Symbolic- and response-related contributions to blindness to compatible stimuli

Blindness to compatible stimuli refers to poorer target identification (e.g., right-pointing arrowhead) following compatible stimuli (e.g., right arrows; Stevanovski, Oriet, & Jolic?ur, 2003) and compatible responses (e.g., right key press; Müsseler & Hommel, 1997a and 1997b). To clarify the role of the response in this effect, we examined the impact of adding or removing an overt response. In three experiments, subjects saw an arrow cue (that sometimes required a response) followed by a brief, masked arrowhead, which was reported on all trials. In all experiments, making a response increased the magnitude of the blindness effect. Furthermore, “no response” performance was unaffected by whether subjects had previously responded to the cue. Results favour a two-factor symbolic- plus response-related activation model over a purely symbolic activation model.     

Procedural and interpersonal fairness moderate the relationship between outcome fairness and acceptance of merit pay

An organizational field study (N = 257) investigated employees' acceptance of a new merit pay system as involving an assessment of whether merit pay can make their earnings more fair, compared to their earnings in the current, seniority-based pay system. We expected that improvement of unfair earnings, and consequently acceptance of merit pay, is considered likely when existing procedures that produce these earnings are unfair, because merit pay improves such procedures. We also expected improvement of unfair earnings, and increased merit pay acceptance, to be likely when employees anticipate fair performance evaluation in a new system, as indicated by fair interpersonal treatment by their supervisor. Results showed that procedural and interpersonal fairness in the existing pay system indeed moderated the relationship between fairness of current outcomes and merit pay acceptance as predicted. Implications for the introduction of merit pay in organizations and for our understanding of the different roles of procedural and interpersonal fairness in outcome evaluations are discussed.     

Sample size, confidence, and contingency judgement.

According to statistical models, the acquisition function of contingency judgement is due to confidence increasing with sample size. According to associative models, the function reflects the accumulation of associative strength on which the judgement is based. Which view is right? Thirty university students assessed the relation between a fictitious medication and a symptom of skin discoloration in conditions that varied sample size (4, 6, 8 or 40 trials) and contingency (delta P = .20, .40, .60 or .80). Confidence was also collected. Contingency judgement was lower for smaller samples, while confidence level correlated inversely with sample size. This dissociation between contingency judgement and confidence contradicts the statistical perspective.     

Discounting in causality and covariation judgements

In two experiments, humans were asked to judge the strength of a moderate contingency between a cue and an outcome in the presence of a second strong contingency between another cue and the outcome. The first experiment replicated the discounting effect whereby a strong contingency causes subjects to reduce or discount judgements of a moderate contingency. This experiment used a video-game procedure in which subjects camouflaged a tank to make it safe from mines. The second causal cue was the presence or absence of a spotter plane. Experiment 1 also ruled out the possibility that judgements might be determined by the number of co-occurrences of the cue and outcome as opposed to the level of contingency. The second experiment used an abstract scenario in which discounting was demonstrated when subjects were asked to judge the relationship between the occurrence of geometric objects. The instructions were neutral to discourage causal hypotheses. These results support the notion that judgements result from associative or connectionist processes and not from a two-step cognitive retrospective process in which an estimate of covariation is calculated between cue and outcome and then in a second step this information is used in a normative manner when a decision is made.