Bidirectional semantic priming in the attentional blink

The time course of semantic priming between two associated words was tracked using rapid serial visual presentation of two synchronized streams of stimuli appearing at about 20 items/sec, each stream including a target word. The two words were semantically related or unrelated and were separated by stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) of 0–213 msec. Accuracy in reporting the first target (T1) versus the second target (T2) has been shown to interact dramatically with SOA over this range. The materials were in English in Experiment1 and Italian in Experiment2. T1 was semantically primed only at short SOAs, whereas T2 was primed at all SOAs (Experiment 1) or at all SOAs except the shortest one (Experiment2). The results indicate a strong competition between target words early in processing, with T2 often becoming the first word identified at short SOAs, thus priming T1.     

Cross-modal attentional deficits in processing tactile stimulation

In order to substantiate recent theorization on the possible links between the causes of the attentional blink and the psychological refractory period phenomena (e.g., Jolicoeur, 1999a), four experiments are reported in which two target stimuli, T₁ and T₂, were presented in different modalities at varying stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs), with each stimulus being associated with a distinct task, Task₁ and Task₂. In Experiment 1, T₁ was a tone, and Task₁ was a speeded vocal response based on pitch. T₂ was a brief press applied to either of two distal fingerpads, and Task₂ was a speeded manual response based on tactile stimulus location. In Experiment 2, the same T₁ as that used in Experiment 1 was presented, and in Task₁ the subject either made a speeded vocal response based on pitch or ignored T₁. T₂ was a masked tactile stimulation, and Task₂ was an unspeeded manual discrimination of the tactile stimulation location. This Task₂ was maintained in Experiments 3 and 4. The auditory T₁ was replaced with a white digit embedded in a rapid serial visualization presentation of a stream of black letters, and in Task₁ the subject either made an unspeeded decision based on T₁ identity or ignored T₁. In all the experiments, the results showed an SOA-locked impairment in Task₂. As SOA was decreased, reaction times in the speeded Task₂ of Experiment 1 increased, and accuracy in the unspeeded Task₂ of Experiments 2–4 decreased. The SOA-locked impairment was almost eliminated when T₁ could be ignored or was absent. The results are discussed in terms of central processing limitations as the cause of such effects.     

Minding the gap: spatial perseveration error in dogs

We investigated a combination of perseveration and detour behaviour in 50 domestic dogs (Canis familiaris). They were required to make a detour through a gap at one end of a straight barrier in order to reach a target. After one, two, three or four repeats, the gap was moved to the opposite end of the barrier, and the detour behaviour of the dogs was recorded. Although the dogs could solve simple detour tasks (80% correct in the first trial), they committed a perseveration error of following the previously learned route despite the clearly visible change in the location of the gap. This ‘misbehaviour’ occurred in 29 of 30 dogs after only two learning trials. They never reached a 100% correct performance level again even after four runs through the second gap location. The results suggest that dogs are reluctant to unlearn acquired spatial motor responses and reinforced navigation, which has important implications for experimental design, everyday dog training and our understanding of their mental capacities.     

The Predictive Brain

During the lengthy and complex process of human evolution our ancestors had to adapt to extremely testing situations in which survival depended on making rapid choices that subjected muscles and the body as a whole to extreme tension. In order to seize a prey traveling at speeds that could reach 36 km per hour Homo sapiens had just thousandths of a second in which to anticipate the right moment and position himself before the prey arrived. He also had to prepare the appropriate gesture, tensing his muscles and overcoming the resistance determined by body weight. While we are no longer faced with an environment that is anything so threatening, our brain continues to use these mechanisms day in day out to save time and energy, enabling us to avoid situations of danger, sense in advance the intentions of an interlocutor, and more besides. In this article we set out to show that our brain is not only a reactive mechanism, capable of reacting quickly to the stimuli that arrive from the external environment, but is above all a pro-active mechanism that allows us to make hypotheses, anticipate the consequences of actions, and formulate expectations: in short, to wrong foot an adversary.     

Do Near-Death Experiences Provide a Rational Basis for Belief in Life after Death?

In this paper I suggest that near-death experiences (NDEs) provide a rational basis for belief in life after death. My argument is a simple one and is modeled on the argument from religious experience for the existence of God. But unlike the proponents of the argument from religious experience, I stop short of claiming that NDEs prove the existence of life after death. Like the argument from religious experience, however, my argument turns on whether or not there is good reason to believe that NDEs are authentic or veridical. I argue that there is good reason to believe that NDEs are veridical and that therefore it is reasonable to believe in the existence of what they seem to be experiences of, namely, a continued state of consciousness after the death of the body. I will then offer some comments on the philosophical import of NDEs, as well as reflections on the current state of contemporary philosophy in light of the neglect of this phenomenon.     

