Rationality ideals and mentality

Mackenzie, this journal, this issue, convincingly shows that in certain dialogue games (commitment games) there are procedural restrictions similar to those that I impose on rationality idealizations. But, whereas my rationality analysis is set in the context of belief games, commitment games do not postulate beliefs. Is this significant? I suggest that mackenzie thinks that it is. There follow discussions of Psychologism and Behaviourism.     

Long latency auditory evoked potentials

Experiment 1 elicited the P1, N1, P2, and N2 components of the long latency auditory evoked potential (AEP) using a 1000 Hz tone presented at 30, 50, or 70 dB SPL and 1-, 3-, or 5- second inter-stimulus intervals to assess the relative effects of the combination of these variables on component amplitude and latency. Four blocks of 16 tone presentations each were recorded from each subject to determine if changes in the AEP would occur because of short-term habituation. Both stimulus factors interacted significantly in a systematic fashion for the amplitude measures, with increases in latency also associated with increases in intensity and inter-stimulus interval. Only minor changes across the four trial blocks for either the amplitude or latency measures were observed over the various stimulus presentation conditions. Experiment 2 employed the same tone stimulus presented at 50 dB SPL and a 3-second inter-stimulus interval. Eight blocks of 64 trials were recorded from each subject on each day for four days to investigate long-term habituation effects. No substantial changes in any of the component amplitudes or latencies were obtained across the 32 trial blocks. It was concluded that intensity and inter-stimulus interval interact to determine AEP amplitude as well as latency values and that the constituent components do not change appreciably with repeated stimulus presentations, even after several days.     

Cognitive Biases in Playing the Lottery: Estimating the Odds and Choosing the Numbers

Three experiments were conducted to examine the operation of the representativeness and anchoring and adjustment heuristics in lottery play. Subjects in Experiments 1 and 2 indicated their chances of winning a lottery with an objective probability of 1 in 10. Consistent with the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, subjects (in both experiments) perceived their chances of winning to be greater when the lottery was based on a single event than when it was based on a disjunctive event. Subjects in these two experiments also selected numbers to play in a pick-3 (Experiment 1) or pick-4 (Experiment 2) lottery. Consistent with the representativeness heuristic, subjects in Experiment 2 demonstrated a preference for numbers without repeating digits. This also occurred in Experiment 3 wherein the numbers actually played in the Indiana daily Pick-3 lottery were examined.     

The Discrediting Effect in Eyewitness Testimony1

Loftus (1974) had subjects read summaries of criminal trials that contained the testimony of either credible or discredited prosecution eyewitnesses, and found no effect of discrediting an eyewitness. Instead, almost as many subjects voted guilty with a discredited eyewitness as with a credible eyewitness; this led Loftus to the conclusion that jurors tend to overbelieve eyewitness testimony. Loftus's conclusion was subsequently challenged by others who reported a strong discrediting effect. A series of three experiments using college students was conducted to explore the characteristics of trial summaries that might account for the discrepancy in results, such as inclusion of judicial instructions concerning proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or an eyewitness's reaffirmation of his testimony following discrediting. In all cases, a strong discrediting effect was found. Apparently the discrediting effect appears regardless of wide variation in content of trial summaries. The present data do not support the overbelief claim.     

Origins of fear of dogs in adults and children: the role of conditioning processes and prior familiarity with dogs.

One hundred adults and 30 children completed questionnaires to investigate fear of dogs. Dog fearful adults asked to recall the origins of their fear reported classical conditioning experiences more frequently than vicarious acquisition or informational transmission. Overall, however, there was no difference in the frequency of attacks reported by the fearful and non-fearful groups. Significantly more fearful than non-fearful adults reported little contact with dogs prior to the onset of their fear which suggests that early non-eventful exposure to dogs may prevent a conditioning event from producing a dog phobia. Most adults reported that their fear began in childhood, and dog fear were more frequently reported by children than by adults. In the aggregate, however, dog-fearful adults and children differed in several ways; children were more likely than adults to report having received warnings about dogs, but also to recognize the potential attractiveness of a friendly dog. Unlike dog-fearful children, dog-fearful adults reported many other fears in addition to their fear of dogs. A better understanding of fear of dogs in adults may depend on discovering why some dog-fearful children, but not others, apparently lose their fear of dogs as they become older.     

Revision algebra semantics for conditional logic

The properties of belief revision operators are known to have an informal semantics which relates them to the axioms of conditional logic. The purpose of this paper is to make this connection precise via the model theory of conditional logic. A semantics for conditional logic is presented, which is expressed in terms of algebraic models constructed ultimately out of revision operators. In addition, it is shown that each algebraic model determines both a revision operator and a logic, that are related by virtue of the stable Ramsey test.The author is grateful for a correction and several other valuable suggestions of two anonymous referees. This work was supported by the McDonnell Douglas Independent Research and Development program.     

Partial monotonicity and a new version of the Ramsey test

We introduce two new belief revision axioms: partial monotonicity and consequence correctness. We show that partial monotonicity is consistent with but independent of the full set of axioms for a Gärdenfors belief revision sytem. In contrast to the Gärdenfors inconsistency results for certain monotonicity principles, we use partial monotonicity to inform a consistent formalization of the Ramsey test within a belief revision system extended by a conditional operator. We take this to be a technical dissolution of the well-known Gärdenfors dilemma.In addition, we present the consequential correctness axiom as a new measure of minimal revision in terms of the deductive core of a proposition whose support we wish to excise. We survey several syntactic and semantic belief revision systems and evaluate them according to both the Gärdenfors axioms and our new axioms. Furthermore, our algebraic characterization of semantic revision systems provides a useful technical device for analysis and comparison, which we illustrate with several new proofs.Finally, we have a new inconsistency result, which is dual to the Gärdenfors inconsistency results. Any elementary belief revision system that is consequentially correct must violate the Gärdenfors axiom of strong boundedness (K^*8), which we characterize as yet another monotonicity condition.This work was supported by the McDonnell Douglas Independent Research and Development program.     

Sentence encoding and implicitly activated memories

Some words have fewer direct associates than others, and, when words varying in set size are studied in a list-learning task, those with smaller sets are more likely to be recalled. This set-size effect is found in cued recall when the words are studied in the absence of related words, but not when studied in the presence of related words. Related words provide context and theoretically inhibit irrelevant associates. The present research determined that set-size effects are found when words are encoded in sentence contexts. In contrast to list-learning experiments, the results of three experiments found such effects even when lexically related words were present in the sentences. Other findings indicated that target-set-size effects were determined by the proximity of related words in the sentence and the nature of the test cue. The results are discussed in relation to a model for explaining set-size effects and to selective findings from the sentence-comprehension literature.