We-Intentions Revisited

This paper gives an up-to-date account of we-intentions and responds to some critics of the author’s earlier work on the topic in question. While the main lines of the new account are basically the same as before, the present account considerably adds to the earlier work. For one thing, it shows how we-intentions and joint intentions can arise in terms of the so-called Bulletin Board View of joint intention acquisition, which relies heavily on some underlying mutually accepted conceptual and situational presuppositions but does not require agreement making or joint intention to form a joint intention. The model yields categorical, unconditional intentions to participate in the content of the we-intention and joint intention (viz. shared we-intention upon analysis). The content of a we-intention can be, but need not be a joint action. Thus a participant alone cannot settle and control the content of the intention. Instead the participants jointly settle the content and control the satisfaction of the intention. These and some other features distinguish we-intentions from “action intentions”, viz. intentions that an agent can alone settle and satisfy. The paper discusses weintentions (and other “aim-intentions”) from this perspective and it also defends the author’s earlier account against a charge of vicious circularity that has been directed against it.     

Decisionarium ‐ aiding decisions,negotiating and collecting opinions on the web

Decisionarium ( www.decisionarium.hut.fi ) is the first public site for interactive multicriteria decision support with tools for individual decision‐making as well as for group collaboration and negotiation. Web‐HIPRE ( www.hipre.hut.fi ) supports value tree and AHP analysis including group models. The RICH methodology ( www.rich.hut.fi ) allows the decision maker to provide incomplete ordinal preference statements when considering the relative importance of attributes in a value tree. Opinions‐Online ( www.opinion.huf.fi ) is a platform for surveys voting and group collaboration. There are different ways for voting, multiattribute scoring, surveys as well as interactive viewing of the results. Joint Gains ( www.jointgains.hut.fi ) applies the method of improving directions to support multiparty negotiations in a multicriteria setting. Smart Swaps offers an implementation of the even swaps procedure ( www.smart‐swaps.hut.fi ). All of the tools above are web‐based, so global interaction is natural and links can be utilized for multimedia information support. Decisionarium also offers access to complete e‐learning modules ( www.dm.hut.fi ) based on the use of the software. There are also illustrative powerpoint presentations and additional Windows software WINPRE and PRIME‐Decisions for value tree analysis under incomplete information. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Morgan on deductive explanation: A rejoinder

This paper is mainly a response to Charles Morgan's criticisms (this journal, pp. 511–25) of the author's model of the (formal aspects of) explanation. It is claimed in the paper that with two modifications and some additional specifications the model withstands Morgan's criticisms.     

On radical conceptual revolutions in social science

The paper considers arguments for and against correction and elimination of the basic conceptual categories as well as theories of social science. It is argued that some correction of at least some basic social notions is called for. A great part of the paper consists in a conceptual investigation of such notion of correction in terms of different notions of corrective explanation.     

ON THE APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICAL LEARNING THEORIES. II

The most important components of the empirical adequacy of a mathematical learning theory are claimed to be: truth, explanatory power, information content, refutability, range, and simplicity. The main result of this paper is that the amount of information common to the theory and the empirical evidence can be used to measure the four first of these. As this common information in turn is measured by a certain kind of statistical likelihood test, a basis is found for comparing theories in empirical research. Provisional rules of acceptance for mathematical learning theories in accordance with this are stated.     

We-intentions, free-riding, and being in reserve

A person can intend to achieve his own personal aims and ends, but he can also intend to promote the goals of his groups or collectives. In many cases of collective action these two types of intention will coincide, but they need not, and when they clash, collective action dilemmas, like free-riderism, will emerge. In this paper we discuss and analyze a central kind of group-intentions termed we-intentions, and distinguish between absolute and conditional we-intentions. The analyses of the latter are then applied to a study of two related social phenomena: the agent's standing in reserve and free-riding.It is our claim that when the agent is intentionally in reserve, this involves his having a specific conditional we-intention to participate in the group's action. On the other hand, if he intends to free-ride, he intends not to participate. We also discuss and analyze different types of free-rider intentions. A person can also have a more complex intention concerning the group's action: He can have a conditional personal intention to free-ride combined with a conditional reserve member's we-intention to participate in the group's action. This may indicate that his motives are confused or mixed, but in most cases it can be taken to express his uncertainty of the fulfillment of the relevant conditions of his actions.A similar uncertainty of other players' actions is also embedded in various game-theoretic settings, and we conclude the paper by representing some free-riding situations in terms of game-theoretic structures. We claim that not only Prisoner's Dilemma but also other games, in particular Chicken, are relevant for studies of free-riding.