Self-disclosure of HIV infection: preliminary results from a sample of Hispanic men.

We examined self-disclosure of HIV infection among 101 seropositive Hispanic men residing in Los Angeles. Results indicated that disclosure was highly selective and presumably influenced by the social, psychological, and material consequences of informing others about one's medical condition. Subjects tended to inform significant others such as parents, friends, and lovers than less significant others such as employers, landlords, and religious leaders. There was a relatively high rate of disclosure (75%) to doctors/dentists who were not treating subjects for HIV infection. Gay and bisexual subjects (89% of the sample) were more inclined to disclose their HIV serostatus to homosexual or bisexual others than to heterosexuals and to inform those who were aware of their sexual orientation. Disclosure increased with severity of disease independently of length of time since testing seropositive. Self-rated negative changes in appearance correlated with disclosure to less significant others. The role of cultural attitudes and values in self-disclosure of HIV infection is discussed.     

The best interest standard: both guide and limit to medical decision making on behalf of incapacitated patients

In this issue of JCE, Douglas Diekema argues that the best interest standard (BIS) has been misemployed to serve two materially different functions. On the one hand, clinicians and parents use the BIS to recommend and to make treatment decisions on behalf of children. On the other hand, clinicians and state authorities use the BIS to determine when the government should interfere with parental decision-making authority. Diekema concedes that the BIS is appropriately used to "guide" parents in making medical treatment decisions for their children. But he argues that the BIS is inappropriately used as a "limiting" standard to determine when to override those decisions. Specifically, Diekema contends that the BIS "does not represent the best means for determining when one must turn to the state to limit parental action." He argues that this limiting function should be served by the harm principle instead of by the BIS. I contend that we should not reassign the BIS's limiting function to the harm principle. In this article I make two arguments to support my position. First, the BIS has effectively served, and can serve, both guiding and limiting functions. Second, the harm principle would be an inadequate substitute. It cannot serve the limiting function as well as the more robust BIS.