Why are Women More Religious than Men? Do Risk Preferences and Genetic Risk Predispositions Explain the Gender Gap?

Risk preference theory argues that the gender gap in religiosity is caused by greater female risk aversion. Although widely debated, risk preference theory has been inadequately tested. Our study tests the theory directly with phenotypic and genetic risk preferences in three dimensions—general, impulsive, and sensation-seeking risk. Moreover, we examine whether the effects of different dimensions of risk preferences on the gender gap vary across different dimensions of religiosity. We find that general and impulsive risk preferences do not explain gender differences in religiosity, whereas sensation-seeking risk preference makes the gender gap in self-assessed religiousness and church attendance insignificant, but not belief in God, prayer, or importance of religion. Genetic risk preferences do not remove any of the gender gaps in religiosity, suggesting that the causal order is not from risk preference to religiosity. Evidence suggests that risk preferences are not a strong predictor for gender differences in religiosity.     

AN EXAMINATION OF THREE MODELS OF TELEVISION VIEWING AND AGGRESSION1

Three general models of the relationship between television viewing and aggressiveness are described: the Facilitation Model, featuring learning or legitimization of aggression from television violence; the Catharsis Model, or the reduction of innate aggressive drives through vicarious participation in television violence; and the Arousal Model, which considers television programming as an agent of arousal, generating a drive toward activity, with the nature of the activity determined by situational factors. The Arousal Model is further discriminated into an Emotional Arousal Model, in which the agent of arousal is emotional reaction to violent content, and the Form Arousal Model, in which arousal is a result of the cognitive effort involved in decoding programming. The Facilitation, Catharsis, and Form Arousal Models are contrasted on a sample of 597 adolescents. The results indicate independent Facilitation and Form Arousal processes occur. A rather startling result is the finding that levels of aggressiveness can be predicted as well by examining only the form of programming as they can by examining only the violent content. Age and sex differences are associated with different strengths of Facilitation and/or Form Arousal effects, indicating possible socialization or maturation processes affecting the response of adolescents to programming.     

COMMONALITY ANALYSIS: A METHOD FOR DECOMPOSING EXPLAINED VARIANCE IN MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSES

Commonality analysis is a procedure for decomposing R² in multiple regression analyses into the percent of variance in the dependent variable associated with each independent variable uniquely, and the proportion of explained variance associated with the common effects of predictors. Commonality analysis thus sheds additional light on the magnitude of an obtained multivariate relationship by identifying the relative importance of all independent variables, findings which can be of theoretical and practical significance. In this paper we offer a brief explication of commonality analysis; a step-by-step discussion of how communication researchers may perform commonality analyses using output from computer-assisted statistical analysis programs like SPSS; and we provide an extended example illustrating a commonality analysis.     

COMMUNICATION AS AN INTENTIONAL,SOCIAL SYSTEM

The argument is presented that taking communication as intentional and as a social system is necessary although not sufficient for defining the concept of communication for scholarly and research purposes. To illustrate the tendency and the error of ignoring the sociality of communication the notion of “intrapersonal communication” is examined. It is contended that many authors reject “intention” as a defining attribute of communication as a result of a strong tendency toward seeing the concept only in a defective form, represented as “speaker's purpose” and that the sense of “intention” needs to be grounded in a prior notion of “intentionality.”     

Market Equality and Social Freedom

ABSTRACT Conflicts between the good of each and the good of all are often presented in terms of freedom versus equality, with liberals pulled one way by libertarians and the other by social democrats. When we distinguish between negative and positive notions not only of freedom but also of equality, the liberal freedom 'to pursue our own good in our own way'is a positive freedom involving a negative idea of equality (or 'equity'). Yet 'equity'is not strong enough to deal with the problem of public goods. Trust is a public good, essential if markets are to work and dependable only where there is a moral commitment to a positive basic equality among citizens.