was due to the increased conditional probability of this response near the end of the sequence. These results extend previous studies of response preparation by showing online response preparation during a temporally extended reaction time task.     

Contemporary psychoanalytical identity and its roots in the history of science

Abstract

The problem of psychoanalytical identity is discussed under the aspects of psychoanalysis:

—as the history of a charismatic movement shaping the organizational and career patterns in a specific direction;

—as a science with the difficulties of defining the correlations of interpretative, clinical-empirical and “scientistic” dimensions inherent in its basic assumptions.     

Apes are intuitive statisticians

Inductive learning and reasoning, as we use it both in everyday life and in science, is characterized by flexible inferences based on statistical information: inferences from populations to samples and vice versa. Many forms of such statistical reasoning have been found to develop late in human ontogeny, depending on formal education and language, and to be fragile even in adults. New revolutionary research, however, suggests that even preverbal human infants make use of intuitive statistics. Here, we conducted the first investigation of such intuitive statistical reasoning with non-human primates. In a series of 7 experiments, Bonobos, Chimpanzees, Gorillas and Orangutans drew flexible statistical inferences from populations to samples. These inferences, furthermore, were truly based on statistical information regarding the relative frequency distributions in a population, and not on absolute frequencies. Intuitive statistics in its most basic form is thus an evolutionarily more ancient rather than a uniquely human capacity.     

Effects of Self-Reported Wisdom on Happiness: Not Much More Than Emotional Intelligence?

Wisdom and emotional intelligence are increasingly popular topics among happiness scholars. Despite their conceptual overlap, no empirical research has examined their interrelations and incremental predictive validities. The aims of this study were (a) to investigate associations between multidimensional conceptualizations of self-reported wisdom (Ardelt in Res Aging 25(3):275–324, 2003, 2004) and emotional intelligence (Davies et al. in J Pers Soc Psychol 75:989–1015, 1998) and (b) to examine the joint effects of self-reported wisdom and emotional intelligence on dimensions of happiness (life satisfaction as well as positive and negative affect). Data were provided by two samples: 175 university students and 400 online workers. Correlations between a composite wisdom score, a composite emotional intelligence score, and happiness facets were positive and moderate in size. Regression analyses showed that the effects of composite wisdom on life satisfaction and positive affect (but not negative affect) became weaker and non-significant when composite emotional intelligence was controlled. Additional analyses including three dimensions of the self-reported wisdom (cognitive, reflective, and affective wisdom) and four dimensions of emotional intelligence (self- and others-emotions appraisal, use and regulation of emotion) revealed a more differentiated pattern of results. Implications for future research on wisdom and happiness are discussed.     

Dynamic doxastic logic: why,how, and where to?

We investigate the research programme of dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) and analyze its underlying methodology. The Ramsey test for conditionals is used to characterize the logical and philosophical differences between two paradigmatic systems, AGM and KGM, which we develop and compare axiomatically and semantically. The importance of Gärdenfors’s impossibility result on the Ramsey test is highlighted by a comparison with Arrow’s impossibility result on social choice. We end with an outlook on the prospects and the future of DDL.