Long-Term Follow-Up of a Randomized Controlled Trial Comparing Acceptance and Commitment Therapy and Standard Cognitive Behavior Therapy for Anxiety and Depression

The present study represents one of the first comparisons of the long-term effectiveness of traditional cognitive behavior therapy (i.e., Beckian cognitive therapy; CT) and acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT). One hundred thirty-two anxious or depressed outpatients were randomly assigned to receive either CT or ACT, and were assessed at posttreatment (n = 90) and at 1.5-year (n = 91) follow-up. As previously reported, the two treatments were equivalently effective at posttreatment according to measures of depression, anxiety, overall (social/occupational/symptom-related) functioning, and quality of life. However, current results suggest that treatment gains were better maintained at follow-up in the CT condition. Clinical significance analyses revealed that, at follow-up, one-third more CT patients were in the clinically normative range in terms of depressive symptoms and more than twice as many CT patients were in the normative range in terms of functioning levels. The possible long-term advantage of CT relative to ACT in this population is discussed.     

Effects of anger, guilt, and envy on moral hypocrisy

In the current article the authors examined the impact of specific emotions on moral hypocrisy, the tendency among people to judge others more severely than they judge themselves. In two studies, they found that (a) anger increased moral hypocrisy, (b) guilt eliminated moral hypocrisy, and (c) envy reversed moral hypocrisy. In particular, these findings were observed in two domains. In Study 1, participants responded to moral dilemmas describing unethical behavior and rated how acceptable it would be if others engaged in the unethical behavior, or alternatively, if they themselves engaged in the unethical behavior. In Study 2, participants were asked how much they would like to donate to research on cancer, or alternatively, how much they think others should donate. The results demonstrate that specific emotions influence moral decision making, even when real money is at stake, and that emotions of the same valence have opposing effects on moral judgment.     

Self–other decision making and loss aversion

In eight studies, we tested the prediction that making choices for others involves less loss aversion than making choices for the self. We found that loss aversion is significantly lessened among people choosing for others in scenarios describing riskless choice (Study 1), gambling (Studies 2 and 3), and social aspects of life, such as likeably and status (Studies 4a–e). Moreover, we found this pattern in relatively realistic conditions where people are rewarded for making desirable (i.e., profitable) choices for others (Study 2), when the other for whom a choice is made is physically present (Study 3), and when real money is at stake (Studies 2 and 3). Finally, we found loss aversion is moderated when factors associated with self–other differences in decision making are taken into account, such as decision makers’ construal level (Study 4a), regulatory focus (Study 4b), degree of information seeking (Study 4c), omission bias (Study 4d), and power (Study 4e).     

Everyday Attention: Variation in Mind Wandering and Memory in a Lecture

Understanding the factors underlying variation in attentional state is critical in a number of domains. Here, we investigate the relation between time on task and mind wandering (i.e., a state of decoupled attention) in the context of a lecture. Lectures are the primary means of knowledge transmission in post secondary education rendering an understanding of attentional variations in lectures a pressing practical concern. We report two experiments wherein participants watched a video recorded lecture either alone (Experiment 1) or in a classroom context (Experiment 2). Participants responded to mind wandering probes at various times in the lecture in an effort to track variations in mind wandering over time. In addition, following the lecture, memory for the lecture material was tested. Results demonstrate that in a lecture mind wandering increases with time on task and memory for the lecture material decreases. In addition, there was a significant relation between mind wandering and memory for lecture material. Theoretical and practical applications of the present results are discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Training in clinical ethics: launching the clinical ethics immersion course at the Center for Ethics at the Washington Hospital Center

In May 2011, the clinical ethics group of the Center for Ethics at Washington Hospital Center launched a 40-hour, three and one-half day Clinical Ethics Immersion Course. Created to address gaps in training in the practice of clinical ethics, the course is for those who now practice clinical ethics and for those who teach bioethics but who do not, or who rarely, have the opportunity to be in a clinical setting. "Immersion" refers to a high-intensity clinical ethics experience in a busy, urban, acute care hospital. During the Immersion Course, participants join clinical ethicists on working rounds in intensive care units and trauma service. Participants engage in a videotaped role-play conversation with an actor. Each simulated session reflects a practical, realistic clinical ethics case consultation scenario. Participants also review patients' charts, and have small group discussions on selected clinical ethics topics. As ethics consultation requests come into the center, Immersion Course participants accompany clinical ethicists on consultations. Specific to this pilot, because participants' evaluations and course faculty impressions were positive, the Center for Ethics will conduct the course twice each year. We look forward to improving the pilot and establishing the Immersion Course as one step towards addressing the gap in training opportunities in clinical ethics.     

