IMPROVING APPLICANTS' REACTIONS TO REJECTION LETTERS: AN APPLICATION OF FAIRNESS THEORY

Explanations in the context of employment rejection letters were studied from the perspective of fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998). In 2 scenario-based studies and 1 field experiment, Would Reducing explanations (i.e., explanations detailing qualifications of the individual who received the job), Should Reducing explanations (i.e., explanations of the appropriateness of the selection process), and Could Reducing explanations (i.e., explanations of external conditions that led to a hiring freeze) were systematically manipulated in communicating negative hiring decisions. Applicants' perceptions of fairness, recommendation intentions, and reapplication behavior were assessed. Results demonstrate strong support for the effectiveness of Would and Could Reducing explanations at reducing perceptions of unfairness and increasing recommendation intentions. In addition, applicants who received the Could Reducing explanation were more than twice as likely to reapply for a future position with the organization than those who received a standard rejection letter. A 3-way interaction among the 3 explanations suggests that 2 explanations may need to be combined in a rejection letter to generate the most positive effects. Findings are discussed from the perspective of fairness theory and practical implications are identified.     

The Principled Case for Employing Private Military and Security Companies in Interventions for Human Rights Purposes

The possibility of using private military and security companies to bolster the capacity to undertake intervention for human rights purposes (humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping) has been increasingly debated. The focus of such discussions has, however, largely been on practical issues and the contingent problems posed by private force. By contrast, this article considers the principled case for privatising humanitarian intervention. It focuses on two central issues. First, does outsourcing humanitarian intervention to private military and security companies pose some fundamental, deeper problems in this context, such as an abdication of a state's duties? Second, on the other hand, is there a case for preferring these firms to other, state‐based agents of humanitarian intervention? For instance, given a state's duties to their own military personnel, should the use of private military and security contractors be preferred to regular soldiers for humanitarian intervention?