Emotions, Retribution, and Punishment

I examine emotional reactions to wrongdoing to determine whether they offer support for retributivism. It is often thought that victims desire to see their victimizer suffer and that this reaction offers support for retributivism. After rejecting several attempts to use different theories of emotion and different approaches to using emotions to justify retributivism, I find that, assuming a cognitive theory of emotion is correct, emotions can be used as heuristic guides much as suggested by Michael Moore. Applying this method to the actual emotional reactions of victims' relatives, however, does not find support for retributivism. Instead, it suggests punishment should be understood as part of a process of recovery with a complex set of demands. Retributive concerns can play a role in the process, but they don't have the priority that retributivism requires.     

Ryle on Knowing How and the Possibility of Vocational Education

abstract   Ryle's claim that knowing how is distinct from knowing that is defended from critics like Stanley and Williamson and Snowdon. However, the way in which Ryle himself deploys this distinction is problematic. By effectively dismissing the idea that systematic propositional knowledge has a significant bearing on knowledge how, Ryle implicitly supports a view of vocational education that favours narrow notions of skill and associated training over knowledge informed occupational practice of the kind found in most Northern European countries. The source of Ryle's error in excluding systematic propositional knowledge from a significant place in the constitution of knowing how is traced. It is argued that Ryle's original distinction survives without the exclusion of systematic propositional knowledge from knowing how and the resulting account does more justice to the practice of vocational education in advanced economies than does Ryle's original treatment.     

Species Inegalitarianism as a Matter of Principle

Most critics of species egalitarianism point to its counter-intuitive implications in particular cases. But this argumentative strategy is vulnerable to the response that our intuitions should give way in the face of arguments showing that species egalitarianism is required by our deepest, most fundamental moral principles. In this article, I develop an argument against deontological versions of species egalitarianism on its own terms. Appealing to the fundamental moral ideal of proportionality, I show that deontological species egalitarianism is morally objectionable as a matter of principle: it is committed to treating two individuals who are extraordinarily similar in morally relevant respects drastically differently. I then illustrate how an inegalitarian account of moral standing might be incorporated into traditional moral theories in ways that make them far more promising as theories of our obligations to the non-human world.     

It's my partner,deal with it: Rejection sensitivity,normative beliefs,and commitment

Past research has shown that normative beliefs, or perceptions of (dis)approval from social network members regarding one's romance, significantly predict relationship commitment. We investigated sensitivity to rejection as a moderator of the normative beliefs–commitment association. We tested and found support for the moderating effect of rejection sensitivity (RS; Study 1) and sensitivity specific to rejection of one's current romantic partner (Study 2) on the normative beliefs–commitment link. The link was significantly stronger for people with lower levels of RS: People who were less sensitive to rejection indicated lower levels of commitment when they perceived less network approval for their relationship. In contrast, people with higher levels of RS indicated higher levels of commitment in the face of less perceived network approval.     

Getting over you: Contributions of attachment theory for postbreakup emotional adjustment

This study used an attachment theoretical framework to identify factors that contribute to postbreakup emotional adjustment. Individuals who recently experienced a breakup were examined twice over a 1‐month period. Greater desire to utilize an ex‐partner as an attachment figure predicted less emotional adjustment. Higher levels of attachment anxiety were associated with less emotional adjustment immediately after the breakup. People who reflected more about the breakup exhibited less emotional adjustment immediately after the breakup compared to people who reflected less, and also less emotional adjustment over the ensuing month if they also reported more attachment anxiety. The article highlights the importance of normative attachment processes, in addition to attachment orientations and coping strategies, for understanding postbreakup adjustment.     

OUR CONSTRUCTIONS OF TRAUMA: A DIALECTICAL PERSPECTIVE

The field of mental health has been confronted by issues of psychological trauma since its inception. Throughout its history there have been a host of oscillating and conflicting views on the reality and consequences of many types of psychological trauma. A dialectical stance provides a useful framework with which to consider and work with these contradicting views. Such a stance enables a focus on the total context in which professional narratives of trauma are formed and looks for useful elements from both sides of the debates about trauma. In this article, dialectical thought is applied to professional narratives regarding the prevalence, responsibility, consequences, and treatment of trauma.     

Unifying the Intellectual Virtues

The intellectual virtues include two seemingly quite different types of traits: reliable faculties on the one hand and inquiry‐regulating traits of intellectual character like conscientiousness and openmindedness on the other. Extant virtue theories do not appear to have provided a single account that adequately covers both types of virtue. In this paper, I examine the different ways in which a trait or disposition can contribute to our cognitive goal of acquiring significant true beliefs. I propose that the two types of virtues can be understood as contributing in different ways to our cognitive goal, and develop a general framework for understanding their value.     

WE (SOMETIMES) KNOW NOT HOW WE FEEL: PREDICTING JOB PERFORMANCE WITH AN IMPLICIT MEASURE OF TRAIT AFFECTIVITY

In this study we examined relationships between trait affectivity and work performance. However, because trait affectivity is believed to operate primarily outside awareness, we assessed it using techniques designed to measure content at explicit  and  implicit levels. Although results were consistent across the explicit and implicit measures (i.e., positive affectivity was positively related to task performance and citizenship behavior, whereas negative affectivity was negatively related to task performance and positively related to counterproductive behavior), the implicit measure predicted greater proportions of variance in supervisor-rated criteria and did so incremental to the explicit measure. We discuss the implications of these results for theory and practice, and highlight the potential usefulness of implicit measures for applied research.