Logic in religious and non-religious belief systems

The paper first proposes a new definition of religion which features a novel four-layered element and which does not involve any circularity (as some definitions do); thereby, it allows to clearly distinguish the phenomenon of religion from certain other worldviews, in particular from certain political ideologies (a number of other definitions do not). Relying on the findings, the paper develops two structural conceptual models which serve to describe religious and non-religious belief systems. Further, the definition and the conceptual models allow to establish a clear criterion to distinguish pivotal structural differences between religious and non-religious belief systems. The criterion is based on the concept of two kinds of rationality: first-level and second-level rationalities. These will demonstrate to what degree religion can be a rational enterprise, and what role logic can play in it. The result is a clear-cut line in the structures of religious and certain consistent non-religious belief systems (e.g. a scientific theory).     

Three Kairoi – Three Aions. Paul Tillich,Ultimate Concern and Pedagogy of Radical Hope

Studies in Philosophy and Education - For contemporary critical philosophers of education, the thought of Paul Tillich, a protestant theologian, does not seem to be a very likely point of...     

An Investigation of a Polish Version of the Parentification Inventory

Journal of Child and Family Studies - Parentification is defined as a pattern of family interactions in which children and adolescents are required to engage in adult-like roles and...     

Procrastination by pigeons with fixed-interval response requirements.

Two experiments studied the phenomenon of procrastination, in which pigeons chose a larger, more delayed response requirement over a smaller, more immediate response requirement. The response requirements were fixed-interval schedules that did not lead to an immediate food reinforcer, but that interrupted a 55-s period in which food was delivered at random times. The experiments used an adjusting-delay procedure in which the delay to the start of one fixed-interval requirement was varied over trials to estimate an indifference point--a delay at which the two alternatives were chosen about equally often. Experiment 1 found that as the delay to a shorter fixed-interval requirement was increased, the adjusting delay to a longer fixed-interval requirement also increased, and the rate of increase depended on the duration of the longer fixed-interval requirement. Experiment 2 found a strong preference for a fixed delay of 10 s to the start of a fixed-interval requirement compared to a mixed delay of either 0 or 20 s. The results help to distinguish among different equations that might describe the decreasing effectiveness of a response requirement with increasing delay, and they suggest that delayed reinforcers and delayed response requirements have symmetrical but opposite effects on choice.     

Conditioned reinforcement and choice with delayed and uncertain primary reinforcers.

In an adjusting-delay choice procedure, pigeons could peck on either a red key or a green key. A peck on the red key always led to a delay associated with red houselights and then food. The delay was adjusted over trials to estimate an indifference point--a delay at which the two keys were chosen about equally often. In some conditions, a peck on the green key led to food on all trials after delays of either 10 s or 30 s, and green houselights were lit during the delays. In other conditions, food was presented on only half of the green-key trials. If the green houselights continued to occur on both reinforcement and nonreinforcement trials, preference for the green key always decreased. Preference for the green key also decreased if half of the trials had 30-s houselights followed by food and the other half had no green houselights and no food. However, preference for the green key actually increased if half of the trials had 10-s green houselights followed by food and the other half had no green houselights followed by no food. The latter condition therefore demonstrated a case in which preference for an alternative increased when food was removed from half of the trials. The results suggest that the red and green houselights served as conditioned reinforcers. A hyperbolic decay model (Mazur, 1989) provided good predictions for all conditions by assuming that the strength of a conditioned reinforcer is inversely related to the total time spent in its presence before food is delivered.     

Is It Harmful? A Thomistic Perspective on Risk Science in Social Welfare

Journal of Religion and Health - Probabilistic information is used increasingly, from medical research to weather forecasting. The relationship between probability and causality requires an...