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We evaluated the effects of three different methods of denying access to requested high-preference activities on escalating problem behavior. Functional analysis and response class hierarchy (RCH) assessment results indicated that 4 topographies of problem behaviors displayed by a 13-year-old boy with high-functioning autism constituted an RCH maintained by positive (tangible) reinforcement. Identification of the RCH comprised the baseline phase, during which computer access was denied by saying "no" and providing an explanation for the restriction. Two alternative methods of saying "no" were then evaluated. These methods included (a) denying computer access while providing an opportunity to engage in an alternative preferred activity and (b) denying immediate computer access by arranging a contingency between completion of a low-preference task and subsequent computer access. Results indicated that a hierarchy of problem behavior may be identified in the context of denying access to a preferred activity and that it may be possible to prevent occurrences of escalating problem behavior by either presenting alternative options or arranging contingencies when saying "no" to a child's requests. 相似文献
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Duncan Pritchard 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》2010,44(2):245-268
This paper examines the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination in the light of the so‐called ‘relevant alternatives’ intuition. It begins by outlining an intuitive relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge which incorporates the insight that there is a close connection between perceptual knowledge and the possession of relevant discriminatory abilities. It is argued, however, that in order to resolve certain problems that face this view, it is essential to recognise an important distinction between favouring and discriminating epistemic support that is often overlooked in the literature. This distinction complicates the story regarding how an alternative becomes relevant, and in doing so weakens the connection between perceptual knowledge and discrimination. The theory that results, however—what I term a ‘two‐tiered’ relevant alternatives theory of perceptual knowledge—accommodates many of our intuitions about perceptual knowledge and so avoids the revisionism of some recent proposals in the epistemological literature. 相似文献
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A great deal of discussion in the recent literature has been devoted to the so-called `McKinsey' paradox which purports to show that semantic externalism is incompatible with the sort of authoritative knowledge that we take ourselves to have of our own thought contents. In this paper I examine one influential epistemological response to this paradox which is due to Crispin Wright and Martin Davies. I argue that it fails to meet the challenge posed by McKinsey but that, if it is set within an externalist epistemology, it may have application to a related paradox that concerns the problem of radical scepticism. 相似文献
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Epistemological contextualism has become one of the most important and widely discussed new proposals in the theory of knowledge. This special issue contributes to the debate by bringing together some of the main participants to provide a state-of-the-art discussion of the proposal. Here we offer a brief overview of the contextualist position, describe some of the main lines of criticism that have been levelled against the view, and present a summary of each of the contributions to this collection. 相似文献
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Duncan Pritchard 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2018,96(1):70-90
Support is canvassed for a novel solution to the sceptical problem regarding our knowledge of the external world. Key to this solution is the claim that what initially looks like a single problem is in fact two logically distinct problems. In particular, there are two putative sceptical paradoxes in play here, which each trade on distinctive epistemological theses. It is argued that the ideal solution to radical scepticism would thus be a biscopic proposal—viz., a two‐pronged, integrated, undercutting treatment of both putative sceptical paradoxes. A particular biscopic proposal is then explored which brings together two apparently opposing anti‐sceptical theses: he Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation and epistemological disjunctivism. It is argued that each proposal enables us to gain a purchase on one, but only one, aspect of the two‐sided sceptical problem. Furthermore, it is argued that these proposals are not only compatible positions, but also mutually supporting and advanced in the same undercutting spirit. A potential cure is thus offered for epistemic angst. 相似文献
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If a subject has a true belief, and she has good evidence for it, and there’s no evidence against it, why should it matter if she doesn’t believe on the basis of the good available evidence? After all, properly based beliefs are no likelier to be true than their corresponding improperly based beliefs, as long as the subject possesses the same good evidence in both cases. And yet it clearly does matter. The aim of this paper is to explain why, and in the process delineate a species of epistemic luck that has hitherto gone unnoticed—what we call propositional epistemic luck—but which we claim is crucial to accounting for the importance of proper basing. As we will see, in order to understand why this type of epistemic luck is malignant, we also need to reflect on the relationship between epistemic luck and epistemic risk. 相似文献