Goldman On Knowledge As True Belief

Alvin Goldman contends that, in addition to the familiar sense or use of the term “knowledge” according to which knowledge is at least true justified belief, there is a weaker yet strict sense or use of the term “knowledge” according to which knowledge amounts to nothing more than information-possession or mere true belief. In this paper, I argue that Goldman has failed to show that there is such a weaker sense, and that, even if he had shown this, he has not shown that this putative weaker sense is a strict one by his own criterion for strictness.     

Judgement of Authenticity of Smiles and Detection of Facial indexes]

The smile is one of the most often expressed emotions during social interactions. It can be authentic, that is, associated with a joyful emotional state in the person expressing it, but it can also be false, that is, deliberately produced in the absence of that emotional state in order to deceive one or more individuals (Ekman, 1993). Even though the fake smile very much resembles the authentic smile, it generally does not constitute the perfect simile. The fake smile more often has a certain degree of asymmetry than the authentic smile (Ekman, Hager, & Friesen, 1981) and it uses the cheek raiser action less often than with the authentic smile (Ekman, Friesen, & O'Sullivan, 1988; Frank, Ekman, & Friesen, 1993). This study looked at the knowledge that adults have of these differences as well as their perceptive ability to detect them. The visual stimuli presented to participants were prepared using the Facial Action Coding System (Ekman & Friesen, 1978). Results show that participants detected the differences between the two types of smile and that detection was better using smile asymmetry than with the cheek raiser action. Analysis of the use of response categories in the detection task indicated that participants underestimated the differences between smiles when they were different and that this tendency was more apparent with the cheek raiser detection method than for asymmetry detection. Participants also demonstrated a better knowledge of smile asymmetry than cheek raiser action. The knowledge gathered suggests that the ability of the receptor to judge smile authenticity is limited by perceptive factors. However, the mediation analyses that we conducted show the judging smile authenticity is not limited to simple perceptive detection of facial clues. Detecting facial clues is a necessary condition for correctly assessing smile authenticity, but it does not explain the variance in these assessments. We believe that this variance would be due more to the importance that participants give to facial clues. Finally, our results show that the capacity to detect differences between authentic and fake smiles is not easy to change. Participants who received modified information on changes of appearance linked to the two facial parameters were not more likely to detect the differences than participants who did not receive information.     

Public self‐consciousness disposition effect on reactions to waiting in line

In this paper, we investigate how high public self‐conscious subjects may display specific reactions while waiting in line with strangers at a movie theatre. Results suggest that, when compared with low public subjects, high public self‐conscious subjects will have an attentional focus directed toward time, will attribute more control to service managers for the cause of the wait and will evaluate the service more negatively. Results concerning relationships between attribution of control, behavioural intentions and service evaluation support those of previous studies and are both directly and indirectly moderated by the public self‐consciousness disposition. This research opens the way to conducting future studies attempting to link other personality dispositions with consumer behaviour in the services domain. Copyright © 2003 Henry Stewart Publications.     

Is Mere True Belief Knowledge?

Crispin Sartwell ingeniously defends the provocative thesis that mere true belief suffices for knowledge. In doing so, he challenges one of the most deeply entrenched epistemological tenets, namely that knowledge must be more than mere true belief. Particularly interesting is the way he defends his thesis by appealing to considerations adduced by such prominent epistemologists as William Alston, Laurence BonJour, Alvin Goldman and Paul Moser, each of whom denies that knowledge is merely true belief. In this paper, I argue that the case Sartwell presents for his thesis fails. However, by examining why it fails, we may derive at least four important epistemological lessons: (1) being justified does not entail being able to give a justification; (2) we should distinguish between epistemic justification conceived of as intrinsically conducive to truth and conceived of as extrinsically conducive to truth; (3) we should distinguish between epistemic justification conceived of as an essential criterion of knowledge and conceived of as an accidental criterion of knowledge; and (4) epistemologists need to specify how the telos of inquiry involves more than the acquisition of (merely) true beliefs.Socrates: Then tell me: what definition can we give with the least risk of contradicting ourselves?Theaetetus: The one we tried before, Socrates. I have nothing else to suggest.Socrates: What was that?Theaetetus: That true belief is knowledge. Surely there can at least be no mistake in believing what is true and the consequences are always satisfactory.Theaetetus 200d–e     

Gender congruence and body satisfaction in nonbinary transgender people: A case control study

Abstract

Background: Binary transgender people access gender affirming medical interventions to alleviate gender incongruence and increase body satisfaction. Despite the increase in nonbinary transgender people, this population are less likely to access transgender health services compared to binary transgender people. No research has yet understood why by exploring levels of gender congruence and body satisfaction in nonbinary transgender people.

