Thoughts Associated with Unprotected Anal Intercourse Among Men at High Risk in San Francisco 1997-1999

Men who had high-risk sex with men in the previous year ( N = 124) were asked to recall their thought processes at the time they last had unprotected anal sex with a man who was HIV-positive or of unknown serostatus. Self-justifications for non-condom use were examined individually and in internally validated scales. The most common single self-justification was I want to have unprotected sex because it feels good , endorsed by 76%. Other common thoughts included the notion that it is only human to slip up occasionally (59%) and the resolution to withdraw before ejaculation (59%). For scaled items, the most strongly endorsed themes were: (1) that condoms reduce sexual pleasure (any of 6 items endorsed at least slightly by 90%); (2) fatalism or leaving it to chance (11 items, 81%); and (3) loss of control (9 items, 77%). The thoughts and themes identified may be useful in planning individual and community prevention messages.     

The Test of Variables of Attention (TOVA): Internal Consistency (Q1 vs. Q2 and Q3 vs. Q4) in Children with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)

The internal consistency of the Test of Variables of Attention (TOVA) was examined in a cohort of 6- to 12-year-old children (N = 63) strictly diagnosed with ADHD. The internal consistency of errors of omission (OMM), errors of commission (COM), response time (RT), and response time variability (RTV) of different test conditions (stimulus infrequent condition [Q₁ vs. Q₂] and stimulus frequent condition [Q₃ vs. Q₄]) was assessed via correlation analyses. All TOVA index scores under investigation assessing its internal consistency exhibited statistically significant correlations. All correlations fell in the moderate-high range.     

Whole-body posture planning in anticipation of a manual prehension task: Prospective and retrospective effects

This study examined the extent to which the anticipation of a manual action task influences whole-body postural planning and orientation. Our participants walked up to a drawer, opened the drawer, then grasped and moved an object in the drawer to another location in the same drawer. The starting placement of the object within the drawer and the final placement of the object in the drawer were varied across trials in either a blocked design (i.e., in trials where the same start and end location were repeated consecutively) or in a mixed fashion. Of primary interest was the posture adopted at the moment of grasping the drawer handle before pulling it out prior to the object manipulation task. Of secondary interest was whether there were sequential effects such that postures adopted in preceding trials influenced postures in subsequent trials. The results indicated that the spatial properties of the forthcoming object manipulation influenced both the postures adopted by the participants and the degree to which the drawer was opened, suggesting a prospective effect. In addition, the adopted postures were more consistent in blocked trials than in mixed trials, suggesting an additional retrospective effect. Overall, our findings suggest that motor planning occurs at the level of the whole body, and reflects both prospective and retrospective influences.     

Against the Compositional View of Facts

It is commonly assumed that facts would be complex entities made out of particulars and universals. This thesis, which I call Compositionalism, holds that parthood may be construed broadly enough so that the relation that holds between a fact and the entities it ‘ties’ together counts as a kind of parthood. I argue, first, that Compositionalism is incompatible with the possibility of certain kinds of fact and universal, and, second, that such facts and universals are possible. I conclude that Compositionalism is false. What all these kinds of fact and universal have in common is a violation of supplementation principles governing any relation that may be intelligibly regarded as a kind of parthood. Although my arguments apply to Compositionalism generally, I focus on recent work by David Armstrong, who is a prominent and explicit Compositionalist.     

Failure to Mentalize: Defect or Defense?

ABSTRACT

The author reviews current thinking on the phenomena of failure to mentalize and provides an alternative to the structural defect point of view. Also included are some clinical implications of this alternative viewpoint.     

Probabilities on Sentences in an Expressive Logic

Automated reasoning about uncertain knowledge has many applications. One difficulty when developing such systems is the lack of a completely satisfactory integration of logic and probability. We address this problem directly. Expressive languages like higher-order logic are ideally suited for representing and reasoning about structured knowledge. Uncertain knowledge can be modeled by using graded probabilities rather than binary truth values. The main technical problem studied in this paper is the following: Given a set of sentences, each having some probability of being true, what probability should be ascribed to other (query) sentences? A natural wish-list, among others, is that the probability distribution (i) is consistent with the knowledge base, (ii) allows for a consistent inference procedure and in particular (iii) reduces to deductive logic in the limit of probabilities being 0 and 1, (iv) allows (Bayesian) inductive reasoning and (v) learning in the limit and in particular (vi) allows confirmation of universally quantified hypotheses/sentences. We translate this wish-list into technical requirements for a prior probability and show that probabilities satisfying all our criteria exist. We also give explicit constructions and several general characterizations of probabilities that satisfy some or all of the criteria and various (counter)examples. We also derive necessary and sufficient conditions for extending beliefs about finitely many sentences to suitable probabilities over all sentences, and in particular least dogmatic or least biased ones. We conclude with a brief outlook on how the developed theory might be used and approximated in autonomous reasoning agents. Our theory is a step towards a globally consistent and empirically satisfactory unification of probability and logic.