Are There Cross-Cultural Legal Principles? Modal Reasoning Uncovers Procedural Constraints on Law

Despite pervasive variation in the content of laws, legal theorists and anthropologists have argued that laws share certain abstract features and even speculated that law may be a human universal. In the present report, we evaluate this thesis through an experiment administered in 11 different countries. Are there cross-cultural principles of law? In a between-subjects design, participants (N = 3,054) were asked whether there could be laws that violate certain procedural principles (e.g., laws applied retrospectively or unintelligible laws), and also whether there are any such laws. Confirming our preregistered prediction, people reported that such laws cannot exist, but also (paradoxically) that there are such laws. These results document cross-culturally and –linguistically robust beliefs about the concept of law which defy people's grasp of how legal systems function in practice.     

The impact of emotions on shopping behavior during epidemic. What a business can do to protect customers

The study investigated how the perception of in‐shop COVID‐19 contraction influences emotions in decision‐making and how they further effect actions undertaken by consumers to control the situation within a store. Structural equation modeling was used to study the relationship between the risk of in‐store infection, emotions and in‐shop behavior, based on data retrieved from 914 questionnaires. Results showed, that the perceived risk of becoming infected in a store causes an increase in arousal and, at the same time, a decrease in perceived pleasure during shopping. The rise in arousal led to an increase in consumers taking actions to decrease their risk of contagion, while an increase in noticeable pleasure lowered interest of following recommendations for pandemic behavior. The findings imply that through changes regarding in‐store atmosphere, stationary shops can provide consumers with a sense of urgency and awareness of infection risk so that they may do their shopping more efficiently.     

Intention inertia and the plasticity of planning

In this article, I examine Michael Bratman’s account of stability in his planning theory of intention (PTI). Future-directed intentions should be stable, or appropriately resistant to change, over time. Bratman claims that the norm of stability governs both intentions and plans. The aim of this article is to critically enrich Bratman’s account of stability by introducing plasticity as an additional norm of planning. I construct plasticity as a kind of stability of intentions which supplements Bratman’s notion of “reasonable stability.” Unlike the latter, plasticity applies mainly to cases in which plan states are abandoned without reconsideration. I focus on the intra-theoretical problems of PTI and elucidate: (1) the distinction between future-directed intentions and plans, (2) the conceptual difference between stability and inertia, which is only implicit in PTI, and (3) the role of the environment of the planner, which has a vestigial role in Bratman’s work. I also defend my incorporation of plasticity against one possible objection and support it in the context of Bratman’s later works. Although critical, my proposal is in moderate harmony with PTI.     

Antarctic skuas recognize individual humans

Recent findings report that wild animals can recognize individual humans. To explain how the animals distinguish humans, two hypotheses are proposed. The high cognitive abilities hypothesis implies that pre-existing high intelligence enabled animals to acquire such abilities. The pre-exposure to stimuli hypothesis suggests that frequent encounters with humans promote the acquisition of discriminatory abilities in these species. Here, we examine individual human recognition abilities in a wild Antarctic species, the brown skua (Stercorarius antarcticus), which lives away from typical human settlements and was only recently exposed to humans due to activities at Antarctic stations. We found that, as nest visits were repeated, the skua parents responded at further distances and were more likely to attack the nest intruder. Also, we demonstrated that seven out of seven breeding pairs of skuas selectively responded to a human nest intruder with aggression and ignored a neutral human who had not previously approached the nest. The results indicate that Antarctic skuas, a species that typically inhabited in human-free areas, are able to recognize individual humans who disturbed their nests. Our findings generally support the high cognitive abilities hypothesis, but this ability can be acquired during a relatively short period in the life of an individual as a result of interactions between individual birds and humans.     

Portfolio Decisions and Brain Reactions via the CEAD method

Decision making can be a complex process requiring the integration of several attributes of choice options. Understanding the neural processes underlying (uncertain) investment decisions is an important topic in neuroeconomics. We analyzed functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data from an investment decision study for stimulus-related effects. We propose a new technique for identifying activated brain regions: cluster, estimation, activation, and decision method. Our analysis is focused on clusters of voxels rather than voxel units. Thus, we achieve a higher signal-to-noise ratio within the unit tested and a smaller number of hypothesis tests compared with the often used General Linear Model (GLM). We propose to first conduct the brain parcellation by applying spatially constrained spectral clustering. The information within each cluster can then be extracted by the flexible dynamic semiparametric factor model (DSFM) dimension reduction technique and finally be tested for differences in activation between conditions. This sequence of Cluster, Estimation, Activation, and Decision admits a model-free analysis of the local fMRI signal. Applying a GLM on the DSFM-based time series resulted in a significant correlation between the risk of choice options and changes in fMRI signal in the anterior insula and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. Additionally, individual differences in decision-related reactions within the DSFM time series predicted individual differences in risk attitudes as modeled with the framework of the mean-variance model.     

