Abstract versus concrete goals: personal striving level, physical illness, and psychological well-being.

This study examined the relation between personal striving level and psychological and physical well-being. Level refers to the degree of generality versus specificity of one's goal strivings. In 3 studies, 188 Ss generated lists of their personal strivings, which were then rated on specificity level. High-level striving was associated with more psychological distress, particularly depression. Low-level striving was related to higher levels of physical illness. Correlations between striving level and self-reported symptoms were generally not as strong as those between level and the more objective illness indicators. High-level strivings were seen as more difficult and requiring more effort than low-level strivings. Results are interpreted in terms of control theory, goal-setting theory, and the repressive personality style.     

Evidence for an error deadzone in compensatory tracking

Humans and monkeys show intermittent arm movements while tracking moving targets. This intermittency has been explained by postulating either a psychological refractory period after each movement and/or an error deadzone, an area surrounding the target within which movements are not initiated. We present a technique to detect and quantify the size of this deadzone, using a compensatory tracking paradigm that distinguishes it from a psychological refractory period. An artificial deadzone of variable size was added around a visual target displayed on a computer screen. While the subject was within this area, he received visual feedback that showed him to be directly on target. The presence of this artificial deadzone could affect tracking performance only if it exceeded the size of his intrinsic deadzone. Therefore, the size of artificial deadzone at which performance began to be affected revealed the size of the intrinsic deadzone. Measured at the subjects' eye, the deadzone was found to vary between 0.06 and 0.38 degrees, depending on the tracking task and viewing conditions; on the screen, this range was 1.3 mm to 3.3 mm. It increased with increasing speed of the target, with increasing viewing distance, and when the amplitude of the movement required was reduced. However, the deadzone size was not significantly correlated with the subjects' level of performance. We conclude that an intrinsic deadzone exists during compensatory tracking, and we suggest that its size is set by a cognitive process not simply related to the difficulty of the tracking task.     

Recovery of Locomotion in Monkeys With Spinal Cord Lesions

This study reanalyzes kinematically (via film) the pre- and postoperative locomotor behavior of 4 of the 10 monkeys with partial spinal cord lesions (T8) briefly described by Eidelberg, Walden, and Nguyen (1981). The behavior of the remaining 6 monkeys is qualitatively described. The analysis reveals that 5 of the animals initially exhibited unilateral hind limb stepping. Hind and forelimb cycle durations often differed postoperatively; the hind limbs commonly showed increased values, whereas forelimb cycle durations were reduced: ipsilateral interlimb phase values were usually inconsistent. A review of prior studies of primate spinal cord lesions indicates that sparing of the ventrolateral quadrant may not be essential for locomotor recovery (cf. Eidelberg, Walden, & Nguyen, 1981). Furthermore, this review as well as the kinematic analysis indicates that primates with very significant spinal lesions can stilI exhibit locomotor movements. Thus, although the primate's spinal cord seems less able than other mammals' to readily organize locomotor movements (Eidelberg, Walden, & Nguyen, 1981), the total absence of stepping in primates with completely transected cords is unexpected and warrants further research.     

Stimulus recognition and the mere exposure effect.

A meta-analysis of research on Zajonc's (1968) mere exposure effect indicated that stimuli perceived without awareness produce substantially larger exposure effects than do stimuli that are consciously perceived (Bornstein, 1989a). However, this finding has not been tested directly in the laboratory. Two experiments were conducted comparing the magnitude of the exposure effect produced by 5-ms (i.e., subliminal) stimuli and stimuli presented for longer durations (i.e., 500 ms). In both experiments, 5-ms stimuli produced significantly larger mere exposure effects than did 500-ms stimuli. These results were obtained for polygon (Experiment 1), Welsh figure (Experiment 2), and photograph stimuli (Experiments 1 and 2). Implications of these findings for theoretical models of the mere exposure effect are discussed.     

Affect, personality, and social activity.

These studies examined relations between social activity and state and trait measures of Positive and Negative Affect. In Study 1 Ss completed scales relevant to 3-factor models of personality and a weekly mood and social activity questionnaire for 13 weeks. In Study 2 Ss completed measures of the 5-factor model of personality and a daily mood and social activity survey for 6-7 weeks. In within- and between-Ss analyses, socializing correlated significantly with state measures of Positive Affect and with trait measures of Extraversion/Positive Emotionality. These relations were relatively general across various types of positive affect and social events; however, specific types of social events also were differentially related to affect. In contrast, social activity had no consistent association with measures of Negative Affect or the other personality dimensions. The results support a temperamental view of Extraversion.     

