Gender role typing,the superwoman ideal,and the potential for eating disorders

The interactive effects of gender role typing and adherence to a superwoman ideal (desiring to excel in many diverse roles) on the potential for disordered eating were examined among a nonclinical sample of women. Results indicated that both masculine and feminine gender-typed women who strongly adhered to a superwoman ideal were at greater risk for eating disorders than androgynous superwomen. In contrast, androgynous superwomen had relatively low potential for disordered eating and appeared comparable to women who, regardless of gender typing, rejected the superwoman ideal. Women undifferentiated with regard to gender type, whether superwomen or not, also had reduced potential for disordered eating. Findings are discussed with regard to gender role socialization and expectations, and the implications for mediating the potential for eating disorders are considered.     

Associative facilitation of word recognition as measured from a neutral prime

It is shown that lexical decision times to strong associates with an associative strength of approximately 40% are facilitated relative to targets following a neutral prime, “blank,” whereas very weak associates with an associative strength of less then 3% are neither facilitated nor inhibited. It is also shown that relative to the “blank” baseline time, a row of crosses inhibits processing of the following target. The latter finding has implications for earlier studies that have used crosses as a neutral prime. In these studies, facilitation effects have been overestimated and inhibition effects have been underestimated. Neely 1976 has proposed a predict-and-match strategy according to which subjects are assumed to predict one or more targets from the prime and to match the actual target onto the predicted targets. A part of this theory is not supported by the present data. The results are discussed in terms of the two-process theory of expectancy (Posner & Snyder, 1975). They are also considered in the light of a recent theory by Becker (1980). As an alternative interpretation of part of the reported data, a coherence assumption by the subjects about all reading materials is introduced.     

The generality of overselectivity in developmentally disabled children

A growing body of research suggests that low Mental Age (MA) autistic and retarded children show a unique stimulus control deficit, one that may cause many or most of their behavioral deficiencies. This problem, stimulus overselectivity, is evidenced when a child responds only to a restricted portion of the stimulus environment when compared with normal children. The purpose of this study was to assess whether this overselectivity is general across situations or whether it is restricted to certain stimulus/task conditions. Eight autistic children, who evidenced overselectivity on a preassessment task, and 8 normal children with similar MA levels participated. All children were trained on 3 tasks to determine if overselectivity varied as a function of different stimulus conditions. Each of the 3 tasks involved training a child to respond to (i.e., touch) a card containing a circle (S +) and to avoid a blank (S ?) card. In each case, the circle comprised a series of dots. The difference between the 3 circles (tasks) was the distance between the successive dots making up each circle. Also, in the minimal separation condition the dots were smaller in size and greater in number than in the larger separation conditions. Of concern was whether autistic children learned about the gestalt (i.e., the circle), which required attention to multiple cues, or whether children would overselect and respond to the dots. The results showed that (1) stimulus overselectivity was found not to be a generalized deficit in autistic subjects; instead, it varied as a function of the stimulus variables; and (2) the stimulus variables manipulated in this study similarly influenced the responding of both normal and autistic children. The implications of these data for a theory of overselectivity are discussed.     

Victim and Perpetrator Accounts of Hurtful Messages: An Actor–Partner Interdependence Model

This study examined how message characteristics and relational turbulence correspond with victim and perpetrator experiences of hurtful messages. Romantic partners described 2 events: one where each of them was a victim of the partner's hurtful message. Trained judges evaluated qualities of hurtful messages and participants reported relationship qualities, intensity of hurt experienced as a victim, and the partner's hurt feelings when the respondent was the perpetrator. Third‐party ratings of hurtfulness were associated with victims' intensity of hurt. For females, relational turbulence was associated with their intensity of hurt as victims. For males, relational turbulence was associated with their perception of the female victims' hurt. The authors discuss the implications for the work on hurtful messages and relational turbulence.     

Memory and Counterfactual Simulations for Past Wrongdoings Foster Moral Learning and Improvement

In four studies, we investigated the role of remembering, reflecting on, and mutating personal past moral transgressions to learn from those moral mistakes and to form intentions for moral improvement. Participants reported having ruminated on their past wrongdoings, particularly their more severe transgressions, and they reported having frequently thought about morally better ways in which they could have acted instead (i.e., morally upward counterfactuals; Studies 1–3). The more that participants reported having mentally simulated morally better ways in which they could have acted, the stronger their intentions were to improve in the future (Studies 2 and 3). Implementing an experimental manipulation, we then found that making accessible a morally upward counterfactual after committing a moral transgression strengthened reported intentions for moral improvement—relative to resimulating the remembered event and considering morally worse ways in which they could have acted instead (Study 4). We discuss the implications of these results for competing theoretical views on the relationship between memory and morality and for functional theories of counterfactual thinking.