Does authoritarianism imply ethnocentric national attitudes: A revised look at the “authoritarian triad” and right‐wing ideology

Dozens of studies have shown that authoritarian people are ethnocentric. They are described as nationalistic, prejudiced, and hostile toward ethnic/national out‐groups. However, it can be argued that this critical claim remains unproven, as researchers do not take into consideration the very conservative right‐wing views typical of authoritarian people. To address this problem, two theoretical approaches were contrasted: the most commonly used right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) approach and the group authoritarianism approach. Both approaches define authoritarianism as the covariance of submission, aggression, and conventionalism, but they differ in that the former is inextricably related to right‐wing ideology while the latter is not. This paper presents the results of two survey studies conducted on samples of 600 and 400 respondents. In Study 1, it was found that RWA and group authoritarianism had different patterns of relationships with in‐group and out‐group national attitudes, providing strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that the right‐wing ideology generated ethnocentric national attitudes. Study 2 showed a strong direct effect of right‐wing ideology on ethnocentric national attitudes, while the impact of “pure” authoritarian covariance is marginal and sometimes even seems to be negative (e.g., ethnic prejudices). These findings suggest that authoritarianism has little to do with ethnocentric national attitudes. It is not the covariance of authoritarian attitudes that results in growing ethnocentrism. The true perpetrator can be found in the large component of right‐wing ideology contained in such measurement instruments as the RWA scale.     

Mental rotation of letters and shapes in developmental dyslexia

Extending the work of Corballis et al (1985, Cortex 21 225-236), we investigated mental rotation of letters (experiment 1), and of letters and shapes (experiment 2) in normal readers and developmental dyslexics. Whereas the overall response times were equal for shapes in both groups, for letters they were slower in dyslexics. For letters as well as for shapes, however, the same mental-rotation effects were obtained between the groups. The results are interpreted as support for the notion of developmental dyslexia as a deficit in functional coordination between graphemic and phonological letter representations.     

How important is a prime's gestalt for subliminal priming?

Masked stimuli (primes) can affect the preparation of a motor response to subsequently presented target stimuli. Under some conditions, reactions to the main stimulus can be facilitated (straight priming) or inhibited (inverse priming) when preceded by a compatible prime (calling for the same response). In the majority of studies in which inverse priming was demonstrated arrows pointing left or right were used as prime and targets. There is, however, evidence that arrows are special overlearned stimuli which are processed in a favorable way. Here we report three experiments designated to test whether the "arrowness" of primes/targets is a sufficient condition for inverse priming. The results clearly show that although inverse priming appeared when non-arrow shapes were used, the magnitude of the priming effect was larger with arrows. The possible reasons for this effect are discussed.     

Emotional Conception: How Embodied Emotion Concepts Guide Perception and Facial Action

ABSTRACT— This study assessed embodied simulation via electromyography (EMG) as participants first encoded emotionally ambiguous faces with emotion concepts (i.e., "angry,""happy") and later passively viewed the faces without the concepts. Memory for the faces was also measured. At initial encoding, participants displayed more smiling-related EMG activity in response to faces paired with "happy" than in response to faces paired with "angry." Later, in the absence of concepts, participants remembered happiness-encoded faces as happier than anger-encoded faces. Further, during passive reexposure to the ambiguous faces, participants' EMG indicated spontaneous emotion-specific mimicry, which in turn predicted memory bias. No specific EMG activity was observed when participants encoded or viewed faces with non-emotion-related valenced concepts, or when participants encoded or viewed Chinese ideographs. From an embodiment perspective, emotion simulation is a measure of what is currently perceived. Thus, these findings provide evidence of genuine concept-driven changes in emotion perception. More generally, the findings highlight embodiment's role in the representation and processing of emotional information.