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901.
Abstract  Libertarian justice arguably permits much that is harsh. It might plausibly be thought to generate only minimal obligations on the part of present people toward future generations. This turns out not to be so, at least on Nozick's version of libertarian justice, which is among the most thoroughly worked-out versions. Nozickian justice generates extensive obligations to future people. This provides an indirect argument for environmentalist policies such as resource conservation and wilderness preservation. The basis for these obligations is Nozick's use of Locke's proviso, which is spelled out using the notion of the baseline. This paper explains how the extensive obligations are implied by the core ideas of Nozickian justice. There is also a discussion of some of the difficulties involved in understanding the notion of the baseline. However, these difficulties do not destroy the theoretical basis for obligations to future generations contained within Nozickian justice. Provided that libertarian justice involves some such device as Locke's proviso the enforcement of substantial environmentalist policies comes within the ambit of the libertarian minimal state.  相似文献   
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ABSTRACT In his book, A Theory of Justice , John Rawls argues against the inclusion of non-human animals within the scope of the principles of justice developed therein. However, the reasons Rawls, and certain commentators, have advanced in support of this view do not adequately support it. Against Rawls' view that 'we are not required to give strict justice' to creatures lacking the capacity for a sense of justice, it is initially argued that (i) de facto inclusion should be accorded non-human animals since their exclusion strains just institutions, and (ii) Rawls' account of the sense of justice has implicit and undefended human chauvinist elements. Two further counter-arguments are then developed in more detail. First, the suggestion that some non-human animals do have a capacity for a sense of justice is explored. Second, the suggestion that the capacity for a sense of justice is unrealised in so many human beings that Rawls' basis for marking out a special place for them is undermined is explored. Attention is next given to Rawls' characterisation of the participants in the original position. It is claimed that there are no good reasons for disallowing the possibility that these individuals turn out to be non-human animals in the real world. If sound, this claim brings non-human animals directly within the scope of Rawlsian principles of justice. The claim is defended against three objections.  相似文献   
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Corrections are made to a statement by Sjöberg (1977) concerning the compatibility of results obtained by him and by Gregson (1976).  相似文献   
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The occurrence of body-focused (self-touching) and object-focused (“free”) movements was investigated in a semi-structured interview involving two communicative tasks—person-oriented and non-person-oriented and two types of encoders (field-dependent and field-independent). Person-oriented information was accompanied by more continuous body touching movements (p < .001) and nonrepresentational (speech primacy) movements (p < .01). Representational (motor primacy) movements were more prevalent during the communication of non-person-oriented information (p < .001). Overall, field-dependent encoders produced more continuous body touching movements than field-independents (p < .05). It is proposed that body-focused movement is a reflection of the degree of uncertainty involved in generating information as a function of, among other factors, the type of information, the psychological differentiation of the encoder (field dependence) and the psychosocial uncertainty of the communicative setting. Object-focused movements seem to occur in relation to the type of information and listener availability.  相似文献   
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