全文获取类型
收费全文 | 789篇 |
免费 | 14篇 |
出版年
2015年 | 6篇 |
2013年 | 13篇 |
2012年 | 6篇 |
2011年 | 14篇 |
2010年 | 10篇 |
2009年 | 11篇 |
2008年 | 19篇 |
2007年 | 24篇 |
2006年 | 10篇 |
2005年 | 9篇 |
2004年 | 7篇 |
2003年 | 5篇 |
2002年 | 5篇 |
2001年 | 10篇 |
1999年 | 8篇 |
1998年 | 13篇 |
1997年 | 15篇 |
1996年 | 12篇 |
1995年 | 14篇 |
1994年 | 10篇 |
1993年 | 5篇 |
1992年 | 15篇 |
1991年 | 17篇 |
1990年 | 16篇 |
1989年 | 11篇 |
1988年 | 26篇 |
1987年 | 18篇 |
1986年 | 28篇 |
1985年 | 21篇 |
1984年 | 29篇 |
1983年 | 22篇 |
1982年 | 21篇 |
1981年 | 41篇 |
1980年 | 15篇 |
1979年 | 22篇 |
1978年 | 17篇 |
1977年 | 16篇 |
1976年 | 22篇 |
1975年 | 20篇 |
1974年 | 23篇 |
1973年 | 18篇 |
1972年 | 22篇 |
1971年 | 15篇 |
1970年 | 16篇 |
1969年 | 15篇 |
1968年 | 5篇 |
1967年 | 11篇 |
1966年 | 12篇 |
1963年 | 5篇 |
1955年 | 6篇 |
排序方式: 共有803条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
731.
732.
733.
734.
735.
736.
ROBERT K. FULLINWIDER 《Journal of applied philosophy》2005,22(2):105-120
abstract The term ‘moralism’ is often used to pick out a set of vices in judgment, such as hypocrisy, officiousness, arrogance, presumption, and sanctimony. I relate these vices to notions of standing and office and the roles they play in proper moral judgment. Behind these notions, I suggest, lie broad moral injunctions to think generously of our fellows and sternly of ourselves. These injunctions are manifested in both serious discourse and popular opinion. Finally, I explore the possibility that the distinction I urge between moralism (the counterfeit) and morality (the genuine) can't ultimately be sustained, and conclude that the distinction stands. 相似文献
737.
ROBERT ELLIOT 《Journal of applied philosophy》1986,3(2):217-227
Abstract Libertarian justice arguably permits much that is harsh. It might plausibly be thought to generate only minimal obligations on the part of present people toward future generations. This turns out not to be so, at least on Nozick's version of libertarian justice, which is among the most thoroughly worked-out versions. Nozickian justice generates extensive obligations to future people. This provides an indirect argument for environmentalist policies such as resource conservation and wilderness preservation. The basis for these obligations is Nozick's use of Locke's proviso, which is spelled out using the notion of the baseline. This paper explains how the extensive obligations are implied by the core ideas of Nozickian justice. There is also a discussion of some of the difficulties involved in understanding the notion of the baseline. However, these difficulties do not destroy the theoretical basis for obligations to future generations contained within Nozickian justice. Provided that libertarian justice involves some such device as Locke's proviso the enforcement of substantial environmentalist policies comes within the ambit of the libertarian minimal state. 相似文献
738.
739.
ROBERT ELLIOT 《Journal of applied philosophy》1984,1(1):95-106
ABSTRACT In his book, A Theory of Justice , John Rawls argues against the inclusion of non-human animals within the scope of the principles of justice developed therein. However, the reasons Rawls, and certain commentators, have advanced in support of this view do not adequately support it. Against Rawls' view that 'we are not required to give strict justice' to creatures lacking the capacity for a sense of justice, it is initially argued that (i) de facto inclusion should be accorded non-human animals since their exclusion strains just institutions, and (ii) Rawls' account of the sense of justice has implicit and undefended human chauvinist elements. Two further counter-arguments are then developed in more detail. First, the suggestion that some non-human animals do have a capacity for a sense of justice is explored. Second, the suggestion that the capacity for a sense of justice is unrealised in so many human beings that Rawls' basis for marking out a special place for them is undermined is explored. Attention is next given to Rawls' characterisation of the participants in the original position. It is claimed that there are no good reasons for disallowing the possibility that these individuals turn out to be non-human animals in the real world. If sound, this claim brings non-human animals directly within the scope of Rawlsian principles of justice. The claim is defended against three objections. 相似文献
740.