Beyond the internalism/externalism debate: The constitution of the space of perception

This paper tackles the problem of the nature of the space of perception. Based both on philosophical arguments and on results obtained from original experimental situations, it attempts to show how space is constituted concretely, before any distinction between the “inner” and the “outer” can be made. It thus sheds light on the presuppositions of the well-known debate between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind; it argues in favor of the latter position, but with arguments that are foundationally antecedent to this debate. We call the position we defend enactive externalism. It is based on experimental settings which, in virtue of their minimalism, make it possible both to defend a sensori-motor/enactive theory of perception; and, especially, to inquire into the origin of the space of perception, showing how it is concretely enacted before the controversy between internalism and externalism can even take place.     

Attention between phenomenology and experimental psychology

It is possible to consider attention as the modulating dimension of consciousness. Understood in this sense, attention can be a privileged theme for relating the first person point of view (conceived as a psycho-phenomenology inspired by the work of Husserl) to the experimental sciences (e.g. psychology, neuropsychology, etc.), which have done a great deal of work on attention. This article will take up in succession some different points of view regarding the status of attention and its structure (e.g. static aspects). It will also consider the dynamic of attention from a micro-genetic point of view as well as a functional point of view. The final section will seek to show not only the unique and original contributions of each perspective, but also each perspective's limitations and biases.     

Lengthening the duration of response execution does not modulate blindness to action-compatible stimuli.

Action-compatible blindness refers to the finding that target stimuli are perceived less frequently if they are presented during the planning or execution of a compatible action (e.g., a left arrow presented during a left manual key press) than during an incompatible action (Müsseler & Hommel, 1997 a, b). We investigated the effect of lengthening the response execution phase in the action-compatible blindness paradigm by requiring subjects to tap a response key once or three times on the assumption that tapping three times would increase the duration of the execution phase of the response. Prior research (e.g., Stevanovski, Oriet, & Jolicoeur, 2002; Wühr & Müsseler, 2001) has shown that larger blindness effects are observed for targets presented during the execution phase of a response than after the response has been made. We investigated whether a larger blindness effect would be observed in the three-tap condition than in the one-tap condition, or whether lengthening the duration of the response would extend the time course of the blindness effect. Neither of these possibilities was supported by the data irrespective of whether the number of taps to be made was blocked or mixed within a block of trials. The results are discussed in terms of current accounts of action-compatible blindness and the possible cognitive differences between making a single response and repeating a response.     

Why untrained control groups provide invalid baselines: A reply to Dienes and Altmann

Dienes and Altmann argue that an untrained control group provides a reliable baseline to measure artificial grammar learning. In this reply, we first provide a fictitious example to demonstrate that this assessment is faulty. We then analyse why this assessment is wrong, and we reiterate the solution proposed in Reber and Perruchet (this issue) for a proper control. Finally, we point out the importance of these methodological principles in the context of implicit learning studies.     

Book Review

Sohan and Celia MODGIL. Piagetian Research: Compilation and Commentary, 8 volumes. Windsor, Berks.: N.F.E.R. Publishing Co, 1976.