Children's Preferences for Humanized versus Natural Animals

Summary

Children's responsiveness to animal drawings led to the theory that they identify more closely with animals than with humans. Werner's (1948) theory suggests, however, that children may identify equally with humans or animals until they become aware that animals are not appropriately personalized. To determine the development of emotional responses to personalized animals, a matched-pair set of drawings (each set comparing a natural versus a humanized animal) were administered to 377 children, aged 6 to 12. Preferences elicited resulted in random distributions of scores from age 6 through age 9. At age 10 (and after) a “J” curve distribution of scores developed. From the age of 10, a majority of children preferred the natural animals while a few dissidents preferred the humanized animals.     

RACISM: BEING IDEAL

‘Race’ is both an empty category and one of the most destructive and powerful forms of social categorization. How is this paradox to be explained and how are its negative consequences for human lives to be resisted? (Rustin 1991 Rustin, M. 1991. “Psychoanalysis, racism and anti‐racism.”. In The Good Society and the Inner World, London: Verso.  [Google Scholar] : 57).

Psychoanalysis is limited in what it can say about social categories. It can say something in general about the process of categorizing. Categorizing is a ubiquitous process, which is both a powerful tool for civilization and also one of the most destructive forces of oppression. The way social categories are used is a social phenomenon. However, in considering race as one example of these destructive forms of stereotyping, I shall argue that the organization of the individual mind is a basis on which the organization of social categories necessarily depends. I shall detail the model of racism which Freud hinted at, and then use racism as one example of the destructive and narcissistic form of stereotyping.     

Disequilibrium in the mind,disharmony in the body

Although it is generally acknowledged that experiences of frustration, confusion, and anxiety are embodied phenomena, very little is known about how these processes modulate presumably unconscious, but constantly present, subtle bodily movement. We addressed this problem by tracking the low-level dynamics of body movement, using 1/f noise, pink noise, or “fractal scaling”, during naturalistic experiences of affect in two studies involving deep learning and effortful problem-solving. Our results indicate that body movement fluctuations of individuals experiencing cognitive equilibrium was characteristic of correlated pink noise, but there was a whitening of the signal when participants experienced states that are diagnostic of cognitive distress such as anxiety, confusion, and frustration. We orient our findings within theories that emphasise the embodied nature of cognition and affect and with perspectives that view affective and cognitive processes as emergent products of a self-organising dynamical system (the brain) that is inextricably coupled to the body.     

The clinical revolution of the ‘wise baby’

In an historical context focused on a close examination of the complex relationship between Freud and Ferenczi, the author shows Ferenczi's contribution to the evolution of psychoanalysis. He describes how his ideas and his therapeutic sensitivity anticipated modern clinical thought (for example, Winnicott and Bion), especially the understanding of borderline and narcissistic pathology. The paper considers the following topics: transference and countertransference; early affectivity; the different psychic trauma; phenomena connected with dissociation; the healing factor of the analysis.     

Preferences,Welfare, and the Status-Quo Bias

Preferences play a role in well-being that is difficult to escape, but whatever authority one grants to preferences, their malleability seems to cause problems for any theory of well-being that employs them. Most importantly, preferences appear to display a status-quo bias: people come to prefer what they are likely rather than unlikely to get. I try to do two things here. The first is to provide a more precise characterization of the status-quo bias, how it functions, and how it infects commonly accepted theories of well-being. The second is to give an alternative characterization of an agent's preferences that succeeds in avoiding the status-quo bias.