When the mask falls: The role of facial motor resonance in memory for emotional language

The recognition and interpretation of emotional information (e.g., about happiness) has been shown to elicit, amongst other bodily reactions, spontaneous facial expressions occurring in accordance to the relevant emotion (e.g. a smile). Theories of embodied cognition act on the assumption that such embodied simulations are not only an accessorial, but a crucial factor in the processing of emotional information. While several studies have confirmed the importance of facial motor resonance during the initial recognition of emotional information, its role at later stages of processing, such as during memory for emotional content, remains unexplored. The present study bridges this gap by exploring the impact of facial motor resonance on the retrieval of emotional stimuli. In a novel approach, the specific effects of embodied simulations were investigated at different stages of emotional memory processing (during encoding and/or retrieval). Eighty participants underwent a memory task involving emotional and neutral words consisting of an encoding and retrieval phase. Depending on the experimental condition, facial muscles were blocked by a hardening facial mask either during encoding, during retrieval, during both encoding and retrieval, or were left free to resonate (control). The results demonstrate that not only initial recognition but also memory of emotional items benefits from embodied simulations occurring during their encoding and retrieval.     

Task-set inertia and memory-consolidation bottleneck in dual tasks

Three dual-task experiments examined the influence of processing a briefly presented visual object for deferred verbal report on performance in an unrelated auditory-manual reaction time (RT) task. RT was increased at short stimulus-onset asynchronies (SOAs) relative to long SOAs, showing that memory consolidation processes can produce a functional processing bottleneck in dual-task performance. In addition, the experiments manipulated the spatial compatibility of the orientation of the visual object and the side of the speeded manual response. This cross-task compatibility produced relative RT benefits only when the instruction for the visual task emphasized overlap at the level of response codes across the task sets (Experiment 1). However, once the effective task set was in place, it continued to produce cross-task compatibility effects even in single-task situations (“ignore” trials in Experiment 2) and when instructions for the visual task did not explicitly require spatial coding of object orientation (Experiment 3). Taken together, the data suggest a considerable degree of task-set inertia in dual-task performance, which is also reinforced by finding costs of switching task sequences (e.g., AC → BC vs. BC → BC) in Experiment 3.     

Achievement emotions in elementary,middle, and high school: How do students feel about specific contexts in terms of settings and subject‐domains?

The present work investigates students' representation of achievement emotions, focusing in context‐specific situations in terms of settings and subject‐domains, as a function of grade level. We involved 527 fourth‐, seventh‐, and eleventh‐graders, who evaluated ten discrete emotions through questionnaires, with reference to verbal language and mathematics, and different settings (class, homework, tests). Confirmatory multitrait‐multimethod analyses indicated higher salience of subject‐domains rather than settings for all the emotions; however, complexity of reality was best explained when also settings were accounted for. Analyses of variance revealed higher intensity of positive emotions for younger students, and the opposite pattern for older students; significant differences for most of the emotions based on the evaluative nature of settings, moderated by class levels; more intense positive emotions for mathematics and more intense negative emotions for Italian. Results are discussed considering their theoretical and applied relevance, corroborating previous literature on domain‐specificity.     

Who are maximizers? Future oriented and highly numerate individuals

Two studies investigated cognitive mechanisms that may be associated with people's tendency to maximize. Maximizers are individuals who are spending a great amount of effort in order to find the very best option in a decision situation, rather than stopping the decision process when they encounter a satisfying option. These studies show that maximizers are more future oriented than other people, which may motivate them to invest the extra energy into optimal choices. Maximizers also have higher numerical skills, possibly facilitating the cognitive processes involved with decision trade‐offs.     

We are what we eat: How food is represented in our mind/brain

Despite the essential role of food in our lives, we have little understanding of the way our knowledge about food is organized in the brain. At birth, human infants exhibit very few food preferences, and do not yet know much about what is edible and what is not. A multisensory learning development will eventually turn young infants into omnivore adults, for whom deciding what to eat becomes an effortful task. Recognizing food constitutes an essential step in this decisional process. In this paper we examine how concepts about food are represented in the human brain. More specifically, we first analyze how brain-damaged patients recognize natural and manufactured food, and then examine these patterns in the light of the sensory-functional hypothesis and the domain-specific hypothesis. Secondly, we discuss how concepts of food are represented depending on whether we embrace the embodied view or the disembodied view. We conclude that research on food recognition and on the organization of knowledge about food must also take into account some aspects specific to food category, the relevance of which has not been sufficiently recognized and investigated to date.     

The attribution of intentionality: the role of skill and morality

The present study contributes to the discussion on the different components which constitute the intentionality concept about an undesired side effect, focusing on the morality and the skill. Two hundred and forty participants were asked to read a brief story about a car accident, in which it was explained the motivation of the high speed and objective and subjective skill of the agent to drive the car, and to fill in six questions about intentionality, objective risk, mental representation of risk, risk acceptance and blameworthiness for the outcome. The principal results showed that when the motivation is morally negative, people judge the side effect more intentional, also because they make more severe judgments about risk and blameworthiness. Moreover, when people are objectively proficient to perform the action (objective skill) the side effect is considered less risky and intentional and, in the case of a negative outcome, they are judged less severely than if they have a poor ability. Finally, a self-assessment of low skill to make the action (subjective skill) leads people to assess higher risks and, consequently, more intentionality for the side effect. The results are discussed on the basis of the literature about some specific components that make up the intentionality concept.     

Toward a Life Course Framework for Studying Vulnerability

Interest in the study of vulnerability has experienced impressive growth across various disciplines. To contribute to this major but scattered development in the study of vulnerability, this article argues for a multidisciplinary life-course framework. This framework promotes a systemic and dynamic perspective focused on three complementary research directions: multidimensional, multilevel, and multidirectional. On the basis of this life course perspective, the authors also propose a definition of vulnerability as a dynamic process of stress and resources across various domains of life (i.e., work, family, health, migration, etc.), levels (i.e., person, group, collective), and time (i.e., long-term processes).     

A common ground in clinical discussion groups: Intersubjective resonance and implicit operational theories

Clinical discussion groups based on the Three‐Level Model for Observing Patient Transformations (3‐LM) enable us to reflect on the clinical common ground shared by psychoanalysts who have different theoretical frameworks. The very existence of this common ground is controversial. While analysts such as Wallerstein support it, others, like Green, think it is just a myth. In their 2005 controversy Wallerstein and Green proposed an observation procedure that might clarify this matter. This procedure bears great similarity to the one used by clinical discussion groups that apply the 3‐LM. The study of numerous theoretically heterogeneous groups that use this model shows that communication is possible in crucial areas. We may thus conclude that a partial and dynamic common ground exists. At a phenomenological level, certain fragments of material produce a shared resonance that enriches clinical understanding for the whole group. Communication is also possible with regard to the conceptualization of patient changes, although some controversial issues persist at this level. Finally, at the level of theoretical explanations, divergences concerning abstract theories do not prevent a fertile interaction among ‘in vivo’ personal implicit theories. The latter give rise to the actual operational frameworks underlying participants' approach to clinical problems.     

PRINZ'S PROBLEMATIC PROXYTYPES

Jesse Prinz has argued that a proxy type theory of concepts provides what he calls the 'intentionality' and 'cognitive content' desiderata better than any current competitor, and that the hybrid nature of proxytypes allows his theory to combine the informational component of informational atomism with the view that concepts are semantically structured entities. In response, I argue that the hybrid character of proxytypes, far from delivering the advantages Prinz claims, generates a threatening dilemma: either his theory is novel but fails to deliver the intentionality and cognitive content desiderata, or it delivers these desiderata but is not novel.