Accuracy and bias in perceptions of emotionally supportive communication in marriage

Abstract This study examined accuracy and bias within people's perceptions of a spouse's emotionally supportive behavior in the United States. Hypotheses stated that people's self‐reported supportiveness, their marital satisfaction, and outside observers' ratings of their partner's support predict people's perceptions of their partner's supportiveness. Married dyads (N = 100) completed measures of marital satisfaction, engaged in a discussion about personal stressors, and rated their own and their spouse's emotional support during the interaction. Third‐party observers also provided a rating of each partner's emotionally supportive behavior. For husbands and wives, perceptions of partner support were positively associated with their own supportiveness and the partner's observable supportive communication. Marital satisfaction predicted greater perception of partner support for wives, but not for husbands.     

UNEQUAL ATTENDANCE: THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RACE, ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY CUES, AND ABSENTEEISM

Although prior evidence has demonstrated racial differences in employee absenteeism, no existing research explains this phenomenon. The present study examined the roles of 2 diversity cues related to workplace support—perceived organizational value of diversity and supervisor–subordinate racial/ethnic similarity—in explicating this demographic difference among 659 Black, White, and Hispanic employees of U.S. companies. Blacks reported significantly more absences than their White counterparts, but this difference was significantly more pronounced when employees believed their organizations placed little value on diversity. Moreover, in a form of expectancy violation, the Black–White difference was significant only when employees had racially similar supervisors (and thus would expect their companies to value diversity) and perceived that the organization placed little value on diversity.     

Changes in Religious Giving Reflect Changes in Involvement: Age and Cohort Effects in Religious Giving, Secular Giving, and Attendance

We present two patterns over time in religious giving, secular giving, and religious service attendance. The first pattern describes the prewar cohort (born 1924–1938) as they aged between middle adulthood (ages 35–49) and their senior years (ages 62–76). The second pattern compares the baby boom cohort (born 1951–1965) in middle adulthood to the middle adulthood of the prewar cohort. We present patterns for all families as well as separately for Catholic and Protestant families using data from three sources. The prewar cohort increased their religious giving and attendance as they aged, but—compared to the prewar cohort in middle adulthood—baby boomers give less than expected to religion and attend less. Baby boomer giving is noticeably less than expected and attendance noticeably lower among Catholic boomers, but less so among Protestant boomers. We argue that together these patterns are evidence that changes in religious giving reflect changes in religious involvement.     

Religion and Substance Abuse Treatment: Individual and Program Effects

The relationship between personal religiousness and substance abuse treatment outcomes has emerged as an important issue in the public health arena. Using the “moral community” perspective, a conceptual framework developed by Stark, Kent, and Doyle (1982) to analyze the contextual effects of religion, we explore the degree to which religion influences two drug treatment outcome measures—critical retention and commitment to treatment. The data are derived from the Drug Abuse Treatment Outcome Studies (DATOS), a national study of 10,010 clients enrolled in 70 drug treatment programs. Three research questions were addressed: (1) What is the relationship between an individual's level of religiosity and retention in treatment and commitment to treatment? (2) How does the ecological context of treatment programs shape the individual‐level relationships? (3) To what extent are program practices and characteristics directly linked to outcome level? The findings are supportive of the literature that shows a weak to moderate relationship between religiosity and treatment outcomes. However, the findings did not show strong support for the “moral community” hypothesis. Although there was a wide variation in the size of the individual‐level religiosity–treatment correlations, the variation could not be conclusively attributed to the overall religious emphasis of the programs. The findings suggest that further research is needed in order to understand fully the role of religion in substance abuse treatment.     

Conflicting Intuitions about Causality1

In this article I examine five kinds of conflicting intuitions about the nature of causality. The viewpoint is that of a probabilistic theory of causality, which I think is the right general framework for examining causal questions. It is not the purpose of this article to defend the general thesis in any depth but many of the particular points I make are meant to offer new lines of defense of such a probabilistic theory. To provide a conceptual framework for the analysis, I review briefly the more systematic aspects of the sort of probabilistic theory of causality I advocate. I first define the three notions of prima facie cause, spurious cause, and genuine cause. The technical details are worked out in an earlier monograph (Suppes 1970) and are not repeated.     

WHY IS THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY WORTH OUR STUDY?

Abstract: Assume for the sake of argument that doing philosophy is intrinsically valuable, where “doing philosophy” refers to the practice of forging arguments for and against the truth of theses in the domains of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and so on. The practice of the history of philosophy is devoted instead to discovering arguments for and against the truth of “authorial” propositions, that is, propositions that state the belief of some historical figure about a philosophical proposition. I explore arguments for thinking that doing history of philosophy is valuable—specifically, valuable in such a way that its value does not reduce to the value of doing philosophy. Most such arguments proffered by historians of philosophy fail, as I show. I then offer a proposal about what makes doing history of philosophy uniquely valuable, but it is one that many historians will not find agreeable.