Out of sight, out of mind: the presence of forensic evidence counts more than its absence

Recent evidence suggests that decision makers in criminal procedures are susceptible to biases. We previously found support for the presence of a feature positive effect (FPE, i.e., people attach more meaning to present than to absent information) in legal-decision making. In this study, we tried to uncover the mechanisms behind the FPE. Taking a cue from the literature on situation models in language comprehension, we investigated whether a FPE manifests itself in the memorization and use of forensic evidence. Students read a case file about a fistfight as well as additional evidence. The forensic evidence was manipulated such that a FPE on guilt estimation and conviction rate could be assessed. While subjects read additional forensic evidence, their eye movements were recorded to explore the presence of FPE in online processing. Afterwards, subjects were asked to decide on the suspect's guilt. They had to recall all information they remembered from the case file and indicate which parts of information they considered relevant to this decision. The results provided evidence for the occurrence of FPE in memorization and use of information and can be explained by the theoretical construct of situation models.     

Developing procedural flexibility: Are novices prepared to learn from comparing procedures?

Background. A key learning outcome in problem‐solving domains is the development of procedural flexibility, where learners know multiple procedures and use them appropriately to solve a range of problems (e.g., Verschaffel, Luwel, Torbeyns, & Van Dooren, 2009 ). However, students often fail to become flexible problem solvers in mathematics. To support flexibility, teaching standards in many countries recommend that students be exposed to multiple procedures early in instruction and be encouraged to compare them. Aims. We experimentally evaluated this recommended instructional practice for supporting procedural flexibility during a classroom lesson, relative to two alternative conditions. The alternatives reflected the common instructional practice of delayed exposure to multiple procedures, either with or without comparison of procedures. Sample. Grade 8 students from two public schools (N= 198) were randomly assigned to condition. Students had not received prior instruction on multi‐step equation solving, which was the topic of our lessons. Method. Students learned about multi‐step equation solving under one of three conditions in math class for about 3 hr. They also completed a pre‐test, post‐test, and 1‐month‐retention test on their procedural knowledge, procedural flexibility, and conceptual knowledge of equation solving. Results. Novices who compared procedures immediately were more flexible problem solvers than those who did not, even on a 1‐month retention test. Although condition had limited direct impact on conceptual and procedural knowledge, greater flexibility was associated with greater knowledge of both types. Conclusions. Comparing procedures can support flexibility in novices and early introduction to multiple procedures may be one important reason.     

The time course of argument reactivation revealed: using the visual world paradigm

Previous research has found that the single argument of unaccusative verbs (such as fall) is reactivated during sentence processing, but the argument of agentive verbs (such as jump) is not (Bever & Sanz, 1997; Friedmann, Taranto, Shapiro, & Swinney, 2008). An open question so far was whether this difference in processing is caused by a difference in thematic roles the verbs assign, or a difference in the underlying syntactic structure. In the present study we tease apart these two potential sources. In order to achieve this, we included a set of verbs (like sparkle) which are equal to unaccusative verbs in the thematic role they assign to their argument, but equal to agentive verbs in the syntactic status of their argument (henceforth mixed verbs). As a method we used the visual world paradigm as this enables us to measure processing of the sentences continuously. This method also allowed us to test another hypothesis, namely the hypothesis that not only the argument of unaccusative verbs is reactivated during processing, but also the argument of agentive verbs. This reactivation is expected as the result of integrating the verb and its argument into one representation. In our experiment, participants listened to sentences including one of the three types of verbs. While listening, they viewed a visual display in which one of four objects was strongly related to the argument of the verb (wood-saw). The gaze record showed that the eyes moved to the related object (saw) upon presentation of the argument (wood). More interestingly, the eyes moved back to the related object upon presentation of the verb (fell). We found that looks to the related object increase only late after verb offset for unaccusative verbs, replicating the findings of previous research. We also found a rise in looks to the related object in agentive verbs, but this rise took place much earlier, starting slightly after verb onset. Finally, we found that mixed verbs pattern in processing with agentive verbs. We conclude that the argument of the verb is always reactivated, independent of verb type. In addition, the timing of integration differs per verb type and depends on the syntactic status of the argument and not on the thematic role that is assigned to the argument.     

