The Interprofessional Collaborative Practice: Clergypersons and Mental Health Professionals

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationships among variables identified in research literature as obstacles and benefits to interprofessional collaboration-- academic education, interprofessional education, teamwork and communication skills, and trust---as it relates to the participation of clergypersons in interprofessional collaborative practice. The sample consisted of ordained Christian clergypersons in Florida who voluntarily completed a survey questionnaire. Standard and stepwise multiple regression was applied to analyze the data. The model accounts for 25% of the variation of interprofessional collaborative practice. Results also revealed that the education variables explained significantly 20% of the variance of interprofessional collaborative practice.     

Health Programming for Clergy: An Overview of Protestant Programs in the United States

The health of clergy is important, and clergy may find health programming tailored to them more effective. Little is known about existing clergy health programs. We contacted Protestant denominational headquarters and searched academic databases and the Internet. We identified 56 clergy health programs and categorized them into prevention and personal enrichment; counseling; marriage and family enrichment; peer support; congregational health; congregational effectiveness; denominational enrichment; insurance/strategic pension plans; and referral-based programs. Only 13 of the programs engaged in outcomes evaluation. Using the Socioecological Framework, we found that many programs support individual-level and institutional-level changes, but few programs support congregational-level changes. Outcome evaluation strategies and a central repository for information on clergy health programs are needed.     

Psychological Profiles of Individuals Seeking Ordination in the Episcopal or Presbyterian (PCUSA) Churches: Comparisons and Contrasts

The present study examined the psychological profiles of 138 candidates for ordained ministry from the Episcopal (n = 90) and Presbyterian Church (USA) (n = 48). Employing scales scores from the MMPI-2, MCMI-III, and 16PF-5, we used a series of one-way ANOVAs to test for differences between genders, denominations, and (for Episcopalians) ordination type and completion versus non-completion of the ordination process. Our results suggest that, consistent with the literature, these future clergy were generally well-adjusted and socially skilled. Denominational differences in our sample were virtually non-existent. While similar on most dimensions, female candidates may appraise their circumstances and relationships with a greater emphasis on emotional considerations than their male counterparts. Differences between Episcopal candidates for the Priesthood and the Deaconate were consistent with differences in their respective leadership and support roles. Finally, discriminant function analysis indicated that candidates who completed their ordination appeared to have a more realistic and positive attitude toward the process as well as a more deferential and less independent orientation than those who did not.     

Three Models of Clergy Systems: Analysis of Couple Processes and Spiritual Meaning

This study explores how parts of the clergy system interact in response to congregational and familial demands. Qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews with twenty-four clergy and their spouses identified three clergy system models based on the spiritual meaning and relational dynamics between the clergy, their spouses, and the congregations: The living sacrifice model emphasizes service to the congregation at the expense of personal and familial needs; the faithful spouse and parent model focuses on family needs over the congregation and practices several disciplines to maintain such a focus; and the peacemaker model seeks as much as possible to satisfy their congregation and their family by intentionally juggling their demands. Results illustrate how relational processes and spiritual meaning contribute to how clergy systems respond to systemic demands and pressures.     

The Unseen Cost: A Discussion of the Secondary Traumatization Experience of the Clergy

The vocation of clergy life can be a hazardous journey. Stress and burnout are issues, which are increasingly reported by clerics. Burnout is defined by a constellation of work related symptoms (Doolittle, Mental Health, Religion & Culture,10(1), 31–38, 2007), with emotional exhaustion recognised as a core component. Despite this recognition the research has not focused on factors which lead to this state of emotional exhaustion in particular secondary traumatization. The purpose of this article is threefold. Firstly, it presents the theoretical framework of secondary trauma. Secondly it reviews the literature aligning clergy and trauma work and thirdly it discuses the emotional and physical toll upon clergy from this aspect of their role.     

Intrinsic value and the supervenience principle

An important constraint on the nature of intrinsic value---the “Supervenience Principle” (SP)---holds that some object, event, or state of affairs ϕ is intrinsically valuable only if the value of ϕ supervenes entirely on ϕ's intrinsic properties. In this paper, I argue that SP should be rejected. SP is inordinately restrictive. In particular, I argue that no SP-respecting conception of intrinsic value can accept the importance of psychological resonance, or the positive endorsement of persons, in explaining value.     

Movin’ on up: higher-level requirements and inferential justification

Does inferential justification require the subject to be aware that her premises support her conclusion? Externalists tend to answer “no” and internalists tend to answer “yes”. In fact, internalists often hold the strong higher-level requirement that an argument justifies its conclusion only if the subject justifiably believes that her premises support her conclusion. I argue for a middle ground. Against most externalists, I argue that inferential justification requires that one be aware that her premises support her conclusion. Against many internalists, I argue that this higher-level awareness needn’t be doxastic or justified. I also argue that the required higher-level awareness needn’t be caused in some appropriate way, e.g. by a reliable or properly functioning faculty. I suspect that this weaker higher-level requirement is overlooked because, at first glance, it seems absurd to allow nondoxastic, unjustified, and unreliably-caused higher-level awareness to contribute to inferential justification. One of the central goals of this paper is to explain how such weak awareness can make an essential contribution to inferential justification.     

Evolved cognitive biases and the epistemic status of scientific beliefs

Our ability for scientific reasoning is a byproduct of cognitive faculties that evolved in response to problems related to survival and reproduction. Does this observation increase the epistemic standing of science, or should we treat scientific knowledge with suspicion? The conclusions one draws from applying evolutionary theory to scientific beliefs depend to an important extent on the validity of evolutionary arguments (EAs) or evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs). In this paper we show through an analytical model that cultural transmission of scientific knowledge can lead toward representations that are more truth-approximating or more efficient at solving science-related problems under a broad range of circumstances, even under conditions where human cognitive faculties would be further off the mark than they actually are.     

Mentalist evidentialism vindicated (and a super-blooper epistemic design problem for proper function justification)

Michael Bergmann seeks to motivate his externalist, proper function theory of epistemic justification by providing three objections to the mentalism and mentalist evidentialism characteristic of nonexternalists such as Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. Bergmann argues that (i) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that justification depends on mental states; (ii) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that the epistemic fittingness of an epistemic input to a belief-forming process must be due to an essential feature of that input, and, relatedly, that mentalist evidentialism is committed to the false thesis that the epistemic fittingness of doxastic response B to evidence E is an essential property of B–E; and (iii) mentalist evidentialism is “unmotivated”. I object to each argument. The argument for (i) begs the question. The argument for (ii) suffers from the fact that mentalist evidentialists are not committed to the consequences claimed for them; nevertheless, I show that there is, in the neighborhood, a substantive dispute concerning the nature of doxastic epistemic fittingness. That dispute involves what I call “Necessary Fittingness”, the view that, necessarily, exactly one (at most) doxastic attitude (belief, or disbelief, or suspension of judgment) toward a proposition is epistemically fitting with respect to a person’s total evidence at any time. Reflection on my super-blooper epistemic design counterexamples to Bergmann’s proper function theory reveals both the plausibility of Necessary Fittingness and a good reason to deny (iii). Mentalist evidentialism is thus vindicated against the objections.