The Effects of Dysphoria and Personality on Negative Self-Referent Attitudes and Perceptions of the Attitudes of Others

The cognitive model of depression posits that depressed individuals harbor more dysfunctional self-referent attitudes, but little is known about how depressed individuals perceive the attitudes and perceptions of others in their social arena. This study examined whether dysphoric individuals perceive others to hold equally negative attitudes about themselves, and whether such perceptions depend on sociotropic (i.e., highly invested in social approval and relationship success) and autonomous (i.e., highly invested in vocational or academic achievement and goal attainment) personality styles. A sample of undergraduate students (N = 197) was recruited, and after the assessment of their depression symptoms and personality style, participants read vignettes that described negative scenarios, and imagined that these scenarios occurred to themselves or the general university student. After reading each vignette, participants also rated their agreement with a number of statements that assessed dysfunctional attitudes. Results indicated that elevated dysphoria (i.e., showing signs of depression) scores were positively associated with dysfunctional self-referent attitudes. Further, moderational analyses examining the interaction of sociotropy and dysphoria did not support the hypothesis that individuals higher on dysphoria and sociotropy were less likely to perceive others as harboring negative attitudes about themselves in comparison to those with elevated dysphoria and lower levels of sociotropy. Last, individuals showing elevated dysphoria and higher scores on subdomains of autonomy were more likely to perceive others as exhibiting negative attitudes about themselves than those with low levels of the trait. These findings, their implications, and strengths and limitations of the current investigation are further discussed.     

Emotivism and Deflationary Truth

The paper investigates different ways to understand the claim that non–cognitivists theories of morality are incoherent. According to the claim, this is so because, on one theory of truth, non–cognitivists are not able to deny objective truth to moral judgments without taking a substantive normative position. I argue that emotivism is not self–defeating in this way. The charge of incoherence actually only amounts to a claim that emotivism is incompatible with deflationary truth, but this claim is based upon a mistake. It relies upon a problematic understanding of both emotivism and the deflationary theory of truth.     

Ideological belief bias with political syllogisms

Abstract

The belief bias in reasoning occurs when individuals are more willing to accept conclusions that are consistent with their beliefs than conclusions that are inconsistent. The present study examined a belief bias in syllogisms containing political content. In two experiments, participants judged whether conclusions were valid, completed political ideology measures, and completed a cognitive reflection test. The conclusions varied in validity and in their political ideology (conservative or liberal). Participants were sensitive to syllogisms’ validity and conservatism. Overall, they showed a liberal bias, accepting more liberal than conservative conclusions. Furthermore, conservative participants accepted more conservative conclusions than liberal conclusions, whereas liberal participants showed the opposite pattern. Cognitive reflection did not magnify this effect as predicted by a motivated system 2 reasoning account of motivated ideological reasoning. These results suggest that people with different ideologies may accept different conclusions from the same evidence.