Object-based representations govern both the storage of information in visual short-term memory and the retrieval of information from it

Interest is growing in how information is retained in visual short-term memory (VSTM). We describe an experiment that assesses VSTM within the context of multidimensional signal detection theory. On every trial, participants were presented with a 250-ms display containing four colored shapes. They were then probed 900 ms later with a colored shape and made separate old/new judgments about the color and the shape. In any particular trial, one, both, or neither of the probed features had been presented. Performance differed according to whether both probed features belonged to a single object or to two different objects. When both probed features belonged to the same object, featural retrieval was better than would be predicted by independent feature storage. When both probed features belonged to two different objects, featural retrieval was worse than would be predicted by independent feature storage. We conclude that storage in and retrieval from VSTM operate on the basis of object-based representations.     

Consciousness cannot be separated from function

Numerous theories of consciousness hold that there are separate neural correlates of conscious experience and cognitive function, aligning with the assumption that there are 'hard' and 'easy' problems of consciousness. Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A 'perfect experiment' illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing the existence of inaccessible conscious states. Finally, we discuss the criteria necessary for forming and testing a falsifiable theory of consciousness.     

The intention interference effect

Intentions have been shown to be more accessible (e.g., more quickly and accurately recalled) compared to other sorts of to-be-remembered information; a result termed an intention superiority effect (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993). In the current study, we demonstrate an intention interference effect (IIE) in which color-naming performance in a Stroop task was slower for words belonging to an intention that participants had to remember to carry out (Do-the-Task condition) versus an intention that did not have to be executed (Ignore-the-Task condition). In previous work (e.g., Cohen et al., 2005), having a prospective intention in mind was confounded with carrying a memory load. In Experiment 1, we added a digit-retention task to control for effects of cognitive load. In Experiment 2, we eliminated the memory confound in a new way, by comparing intention-related and control words within each trial. Results from both Experiments 1 and 2 revealed an IIE suggesting that interference is very specific to the intention, not just to a memory load.     

What should we expect after the next attack?

A test of any science is its ability to predict events under specified conditions. A test for the psychology represented in this special issue of the American Psychologist is its ability to predict individual and social behavior in the aftermath of a next terror attack. This article draws on that science to make such predictions. These predictions are conditioned on both the nature of the attack and our institutional preparations for it. Some attacks will test our resilience more than others. Whatever the attack, we will reduce its impacts if our institutions take advantage of psychological science. That science can reduce the scope of attacks by limiting terrorists' ability to organize their operations and by enhancing our ability to restrain them. It can reduce the impacts of any attacks that do occur by strengthening the institutions and civil society that must respond to them. Realizing these possibilities will require our social institutions to rely on science, rather than intuition, in dealing with these threats. It will require our profession to provide psychologists with rewards for public service, applied research, and interdisciplinary collaboration, as demanded by complex problems. Responding to these challenges could strengthen society and psychology.     

The what–where trade-off in multiple-identity tracking

Observers are poor at reporting the identities of objects that they have successfully tracked (Pylyshyn, Visual Cognition, 11, 801-822, 2004; Scholl & Pylyshyn, Cognitive Psychology, 38, 259-290, 1999). Consequently, it has been claimed that objects are tracked in a manner that does not encode their identities (Pylyshyn, 2004). Here, we present evidence that disputes this claim. In a series of experiments, we show that attempting to track the identities of objects can decrease an observer's ability to track the objects' locations. This indicates that the mechanisms that track, respectively, the locations and identities of objects draw upon a common resource. Furthermore, we show that this common resource can be voluntarily distributed between the two mechanisms. This is clear evidence that the location- and identity-tracking mechanisms are not entirely dissociable.     

The role of Gestalt grouping principles in visual statistical learning

A major issue in visual scene recognition involves the extraction of recurring chunks from a sequence of complex scenes. Previous studies have suggested that this kind of learning is accomplished according to Bayesian principles that constrain the types of extracted chunks. Here we show that perceptual grouping cues are also incorporated in this Bayesian model, providing additional evidence for the possible span of chunks. Experiment 1 replicates previous results showing that observers can learn three-element chunks without learning smaller, two-element chunks embedded within them. Experiment 2 shows that the very same embedded chunks are learned if they are grouped by perceptual cues, suggesting that perceptual grouping cues play an important role in chunk extraction from complex scenes.     

Trauma-Focused CBT for Traumatic Grief in Military Children

Although military children are typically as resilient as the general child population, the ongoing conflict has exposed military children to unusual stressors such as repeated deployment, severe injury, or the death of a parent or sibling. U.S. forces have experienced more than 5,600 casualties during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, with growing numbers of suicides among Service members. These deaths have affected thousands of military children. Most bereaved military children experience adaptive grief characterized by deep sadness, longing for the deceased person, and being comforted by positive memories of the deceased. A smaller number of military children develop childhood traumatic grief, characterized by trauma symptoms that interfere with adaptive grieving. Children with traumatic grief get “stuck” on the traumatic aspects of the death such as picturing the imagined or real details of the death; imagining the pain their loved one experienced in the moments before dying; wishing for revenge; and becoming angry at those who do not understand or share the child’s thoughts and feelings about the death. These children avoid reminders of the deceased person. Trauma-focused cognitive behavioral therapy (TF-CBT) is an evidence-based treatment for children with trauma symptoms including those with traumatic grief. TF-CBT may be particularly suitable for military families. This article describes the clinical application of TF-CBT for traumatic grief in military children.