Why is Gandhi Wise? A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Gandhi as an Exemplar of Wisdom

This study explores cross-cultural differences in why Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi is nominated as an historical exemplar of wisdom. We compare the answers of emerging adults (aged 18–30) from three populations: Indian citizens, Canadian citizens, and Indian immigrants to Canada. Chi-square analyses showed that these groups emphasize significantly different aspects of Gandhi’s wisdom: Canadian citizens see Gandhi’s wisdom as practical and intellectual; Indian citizens see Gandhi’s wisdom as practical and benevolent; Indian immigrants to Canada consider Gandhi to integrate benevolent, intellectual, and practical aspects of wisdom; they also differ significantly in attributes associated with their implicit theory about his wisdom. Participants who know more about Gandhi also claim that he had a greater impact on their own lives. These findings suggest that historical exemplars of wisdom are filtered through the sociocultural contexts of each participant’s own lived experience, but that they still can be an inspiration in personally meaningful ways.     

Moral affect and cognitive processes: Differentiating shame from guilt among men and women

Men (n = 103) and women (n = 183) completed measures of shame, guilt, self-critical cognitions, and perfectionism in order to explore gender differences in cognitive processes associated with moral affect. Women reported significantly higher rates of shame and guilt than men. Separate factor analyses for gender indicated that for men, shame loaded with self-critical cognitions while guilt loaded with dimensions of perfectionism. For women, both shame and guilt loaded with self-critical cognitions, but only socially-prescribed perfectionism. Results suggest that a person's gender may need to be considered in evaluations of shame and guilt.     

Psychometric validation of two Procrastination inventories for adults: Arousal and avoidance measures

Lay's (1986) General Procrastination (GP) and McCown and Johnson's (1989) Adult Inventory for Procrastination (AIP) measures were evaluated across two studies. In Study 1, both inventories were administered to two groups of college students (Sample 1 n=52; Sample 2 n=59), who were asked to return completed scales before the end of the semester. Students' attendance rates at study groups, test grades, and time required to complete multiple choice items on two exams also were recorded. Results indicated that high procrastination scores were related to a higher number of days to return completed inventories but not attendance, exams scores, or test-taking time. In Study 2, nontraditional age university students (n=215) were asked to complete procrastination measures as well as sensation-seeking, need for cognition, and self-esteem inventories. Factor analysis indicated that scores on Lay's (1986) scale loaded on sensation-seeking, while McCown and Johnson's (1989) scale loaded negatively with need for cognition and self-esteem variables. It would appear that although the scales assessed procrastinatory behavior, one inventory is indicative of sensation-seeking and the other the avoidance of poor self-esteem.Data for Study 1/Sample 1 and Study 2 were collected when the author was a Visiting Assistant Professor at Baruch College/CUNY. The author thanks instructors for permitting class time to be devoted to the data collection process. Also, the author thanks Bill McCown and Clarry Lay for editing an early draft of this paper.     

Procrastination as self‐regulation failure of performance: effects of cognitive load,self‐awareness,and time limits on ‘working best under pressure’

Effects of cognitive load, objective self‐awareness and time limits on the self‐regulation of performance speed and accuracy were investigated between procrastinators and non‐procrastinators. In experiment 1 chronic procrastinators completed fewer items (slow speed) and made more errors (less accuracy) than non‐procrastinators under high but not low cognitive load conditions when the time span was limited and brief. In experiment 2 chronic procrastinators performed slower than non‐procrastinators under a 2 second, but not under no limit, 1 second, or 4 second time limit conditions. Chronic procrastinators compared to non‐procrastinators also performed more slowly and made more performance errors under objective self‐awareness conditions regardless of the length of time. These experiments indicate that chronic procrastinators regulate ineffectively their performance speed and accuracy when they ‘work under pressure’ (defined by high cognitive load, objective self‐awareness, and imposed time limitations). Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mirror Neurons and the Evolution of Embodied Language

ABSTRACT— Mirror neurons are a class of neurons first discovered in the monkey premotor cortex that activate both when the monkey executes an action and when it observes the same action made by another individual. These neurons enable individuals to understand actions performed by others. Two subcategories of mirror neurons in monkeys activate when they listen to action sounds and when they observe communicative gestures made by others, respectively. The properties of mirror neurons could constitute a substrate from which more sophisticated forms of communication evolved; this would make sense, given the anatomical and functional homology between part of the monkey premotor cortex and Broca's area (the "speech" area of the brain) in humans. We hypothesize that several components of human language, including some aspects of phonology and syntax, could be embedded in the organizational properties of the motor system and that a deeper knowledge of this system could shed light on how language evolved.     

Neurophysiological bases underlying the organization of intentional actions and the understanding of others’ intention

Philosophical and neuroscientific investigation on intentional actions focused on several different aspects, making difficult to define what should be meant with the concept of intention. Most of our everyday actions are constituted by complex and finely organized motor sequences, planned and executed in order to attain a desired final goal. In this paper, we will identify the final goal of the action as the motor intention of the acting individual. First, we will review the relative contribution of the vast neuroscientific literature on the role of different cortical areas in the organization of goal-directed movement. In particular, we will describe recent data on the cortical organization of natural action sequences, showing that this organization could be at the basis not only of our capacity of acting intentionally, but also of our ability to understand the motor intentions underlying others’ behaviour which is crucial during social interactions.