Causal imprinting in causal structure learning

Suppose one observes a correlation between two events, B and C, and infers that B causes C. Later one discovers that event A explains away the correlation between B and C. Normatively, one should now dismiss or weaken the belief that B causes C. Nonetheless, participants in the current study who observed a positive contingency between B and C followed by evidence that B and C were independent given A, persisted in believing that B causes C. The authors term this difficulty in revising initially learned causal structures "causal imprinting." Throughout four experiments, causal imprinting was obtained using multiple dependent measures and control conditions. A Bayesian analysis showed that causal imprinting may be normative under some conditions, but causal imprinting also occurred in the current study when it was clearly non-normative. It is suggested that causal imprinting occurs due to the influence of prior knowledge on how reasoners interpret later evidence. Consistent with this view, when participants first viewed the evidence showing that B and C are independent given A, later evidence with only B and C did not lead to the belief that B causes C.     

Keeping People In or Out?

Abstract : In this article I argue that the Lutheran doctrine of two kingdoms provides a good basis for the legitimate participation of all citizens in political discourse and decisions, no matter what faith they hold. The argument is backed by selected insights from philosopher Jürgen Habermas and sociologists Linda Woodhead and Paul Heelas. Against this backdrop, I suggest some challenges for a theology that addresses issues related to religion and society.     

Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan: Religion and Politics in United States War‐Culture

Abstract : This article digs beneath the surface of American assumptions regarding war to explore the ethical interconnections between national identity, war, and religion. Striking differences emerge between the dynamics of religion and politics with regard to war and peace in presidential speeches regarding the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, and the analysis of war from an earlier generation, encapsulated by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s “Beyond Vietnam: A Call to Conscience,” from 1967. Study of this political discourse helps us better understand our own reality in the United States, and the moral consequences of our beliefs about war, sacrifice, the human character, and the identity of the nation.     

APOLOGIZING WITHOUT REGRET

A common belief about the nature of agent regret is that regretting some event E is closely linked to being sorry for the occurrence of E. Or more specifically, that if one is sorry for E then she must regret E. I will call this ‘the sorry‐regret hypothesis’. My contention is that one may be sorry for some action but not regret it. I take the rejection of this ‘truism’ to be a positive development. I offer two lines of argument for rejecting the sorry‐regret hypothesis. One line of argument is based on counterexamples. The second attacks the validity of a reconstructed argument for the sorry‐regret hypothesis. It is desirable to reject the sorry‐regret hypothesis since there is a component of regret that many will not wish to be saddled with as a condition of apologizing. To regret an act, one must wish that she had not performed that act. Since a person is the person she is (speaking loosely) because of the actions she has performed, for many actions, if one regrets an action, then she wishes that she were a different person. This is a worrisome consequence.     

Moral signals, public outrage, and immaterial harms

Public outrage is often triggered by “immaterially” harmful acts (i.e., acts with relatively negligible consequences). A well-known example involves corporate salaries and perks: they generate public outrage yet their financial cost is relatively minor. The present research explains this paradox by appealing to a person-centered approach to moral judgment. Strong moral reactions can occur when relatively harmless acts provide highly diagnostic information about moral character. Studies 1a and 1b first demonstrate dissociation between moral evaluations of persons and their actions—although violence toward a human was viewed as a more blameworthy act than violence toward an animal, the latter was viewed as more revealing of bad moral character. Study 2 then shows that person-centered cues directly influence moral judgments—participants preferred to hire a more expensive CEO when the alternative candidate requested a frivolous perk as part of his compensation package, an effect mediated by the informativeness of his request.