False Consensus,Stereotypic Cues,and the Perception of Integrative Potential in Negotiation1

We argue that negotiators' fixed-sum perceptions are caused by the same judgment process that creates false consensus. Bargainers' reliance on their own preferences as a cue to others' preferences leads them to anticipate a fixed-sum conflict. When presented with stereotypic cues, subjects in a negotiating experiment anticipated the variable-sum nature of the task and subsequently realized highly efficient settlements extremely quickly. Surprisingly, even when the party's preferences were unrepresentative of the stereotype, agreements were no less efficient than in the absence of the cue. The implications of these findings for bargaining research and practice are discussed.     

Causal Attributions for Poorly Performing Projects: Their Effect on Project Continuation Decisions

This study examined the escalation problem within an attribution theory framework. Students read a case scenario containing causal attribution information that described a poorly performing project under their supervision. They made estimates of its future success, as well as a decision whether to continue it. Perceived stability of causality had the primary effect on expectancy of success. A project whose performance downturn was attributed to a stable cause had a lower expectancy. Locus of causality had a smaller but still significant effect. Project downturns attributed to internal causes had a lower expectancy. Expectancy of success was significantly correlated with project continuation decisions. Discrepancies between these results and those reported by Staw and Ross (1978) are accounted for in terms of Weiner's (1985, 1986) attributional analysis.     

Relations in Monadic Third-Order Logic

The representation of quantification over relations in monadic third-order logic is discussed; it is shown to be possible in numerous special cases of foundational interest, but not in general unless something akin to the Axiom of Choice is assumed.     

MEMORY PROCESSES IN DELAYED SPATIAL DISCRIMINATIONS: RESPONSE INTENTIONS OR RESPONSE MEDIATION?

Pigeons were trained on a pair-comparison task in which left versus right choices were reinforced following different sequences of two center-key stimuli. Choice accuracy was higher when retention intervals occurred after the entire sequence than when they separated the two stimuli comprising it, and this effect occurred independently of whether the initial and terminal stimuli came from the same or different dimensions. The initial stimulus from the prior trial was a source of proactive interference only in groups for which the retention interval separated the two sequence stimuli. By contrast, differential delay-interval behavior was observed only in groups for which the retention interval followed presentation of the entire sequence. These results indicate that coding processes in delayed discriminations are influenced by the location of the retention interval, and that response mediation affects retention performances if the reinforced choice can be determined prior to the interval.     

Toward a theory of verbal behavior

This paper is a reply to an accompanying set of six commentaries by Sidman; Hayes and Barnes; Schusterman, Kastak, and Reichmuth; Tonneau and Sokolowski; Lowenkron; and Moerk. Those commentaries were prompted by our article “On the Origins of Naming and Other Symbolic Behavior” (1996), which was, in turn, followed by 26 commentaries and a reply. In the course of the present reply, we further develop the naming account to embrace more complex verbal relations such as same, different, more, and less. We also examine what we see as the lack of conceptual coherence in equivalence theories, including relational frame theory, and the disparities between these accounts and the findings from empirical research.     

Separability of item and person parameters in response time models

This paper discusses two forms of separability of item and person parameters in the context of response time (RT) models. The first is separate sufficiency: the existence of sufficient statistics for the item (person) parameters that do not depend on the person (item) parameters. The second is ranking independence: the likelihood of the item (person) ranking with respect to RTs does not depend on the person (item) parameters. For each form a theorem stating sufficient conditions, is proved. The two forms of separability are shown to include several (special cases of) models from psychometric and biometric literature. Ranking independence imposes no restrictions on the general distribution form, but on its parametrization. An estimation procedure based upon ranks and pseudolikelihood theory is discussed, as well as the relation of ranking independence to the concept of double monotonicity.I am indebted to Wim van der Linden for bringing Thissen's (1983) paper to my notice, and to Martijn Berger, Frans Tan, and the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

Davidson on First-Person Authority

Davidson's explanation of first-person authority in utterance of sentences of the form 'I V that p ' derives first-person authority from the requirements of interpretation of speech. His account is committed to the view that utterance sentences are truth-bearers, that believing that p is a matter of holding true an utterance sentence, and that a speaker's knowledge of what he means gives him knowledge of what belief he expresses by his utterance. These claims are here faulted. His explanation of first-person authority by reference to the requirements of interpretability is committed to the view that all understanding involves interpretation. This is argued to be a misconception of understanding and of speaker's meaning. Davidson's account involves acceptance of the cognitive assumption that normally when a person V s that p , he knows that he does. This assumption is challenged. Throughout, Davidson's conception is compared and contrasted with Wittgenstein's.