Objective: The aim of this study was to compare levels of gender congruence and body satisfaction in nonbinary transgender people to controls [binary transgender people and cisgender (nontrans) people].

Method: In total, 526 people from a community sample in the UK took part in the study (97 nonbinary, 91 binary, and 338 cisgender identifying people). Participants were asked to complete an online survey about gender congruence and body satisfaction.

Results: There were differences in gender congruence and body satisfaction between nonbinary and binary transgender people. On sex-specific parts of the body (i.e., chest, genitalia, and secondary sex characteristics), nonbinary transgender people reported significantly higher levels of gender and body satisfaction compared to binary transgender people. However, there was no difference in congruence and satisfaction with social gender role between the two transgender groups (nonbinary and binary). Cisgender people reported significantly higher levels of gender congruence and body satisfaction compared to transgender people (nonbinary and binary).

Conclusions: There are differences in gender congruence and body satisfaction between nonbinary and binary transgender people. Nonbinary individuals may be less likely to access transgender health services due to experiencing less gender incongruence and more body satisfaction compared to binary transgender people. Transgender health services need to be more inclusive of nonbinary transgender people and their support and treatment needs, which may differ from those who identify within the binary gender system.     

Strategies in subtraction problem solving in children

The aim of this study was to investigate the strategies used by third graders in solving the 81 elementary subtractions that are the inverses of the one-digit additions with addends from 1 to 9 recently studied by Barrouillet and Lépine. Although the pattern of relationship between individual differences in working memory, on the one hand, and strategy choices and response times, on the other, was the same in both operations, subtraction and addition differed in two important ways. First, the strategy of direct retrieval was less frequent in subtraction than in addition and was even less frequent in subtraction solving than the recourse to the corresponding additive fact. Second, contrary to addition, the retrieval of subtractive answers is confined to some peculiar problems involving 1 as the subtrahend or the remainder. The implications of these findings for developmental theories of mental arithmetic are discussed.     

Postscript: A good psychological theory of reasoning must predict behavior and explain the data

In their stimulating comment on Barrouillet, Gauffroy, and Lecas Oberauer and Oaksford argued that we gave no rationale for the assumption that the mental models of false-antecedent cases have a different epistemic status from the p q model and that no new computational level account of the conditional was provided to justify this move. The resulting lack of coherent principles would undermine the heuristic power of the mental model theory and lead to unacceptable consequences. Though our theory probably presents many weaknesses, it is false to assume that we did not give any rationale for the truth value gap of conditionals. Our proposal elaborates the distinction between initial and fleshed-out models that is at the core of the theory from its very beginning (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), and assumes that people consider those cases that match the initial model as making the conditional true whereas the cases that match the models added through fleshing out are judged as leaving its truth value indeterminate. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved).     

Mental models and the suppositional account of conditionals

The mental model theory of conditional reasoning presented by P. N. Johnson-Laird and R. M. J. Byrne (2002) has recently been the subject of criticisms (e.g., J. St. B. T. Evans, D. E. Over, & S. J. Handley, 2005). The authors argue that the theoretical conflict can be resolved by differentiating 2 kinds of reasoning, reasoning about possibilities given the truth of assertions and reasoning about the truth of assertions given possibilities. The standard mental model theory accounts for the former kind of reasoning but does not adequately account for the latter, contrary to the suppositional approach favored by J. St. B. T. Evans et al. (2005). The authors thus propose a modified mental model theory of conditionals that reconciles the 2 theoretical approaches. It is demonstrated that this theory is able to explain the key findings that have been opposed to the standard theory by J. St. B. T. Evans et al. and makes new predictions that are empirically verified.