The rate of “mental rotation” of images: A test of a holistic analogue hypothesis

This paper discusses the analogue-propositional distinction and argues that, given an appropriate understanding of this issue, the question of whether a particular cognitive function is analogue or not is an empirical one. As an example of how the question can be empirically investigated, the proposed analogue operation for mental rotation of images is considered. It is argued that the view that images are rotated in a holistic analogue manner should predict that rotation rate is independent of such factors as the conceptual complexity of the stimulus or of the comparison task. Two experiments are described that investigated the effects of several stimulus and task variables on the apparent rate of “mental rotation” of images in a Shepard-type task. Instead of comparing a stimulus and misoriented probe figure to determine whether they are identical (except for orientation) or mirror images, as was the case in most of previous studies, the present experiments required subjects to judge whether the misoriented probe was a subfigure of the target stimulus. The results showed that the “rotation rate” (i.e., the slope of the RT vs. angle of misorientation function) was influenced by practice, stimulus attributes, and the nature of the comparison task. In particular, when the probe was a “good” subfigure of the reference stimulus, apparent rotation rate was greater. These results are interpreted as indicating that the linear RT vs. angle relation is not due to a holistic analogue rotation of images, as had been supposed, but arises from a more articulated and piecemeal process in which analysis of the stimulus figure interacts with the comparison task.     

Some primitive mechanisms of spatial attention

Our approach to studying the architecture of mind has been to look for certain extremely simple mechanisms which we have good reason to suspect must exist, and to confirm these empirically. We have been concerned primarily with certain low-level mechanisms in vision which allow the visual system to simultaneously index items at multiple spatial locations, and have developed a provisional model (called the FINST model) of these mechanisms. Among the studies we have carried out to support these ideas are ones showing that subjects can track multiple independent moving targets in a field of identical distractors, and that their ability to track these targets and detect changes occuring on them does not generalize to non-targets or to items lying inside the convex polygon that they form (so that a zoom lens of attention does not fit the data). We have used a visual search paradigm to show that (serial or parallel) search can be confined to a subset of indexed items and the layout of these items is of little importance. We have also carried out a large number of studies on the phenomenon known as subitizing and have shown that subitizing occurs only when items can be preattentively individuated and in those cases location precuing has little effect, compared with when counting occurs, which suggests that subitizing may be carried out by counting active indexes rather than items in the visual field. And finally we have run studies showing that a certain motion effect which is sensitive to attention can occur at multiple precued loci. We believe that taken as a whole the evidence is most parsimoniously accounted for in terms of the hypothesis that there is an early preattentive stage in vision where a small number of salient items in the visual field are indexed and thereby made readily accessible for a variety of visual tasks.     

Evidence against a speed limit in multiple-object tracking

Everyday tasks often require us to keep track of multiple objects in dynamic scenes. Past studies show that tracking becomes more difficult as objects move faster. In the present study, we show that this trade-off may not be due to increased speed itself but may, instead, be due to the increased crowding that usually accompanies increases in speed. Here, we isolate changes in speed from variations in crowding, by projecting a tracking display either onto a small area at the center of a hemispheric projection dome or onto the entire dome. Use of the larger display increased retinal image size and object speed by a factor of 4 but did not increase interobject crowding. Results showed that tracking accuracy was equally good in the large-display condition, even when the objects traveled far into the visual periphery. Accuracy was also not reduced when we tested object speeds that limited performance in the small-display condition. These results, along with a reinterpretation of past studies, suggest that we might be able to track multiple moving objects as fast as we can a single moving object, once the effect of object crowding is eliminated.     

Mental imagery: in search of a theory

It is generally accepted that there is something special about reasoning by using mental images. The question of how it is special, however, has never been satisfactorily spelled out, despite more than thirty years of research in the post-behaviorist tradition. This article considers some of the general motivation for the assumption that entertaining mental images involves inspecting a picture-like object. It sets out a distinction between phenomena attributable to the nature of mind to what is called the cognitive architecture, and ones that are attributable to tacit knowledge used to simulate what would happen in a visual situation. With this distinction in mind, the paper then considers in detail the widely held assumption that in some important sense images are spatially displayed or are depictive, and that examining images uses the same mechanisms that are deployed in visual perception. I argue that the assumption of the spatial or depictive nature of images is only explanatory if taken literally, as a claim about how images are physically instantiated in the brain, and that the literal view fails for a number of empirical reasons--for example, because of the cognitive penetrability of the phenomena cited in its favor. Similarly, while it is arguably the case that imagery and vision involve some of the same mechanisms, this tells us very little about the nature of mental imagery and does not support claims about the pictorial nature of mental images. Finally, I consider whether recent neuroscience evidence clarifies the debate over the nature of mental images. I claim that when such questions as whether images are depictive or spatial are formulated more clearly, the evidence does not provide support for the picture-theory over a symbol-structure theory of mental imagery. Even if all the empirical claims were true, they do not warrant the conclusion that many people have drawn from them: that mental images are depictive or are displayed in some (possibly cortical) space. Such a conclusion is incompatible with what is known about how images function in thought. We are then left with the provisional counterintuitive conclusion that the available evidence does not support rejection of what I call the "null hypothesis"; namely, that reasoning with mental images involves the same form of representation and the same processes as that of reasoning in general, except that the content or subject matter of thoughts experienced as images includes information about how things would look.