Affect-biased attention as emotion regulation

The affective biasing of attention is not typically considered to be a form of emotion regulation. In this article, we argue that 'affect-biased attention' - the predisposition to attend to certain categories of affectively salient stimuli over others - provides an important component of emotion regulation. Affect-biased attention regulates subsequent emotional responses by tuning one's filters for initial attention and subsequent processing. By reviewing parallel research in the fields of emotion regulation and affect-biased attention, as well as clinical and developmental research on individual differences in attentional biases, we provide convergent evidence that habitual affective filtering processes, tuned and re-tuned over development and situation, modulate emotional responses to the world. Moreover, they do so in a manner that is proactive rather than reactive.     

Temporal stability of behavioural intention as a moderator of intention–health behaviour relationships

Seven prospective studies of health behaviours containing eight prospective datasets testing the moderating role of intention stability on intention–behaviour and past behaviour–behaviour relationships were examined within the context of the Theory of Planned Behaviour. The measure of intention stability was based on lack of change in intentions between the two measurement time points. Across different behaviours, samples and time frames more stable intentions were associated with intentions at time 1 that were stronger predictors of behaviour at time 2. Intention stability did not consistently moderate the past behaviour–behaviour relationship. Across studies the frequency-weighted mean correlation between intentions and behaviour was substantially greater for stable (r ₊?=?0.60) compared to unstable (r ₊?=?0.27) intentions (Z _difference?=?6.65, p?<?0.001). The past behaviour–behaviour correlation was also stronger for stable (r ₊?=?0.50, p?<?0.001) compared to unstable (r₊ ?=?0.34, p?<?0.001) intentions (Z _difference?=?3.12, p?<?0.01). Perceived behavioural control was the variable most strongly related to stable intentions. Implications for understanding the role of health cognitions in the performance of health behaviour are discussed.     

Post-War Trauma and Reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Observations,Experiences, and Implications for Marriage and Family Therapy

The 1992-1995 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina caused much devastation in that region of the world. This article describes the themes and issues that emerged from information gained from interviews with Bosnian professionals through a project entitled “Trauma and Reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” funded by the National Research Council. The current issues facing Bosnia include complex trauma-related and post-war issues, lack of coordination in professional services, limited outcome research and program evaluation, and the need for services for children and families. Recommendations and implications for marriage and family therapy are included.

     

Valence and the development of immediate and long-term false memory illusions

Across five experiments we examined the role of valence in children's and adults’ true and false memories. Using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm and either neutral or negative-emotional lists, both adults’ (Experiment 1) and children's (Experiment 2) true recall and recognition was better for neutral than negative items, and although false recall was also higher for neutral items, false recognition was higher for negative items. The last three experiments examined adults’ (Experiment 3) and children's (Experiments 4 and 5) 1-week long-term recognition of neutral and negative-emotional information. The results replicated the immediate recall and recognition findings from the first two experiments. More important, these experiments showed that although true recognition decreased over the 1-week interval, false recognition of neutral items remained unchanged whereas false recognition of negative-emotional items increased. These findings are discussed in terms of theories of emotion and memory as well as their forensic implications.     

Reasonable Trust

Abstract: Establishing trust among individual agents has defined a central issue of practical reasoning since the dawning of liberal individualism. Hobbes was convinced that foolish self‐interest always threatens to defeat uncompelled cooperation when one can gain by abandoning a joint effort. Against this philosophical background, scientific studies of human beings display a surprisingly cooperative species. It would seem to follow that biologically inherited characteristics impair our reason. The response proposed here distinguishes rationality and reasonableness as two forms of good reasoning. One is consistent with the model of strategic rationality, the other with a model of emotional relationship. From the Hobbesian perspective trusting agents are not rational if their makeup discourages advantageous defection even when one knows it will not be detected or punished. The point is indecisive because reasonable trust insulates cooperative action from the factors that have appeared to make it chancy or unstable without some enforcing power. A critical theme is that trust does not simply rest upon a biological disposition to conform to norms. That would explain but not justify aversion to defection. In fact, trust can survive reasoned challenges to norm‐conforming dispositions, displaying the responsible social animal living along with the rational individual.