Electrophysiological correlates of emotional crossmodal processing in binge drinking

Emotional crossmodal integration (i.e., multisensorial decoding of emotions) is a crucial process that ensures adaptive social behaviors and responses to the environment. Recent evidence suggests that in binge drinking—an excessive alcohol consumption pattern associated with psychological and cerebral deficits—crossmodal integration is preserved at the behavioral level. Although some studies have suggested brain modifications during affective processing in binge drinking, nothing is known about the cerebral correlates of crossmodal integration. In the current study, we asked 53 university students (17 binge drinkers, 17 moderate drinkers, 19 nondrinkers) to perform an emotional crossmodal task while their behavioral and neurophysiological responses were recorded. Participants had to identify happiness and anger in three conditions (unimodal, crossmodal congruent, crossmodal incongruent) and two modalities (face and/or voice). Binge drinkers did not significantly differ from moderate drinkers and nondrinkers at the behavioral level. However, widespread cerebral modifications were found at perceptual (N100) and mainly at decisional (P3b) stages in binge drinkers, indexed by slower brain processing and stronger activity. These cerebral modifications were mostly related to anger processing and crossmodal integration. This study highlights higher electrophysiological activity in the absence of behavioral deficits, which could index a potential compensation process in binge drinkers. In line with results found in severe alcohol-use disorders, these electrophysiological findings show modified anger processing, which might have a deleterious impact on social functioning. Moreover, this study suggests impaired crossmodal integration at early stages of alcohol-related disorders.     

Correction to: A psychophysiological investigation of mourning: There are two sides to the story

Motivation and Emotion -     

Maternal Depression,Maternal Expressed Emotion,and Youth Psychopathology

Across development, maternal depression has been found to be a risk factor for youth psychopathology generally and youth depression specifically. Maternal Expressed Emotion (EE) has been examined as a predictor of outcome among youth with depression. The present study explored the associations between youth psychopathology and two predictors–maternal depression within the child’s lifetime and maternal EE–in a study of children at risk for depression. One hundred and seventy-one youth, ages 8–12, and their mothers participated. To assess maternal and youth psychopathology, dyads were administered structured diagnostic assessments, and mothers and children completed self-report measures of their own depressive symptoms. In addition, mothers completed the Achenbach Child Behavior Checklist–Parent Report Version (CBCL) for their children. Maternal EE was assessed based on the Five Minute Speech Sample. History of maternal depression was associated with high maternal EE, and the combination of maternal depression history and maternal EE was associated with children’s own reports of higher depressive symptoms. Current maternal depressive symptoms were associated with mothers’ reports of children’s Internalizing scores on the CBCL, and maternal depression history, current maternal depressive symptoms, and maternal EE were strongly associated with mothers’ reports of children’s Externalizing and Total Problem scores on the CBCL. History of maternal depression and a rating of high or borderline Critical EE (characterized by maternal critical comments and/or reports of a negative relationship) were independently associated with children’s depression diagnoses.     

Beyond the internalism/externalism debate: The constitution of the space of perception

This paper tackles the problem of the nature of the space of perception. Based both on philosophical arguments and on results obtained from original experimental situations, it attempts to show how space is constituted concretely, before any distinction between the “inner” and the “outer” can be made. It thus sheds light on the presuppositions of the well-known debate between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind; it argues in favor of the latter position, but with arguments that are foundationally antecedent to this debate. We call the position we defend enactive externalism. It is based on experimental settings which, in virtue of their minimalism, make it possible both to defend a sensori-motor/enactive theory of perception; and, especially, to inquire into the origin of the space of perception, showing how it is concretely enacted before the controversy between internalism and externalism can even take place.     

Attention between phenomenology and experimental psychology

It is possible to consider attention as the modulating dimension of consciousness. Understood in this sense, attention can be a privileged theme for relating the first person point of view (conceived as a psycho-phenomenology inspired by the work of Husserl) to the experimental sciences (e.g. psychology, neuropsychology, etc.), which have done a great deal of work on attention. This article will take up in succession some different points of view regarding the status of attention and its structure (e.g. static aspects). It will also consider the dynamic of attention from a micro-genetic point of view as well as a functional point of view. The final section will seek to show not only the unique and original contributions of each perspective, but also each perspective's limitations and biases.     

Lengthening the duration of response execution does not modulate blindness to action-compatible stimuli.

Action-compatible blindness refers to the finding that target stimuli are perceived less frequently if they are presented during the planning or execution of a compatible action (e.g., a left arrow presented during a left manual key press) than during an incompatible action (Müsseler & Hommel, 1997 a, b). We investigated the effect of lengthening the response execution phase in the action-compatible blindness paradigm by requiring subjects to tap a response key once or three times on the assumption that tapping three times would increase the duration of the execution phase of the response. Prior research (e.g., Stevanovski, Oriet, & Jolicoeur, 2002; Wühr & Müsseler, 2001) has shown that larger blindness effects are observed for targets presented during the execution phase of a response than after the response has been made. We investigated whether a larger blindness effect would be observed in the three-tap condition than in the one-tap condition, or whether lengthening the duration of the response would extend the time course of the blindness effect. Neither of these possibilities was supported by the data irrespective of whether the number of taps to be made was blocked or mixed within a block of trials. The results are discussed in terms of current accounts of action-compatible blindness and the possible cognitive differences between making a single response and repeating a response.