Future-event schemas and certainty about the future: automaticity in depressives' future-event predictions.

The proposition was tested that depressives make predictions about the future based on a pessimistic future-event schema. Participants varying in depression predicted whether positive and negative events would happen to them (or to an average person) in the future by pressing yes or no at a computer terminal as quickly as possible, either under a concurrent attentional load or under no such load. As hypothesized, depressives predicted more negative events and fewer positive events than did mild depressives or nondepressives and showed greater automaticity in their predictions. That is, the attentional load did not increase depressives' response latencies for either negative or positive events, even though it did so reliably for both mildly depressed and nondepressed individuals. Depressives may thus possess a highly developed future-event schema that operates efficiently in enabling future-event predictions.     

Why do people need self-esteem? Converging evidence that self-esteem serves an anxiety-buffering function.

Three studies were conducted to assess the proposition that self-esteem serves an anxiety-buffering function. In Study 1, it was hypothesized that raising self-esteem would reduce anxiety in response to vivid images of death. In support of this hypothesis, Ss who received positive personality feedback reported less anxiety in response to a video about death than did neutral feedback Ss. In Studies 2 and 3, it was hypothesized that increasing self-esteem would reduce anxiety among individuals anticipating painful shock. Consistent with this hypothesis, both success and positive personality feedback reduced Ss' physiological arousal in response to subsequent threat of shock. Thus, converging evidence of an anxiety-buffering function of self-esteem was obtained.     

Repression at encoding: discrete appraisals of emotional stimuli.

In previous research, the emotions associated with repressors' memorial representations were found to be more discrete than those associated with nonrepressors'. In each of the 3 experiments reported here, repressive discreteness was apparent in repressors' appraisals of emotional stimuli at the time they were encoded. In 1 experiment, Ss appraised individual facial expressions of emotion. Repressors judged the dominant emotions in these faces as no less intense than did nonrepressors, but they appraised the blend of nondominant emotions as less intense than did nonrepressors. In the remaining 2 experiments, Ss appraised crowds of emotional faces as well as crowds of geometric shapes. In both crowd experiments, the repressive discreteness was evident in appraisals of crowds of emotional faces but not in appraisals of crowds of geometric shapes. The repressive discreteness effect did not appear to reflect a general repressor-nonrepressor difference in the appraisal of stimulus features. Rather, the results suggested that repressive discreteness may be constrained to appraisals of emotions.     

Does memory contaminate test-retest reliability?

The Wonderlic Personnel Test (1983) was administered twice over a 3-week period under conditions in which the activity of the second test was experimentally manipulated. Data from 302 undergraduates were analyzed. The standard test-retest reliability coefficient, .872, was not significantly different from the coefficients obtained from three other groups that, on the second test, were each given specific instructions: (a) to reason out the answers (pure reassess condition); (b) to use reasoning, memory of their initial responses, or both (reassess and memory); or (c) to take an alternate form of the test (parallel). However, the standard test-retest reliability coefficient was higher, p less than .10, than the coefficient obtained from a condition (pure memory) in which subjects were instructed to duplicate their previous responses, using only memory. Although the subjects in the test-retest and combined reassess and memory conditions reported recalling previous answers for 20-25% of the items on the second test, it was concluded that conscious repetition of specific responses did not seriously inflate the estimate of test-retest reliability.     

Mothers with hostile, Type A predisposing child-rearing practices.

The authors examined characteristics of Finnish mothers (N = 924) who use hostile child-rearing practices (i.e., they ignore the child, are punitive and irritable, and perceive the child as a burden), practices that have been shown (R?ikk?nen & Keltikangas-J?rvinen, 1992) to predispose children to Type A behavior. The results of this study indicate that two factors--Type A behavior in the mothers and the mothers' sociodemographic background (low occupational status, low educational level and young age)--increase the probability of the mothers' treating their children in a hostile manner. Also, the mothers of boys in this study reported more hostile child-rearing practices than the mothers of girls did.