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131.
Piotr Styrkowiec Adrianna Babijew Karolina Dunaj Michał Wierzbicki 《Journal of Cognitive Psychology》2020,32(2):161-179
ABSTRACTIf spatial stimulus-response correspondence (SRC) effect results from automatic processes, cognitive load should not affect this effect. However, if spatial SRC effect is based on the interference of cognitive codes, cognitive load should influence it. Furthermore, the motion-based SRC effect should be affected by the cognitive load, as this SRC effect is related to the cognitive codes interference. In this study, participants performed combined tasks for space-based and motion-based SRC effects without working memory load (WML), or under spatial and verbal WML to see if cognitive load affects both SRC effects or just one. Results demonstrated that space-based SRC remained intact from WML, while the motion-based SRC was influenced by WML, although only in limited degree. This supports the notion that automatic processes underlie space-based SRC effect, whereas the motion-based SRC effect is related to cognitive codes interference, but the latter requires further investigation. 相似文献
132.
Piotr Dehnel 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2020,28(1):75-95
ABSTRACTThis article aims to analyse Wittgenstein’s 1929–1932 notes concerning Frege’s critique of what is referred to as old formalism in the philosophy of mathematics. Wittgenstein disagreed with Frege’s critique and, in his notes, outlined his own assessment of formalism. First of all, he approvingly foregrounded its mathematics-game comparison and insistence that rules precede the meanings of expressions. In this article, I recount Frege’s critique of formalism and address Wittgenstein’s assessment of it to show that his remarks are not so much a critique of Frege as rather a defence of the formalist anti-metaphysical investment. 相似文献