Motor movement matters: The flexible abstractness of inner speech

Inner speech is typically characterized as either the activation of abstract linguistic representations or a detailed articulatory simulation that lacks only the production of sound. We present a study of the speech errors that occur during the inner recitation of tongue-twister-like phrases. Two forms of inner speech were tested: inner speech without articulatory movements and articulated (mouthed) inner speech. Although mouthing one’s inner speech could reasonably be assumed to require more articulatory planning, prominent theories assume that such planning should not affect the experience of inner speech and, consequently, the errors that are “heard” during its production. The errors occurring in articulated inner speech exhibited the phonemic similarity effect and the lexical bias effect—two speech-error phenomena that, in overt speech, have been localized to an articulatory-feature-processing level and a lexical—phonological level, respectively. In contrast, errors in unarticulated inner speech did not exhibit the phonemic similarity effect—just the lexical bias effect. The results are interpreted as support for a flexible abstraction account of inner speech. This conclusion has ramifications for the embodiment of language and speech and for the theories of speech production.     

Do Elite Athletes Renowned for Their Aggressive Play Transfer Aggression to Nonsport Settings? A Qualitative Exploratory Study

This exploratory qualitative study concerned elite-level male Australian footballers' attitudes to and experience of off-the-field aggression and violence. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with athletes selected for their highly aggressive play on the field. Data was analyzed, according to established principles for qualitative data. Reversal theory was used to interpret findings related to: (a) athletes' perception and experience of violent incidents in off-the-field social settings; (b) the possible role of alcohol; (c) athletes' responses and means of coping; and (d) athletes' perception of the different physical risks in on- and off-the-field violence. The results indicated, for example, that athletes sometimes found themselves the target of violence, but generally did not report instigating it. Provocation caused angry verbal and physical aggressive responses from some athletes, but others had developed coping and avoidance strategies. Athletes perceived the physical risk involved in on- and off-the-field aggression differently and distinguished the boundary that exists between the two.     

Some Changing Aspects of the Self-Concept of Pubescent Males

Fifty Ss initially rated themselves and a friend on intelligence. Ss were then divided into High and Low Acceptance groups using a self-ideal discrepancy. It was predicted that the High Acceptance group would generally rate themselves higher on the self-concept measures than would the Low Acceptance group. Further, and most importantly, it was predicted that the High group would rate their friend's intelligence as similar to their own, while the Low group would rate their friend higher than themselves and, therefore, closer to their ideal. The predictions were generally supported, although the High group failed to exhibit the expected trait similarity. It was concluded that a trait complementarity model was most appropriate for interpreting the results of both groups.     

Inner speech slips exhibit lexical bias, but not the phonemic similarity effect

Inner speech, that little voice that people often hear inside their heads while thinking, is a form of mental imagery. The properties of inner speech errors can be used to investigate the nature of inner speech, just as overt slips are informative about overt speech production. Overt slips tend to create words (lexical bias) and involve similar exchanging phonemes (phonemic similarity effect). We examined these effects in inner and overt speech via a tongue-twister recitation task. While lexical bias was present in both inner and overt speech errors, the phonemic similarity effect was evident only for overt errors, producing a significant overtness by similarity interaction. We propose that inner speech is impoverished at lower (featural) levels, but robust at higher (phonemic) levels.     

Is comprehension necessary for error detection? A conflict-based account of monitoring in speech production

Despite the existence of speech errors, verbal communication is successful because speakers can detect (and correct) their errors. The standard theory of speech-error detection, the perceptual-loop account, posits that the comprehension system monitors production output for errors. Such a comprehension-based monitor, however, cannot explain the double dissociation between comprehension and error-detection ability observed in the aphasic patients. We propose a new theory of speech-error detection which is instead based on the production process itself. The theory borrows from studies of forced-choice-response tasks the notion that error detection is accomplished by monitoring response conflict via a frontal brain structure, such as the anterior cingulate cortex. We adapt this idea to the two-step model of word production, and test the model-derived predictions on a sample of aphasic patients. Our results show a strong correlation between patients’ error-detection ability and the model’s characterization of their production skills, and no significant correlation between error detection and comprehension measures, thus supporting a production-based monitor, generally, and the implemented conflict-based monitor in particular. The successful application of the conflict-based theory to error-detection in linguistic, as well as non-linguistic domains points to a domain-general monitoring system.