INCREASING THE ACCURACY OF CORRECTIONS FOR RANGE RESTRICTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR SELECTION PROCEDURE VALIDITIES AND OTHER RESEARCH RESULTS

The common practice in meta-analyses and in individual studies of correcting for direct range restriction even though range restriction is actually indirect has long been known to lead to undercorrection, but this error has been assumed to be small. Using validity generalization data sets for 4 jobs, this study calibrated this error by comparing meta-analysis results based on corrections for direct range restriction with the more accurate results from a recently developed method of correcting for indirect range restriction. It was found that, on average, correction for direct range restriction resulted in substantial underestimation of operational validities for both job performance measures (21%) and training performance measures (28%). In addition, 90% credibility values were on average underestimated by 38%–40%. In addition to the implications for personnel selection, these findings suggest that similar underestimation of important relationships has occurred in other areas of research, with potential implications for theory development.     

Utility, Subjectivism and Moral Ontology

The paper seeks to show that underlying Bentham's concept of utility is a commitment to a criterion or principle of moral status distinguishing morally relevant beings from the morally irrelevant. Further, that the notion of moral status is ultimately inconsistent with Bentham's utility; that it implies something like a Kantian ethic barring the use of morally relevant beings as mere means to some other's satisfaction, an ethic which suitably interpreted may be more useful in defence of some concerns for which Bentham has traditionally been cited, animal rights for example. The paper concludes by noting the history and politics of moral status and argues that the concept involves a fusion of fact and value, the empirical and the evaluative, undermining assumptions of a rigid separation of the two and the consequent essential subjectivity of the latter.     

Do we look happy? Perceptions of romantic relationship quality on Facebook

Does the information that people share about their romantic relationships on Facebook influence how other people perceive their relationship quality? Across 2 studies, people's accuracy at inferring others' relationship quality based on their Facebook profiles and how Facebook profiles influenced others' judgments of people's relationship quality and likability were investigated. Perceived relationship quality corresponded to self‐reported relationship quality (Study 1), and people with more visible relationships were perceived as having greater relationship satisfaction and commitment (Studies 1 and 2) and being more likable (Study 2). High disclosure about the relationship predicted greater perceived relationship quality but lower likability (Study 2). These findings illuminate how sharing information about one's relationship influences other people's impressions of the individual and the relationship.     

Aesthetics Makes Nothing Happen? The Role of Aesthetic Properties in the Constitution of Non‐aesthetic Value

The relationship between aesthetic value and other moral and cognitive values has been a key theme within contemporary aesthetic discussion. In this article, I explore once again the implications of this relationship, but from what I think might be a different angle. With few exceptions, notably Dominic Lopes, most of the contributions to this issue have dealt with the impact that moral or cognitive values could possibly have on the overall aesthetic value of a work of art. In this article, I explore instead how aesthetic properties or merits could play a role in explaining moral and cognitive properties. To do so, I first offer some examples that I think may reasonably exemplify the phenomenon we are considering. Second, I argue that a proper account of interactionism should meet at least two constraints: the relevance constraint and the autonomy constraint. Finally, I try to clarify how it is possible that aesthetic properties substantially contribute to other values by appealing to the notions of expression and the affective character of aesthetic properties.