Rawlsian Justice and non-Human Animals

ABSTRACT In his book, A Theory of Justice , John Rawls argues against the inclusion of non-human animals within the scope of the principles of justice developed therein. However, the reasons Rawls, and certain commentators, have advanced in support of this view do not adequately support it. Against Rawls' view that 'we are not required to give strict justice' to creatures lacking the capacity for a sense of justice, it is initially argued that (i) de facto inclusion should be accorded non-human animals since their exclusion strains just institutions, and (ii) Rawls' account of the sense of justice has implicit and undefended human chauvinist elements. Two further counter-arguments are then developed in more detail. First, the suggestion that some non-human animals do have a capacity for a sense of justice is explored. Second, the suggestion that the capacity for a sense of justice is unrealised in so many human beings that Rawls' basis for marking out a special place for them is undermined is explored. Attention is next given to Rawls' characterisation of the participants in the original position. It is claimed that there are no good reasons for disallowing the possibility that these individuals turn out to be non-human animals in the real world. If sound, this claim brings non-human animals directly within the scope of Rawlsian principles of justice. The claim is defended against three objections.     

Content and distance similarity models: a correction to Sjöberg

Corrections are made to a statement by Sjöberg (1977) concerning the compatibility of results obtained by him and by Gregson (1976).     

BODY MOVEMENT IN RELATION TO TYPE OF INFORMATION (PERSON- AND NONPERSON-ORIENTED) AND COGNITIVE STYLE (FIELD DEPENDENCE)1

The occurrence of body-focused (self-touching) and object-focused (“free”) movements was investigated in a semi-structured interview involving two communicative tasks—person-oriented and non-person-oriented and two types of encoders (field-dependent and field-independent). Person-oriented information was accompanied by more continuous body touching movements (p < .001) and nonrepresentational (speech primacy) movements (p < .01). Representational (motor primacy) movements were more prevalent during the communication of non-person-oriented information (p < .001). Overall, field-dependent encoders produced more continuous body touching movements than field-independents (p < .05). It is proposed that body-focused movement is a reflection of the degree of uncertainty involved in generating information as a function of, among other factors, the type of information, the psychological differentiation of the encoder (field dependence) and the psychosocial uncertainty of the communicative setting. Object-focused movements seem to occur in relation to the type of information and listener availability.     

READING WITH OTHERS: LEVINAS' ETHICS AND SCRIPTURAL REASONING

This essay explores different frameworks for learning, progressing from a relatively basic model of acquiring information through first linguistic models, and then through social interaction, leading to textual practices, and culminating with reading with others from other traditions. For this sequence there is a parallel one concerning kinds of reasoning (and the relevant sciences). But the essay focuses on providing the best account of ethical responsibility for each practice of learning: the greater the social complexity and the respect for otherness, the richer the account of the ethics of learning.