Theory of mind and wisdom: The development of different forms of perspective-taking in late adulthood

How does perspective-taking develop over the lifespan? This question has been investigated in two separate research traditions, dealing with theory of mind (ToM) and wisdom, respectively. Operating in almost complete isolation from each other, and using rather different conceptual approaches, these two traditions have produced seemingly contradictory results: While perspective-taking has been consistently found to decline in old age in ToM research, studies on wisdom have mostly found that perspective-taking remains constant or sometimes even increases in later adulthood. This study sought to integrate these two lines of research and clarify the seemingly contradictory patterns of findings by systematically testing for both forms of perspective-taking and their potential cognitive foundations. The results revealed (1) the dissociation in developmental patterns between ToM perspective-taking (declining with age) and wisdom-related perspective-taking (no decline with age) also held – documented here for the first time – in one and the same sample of younger versus older adults; (2) this dissociation was of limited generality: It did not (or only partly) hold once the material of the two types of tasks was more closely matched; and (3) the divergent developmental patterns of ToM perspective-taking versus wisdom-related perspective-taking could be accounted for to some degree by the fact that only TOM perspective-taking was related to developmental changes in fluid intelligence.     

Exploring the hardship of ease: Subjective and objective effort in the ease-of-processing paradigm

Numerous studies examined the role of processing effort in judgments using the “ease-of-processing” paradigm in which participants generate or retrieve few or many issue-relevant thoughts. Because earlier studies only assessed the subjective effort, it is unclear if this paradigm also mobilizes objective effort, and how such effort relates to subjective effort. These questions were addressed in two experiments modeled on standard tasks from the processing effort literature: “ease of argument generation” (Study 1) and “ease of retrieval” (Study 2). In both experiments we simultaneously measured subjective effort (via self-report) and objective effort (via cardiovascular reactivity). The results showed that processing ease manipulations (generation or retrieval of few vs. many exemplars) influence not only subjective effort, but also objective effort, as reflected especially by increases of systolic blood pressure in the many exemplars condition. However, only subjective effort was related to judgment. In the discussion, we consider the role of various forms of effort and other relevant variables in “processing ease” effects.     

Action rules: why the visual control of reaching and grasping is not always influenced by perceptual illusions

It is generally accepted that vision first evolved for the distal control of movement and that perception or 'representational' vision emerged much later. Vision-for-action operates in real time and uses egocentric frames of reference and the real metrics of the world. Vision-for-perception can operate over longer time scales and is much more scene-based in its computations. These differences in the timing and metrics of the two systems have been examined in experiments that have looked at the way in which each system deals with visual illusions. Although controversial, the consensus is that actions such as grasping and reaching are often unaffected by high-level pictorial illusions, which by definition affect percetion. However, recent experiments have shown that, for actions to escape the effects of such illusions, they must be highly practiced actions, preferably with the right hand, and must be directed in real time at visible targets. This latter finding suggests that some of the critical components of the encapsulated (bottom-up) systems that mediate the visual control of skilled reaching and grasping movements are lateralised to the left hemisphere.     

Irrational Wanting and Subrational Liking: How Rudimentary Motivational and Affective Processes Shape Preferences and Choices

People's wanting and liking reactions reflect not only high-level beliefs, but also the operation of rudimentary biopsychological processes. Previous studies suggest that the following wanting and liking processes may be relevant to political behavior: irrational wanting (where wanting is triggered by activation of the brain dopamine system and becomes dissociated from liking); unconscious liking and wanting (where evaluative judgments and behavior are modified without awareness of the eliciting affective stimuli or of the underlying affective response); and fluency-based liking (where preferences are influenced by the ease of stimulus processing). This review suggests how conceptual and methodological tools from affective neuroscience and psychophysiology can refine our understanding of basic affective and motivational processes that shape political attitudes and choices.     

Baring Their Souls in Online Profiles or Not? Religious Self‐Disclosure in Social Media

This study measured the prevalence of religious self‐disclosure in public MySpace profiles that belonged to a subsample of National Study of Youth and Religion (NSYR) wave 3 respondents (N = 560). Personal attributes associated with religious identification as well as the overall quantity of religious self‐disclosures are examined. A majority (62 percent) of profile owners identified their religious affiliations online, although relatively few profile owners (30 percent) said anything about religion outside the religion‐designated field. Most affiliation reports (80 percent) were consistent with the profile owner's reported affiliation on the survey. Religious profile owners disclosed more about religion when they also believed that religion is a public matter or if they evaluated organized religion positively. Evangelical Protestants said more about religion than other respondents. Religiosity, believing that religion is a public matter, and the religiosity of profile owners’ friendship group were all positively associated with religious identification and self‐disclosure.     

Do university students really have difficulty in duration judgments? Comment on Okazaki and Matsuda (2008, 2010)

Reinterpretation suggests that low performance of the participants studied by Okazaki and Matsuda (2008, 2010) may have been caused by using a procedure which overloads the cognitive capacities of undergraduate students. The questions asked participants about their reasoning could have led to cognitive overload because they performed two tasks: judgment of movement duration and paying attention to what kind of knowledge should be used (alpha or beta). Some interpretations are offered referring to possible effects of training procedures for applying both kinds of knowledge.     

Logic, Formal Methodology and Semantics in Works of Ryszard W��jcicki

For decades Ryszard Wójcicki has been a highly influential scholar in the community of logicians and philosophers. Our aim is to outline and comment on some essential issues on logic, methodology of science and semantics as seen from the perspective of distinguished contributions of Wójcicki to these areas of philosophical investigations.     

Individual differences in prejudice and associative versus rule‐based forms of transitive reasoning

Two experiments examined whether individual differences in prejudice are associated with different reasoning styles when targets and nontargets of prejudice are processed in the same context. High‐prejudice and low‐prejudice participants studied pairwise relations between four persons (one a prejudice target, three nontargets). Stereotypes were made salient by using specific ethnic names and stereotypic traits to define relations between the targets. Relations between the persons were always stereotype congruent in Experiment 1, whereas they were sometimes stereotype incongruent in Experiment 2. We examined study time, relational memory, and transitive reasoning in both experiments. The results of both experiments indicated that the high‐prejudice participants studied sets of relations presented to them faster than did the low‐prejudice participants. The high‐prejudice participants were also more likely to show impaired relational memory and reasoning about nontarget persons but no such limitations with respect to target persons. This novel evidence that prejudice might substantially impair memory and transitive reasoning processes about nontarget persons is discussed in the light of alternative theoretical frameworks in the social cognition and emotion domains. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.