Mechanisms of priming of pop-out: Stored representations or feature-gain modulations?

Previous research has shown that repetition of a task-relevant attention-capturing feature facilitates popout search. This priming of pop-out effect is due to some residual memory from recent trials. We explore two possible mechanisms of priming of pop-out: a top-down attentional benefit from a memory of the previous target representation that is stored in visual short-term memory (VSTM) and a bottom-up change of attentional gains from perceptual features of the previously attended target. We manipulated participants’ ability to form a memory trace in VSTM by occupying it with a distractor task and found that occupying VSTM did not interfere with priming of pop-out. We next manipulated attentional gains associated with feature values by inserting an irrelevant task between pop-out searches. We found that the color of the target from the intervening perceptual task influenced pop-out search: The current pop-out search was facilitated when the intervening task’s target matched the target color of the pop-out search. These results suggest that priming of pop-out might not be due to a memory trace of the previous targets in VSTM but, rather, might be due to changes in attentional control based on priming from relatively low-level feature representations of previously attended objects.     

Perceptual load modulates attentional capture by abrupt onsets

The abrupt appearance of a new object captures attention, even when the object is task irrelevant. These findings suggest that abrupt onsets capture attention in a stimulus-driven manner and are not susceptible to top-down influences on attentional control. However, previous studies examining the ability of abrupt onsets to capture attention have used search displays that lacked significant complexity. Because attention is a limited capacity mechanism, it is possible that increasing the complexity, or perceptual load, of the search arrays may modulate capture by abrupt onsets. We used a flanker task to examine the effect of perceptual load on attentional capture by abruptly appearing objects. Subjects searched for a target letter through low-load (set size=1) and high-load (set size=6) displays. On each trial, irrelevant flankers also appeared, one as an onset and the other as an offset. Onset flankers affected search in low-load but not high-load displays. This modulation of attentional capture was not caused by generalized slowing when subjects searched through high-load displays; search for a single perceptually degraded target slowed response times but did not affect attentional capture. These findings demonstrate that attentional capture by an abrupt onset is attenuated when people search through high-load scenes.     

Teleological Essentialism

Placeholder essentialism is the view that there is a causal essence that holds category members together, though we may not know what the essence is. Sometimes the placeholder can be filled in by scientific essences, such as when we acquire scientific knowledge that the atomic weight of gold is 79. We challenge the view that placeholders are elaborated by scientific essences. In our view, if placeholders are elaborated, they are elaborated by Aristotelian essences, a telos. Utilizing the same kind of experiments used by traditional essentialists—involving superficial change (study 1), transformation of insides (study 2), acquired traits (study 3), and inferences about offspring (study 4)—we find support for the view that essences are elaborated by a telos. And we find evidence (study 5) that teleological essences may generate category judgments.     

Children's counterfactual inferences about long and short causal chains

Recent findings on counterfactual reasoning in children have led to the claim that children's developing capacities in the domain of ‘theory of mind’ might reflect the emergence of the ability to engage in counterfactual thinking over the preschool period (e.g. Riggs, Peterson, Robinson & Mitchell, 1998 ). In the study reported here, groups of 3- and 4-year old children were presented with stories describing causal chains of several events, and asked counterfactual thinking tasks involving changes to different points in the chain. The ability to draw successful counterfactual inferences depended strongly on the inferential length of the problem, and the age of the children; while 3-year-olds performed above chance on short inference counterfactuals, they performed below chance on problems involving longer inference chains. Four-year-old children were above chance on all problems. Moreover, it was found that while success on longer chain inference problems was significantly correlated with the ability to pass tests of standard false belief, there was no such relationship for short inference problems, which were significantly easier than false belief problems. These results are discussed in terms of the developmental relationships between causal knowledge, counterfactual thinking and calculating the contents of mental states.     

Object-based control of attention is sensitive to recent experience

How is attention guided by past experience? In visual search, numerous studies have shown that recent trials influence responses to the current trial. Repeating features such as color, shape, or location of a target facilitates performance. Here we examine whether recent experience also modulates a more abstract dimension of attentional control, object-based and location-based control. Participants performed a cued target discrimination task with stimuli presented on 2 rectangles. Response times to targets appearing in an uncued location on a cued rectangle were faster than to targets on the uncued rectangle, demonstrating an object-based attentional benefit. We investigated the object-based benefit on the current trial contingent on the cue-target relationship on the previous trial. The object-based benefit was significant only when the cued object contained the target on the previous trial, not when the uncued object contained the target. This effect of recent experience was not due to either the repetition of spatial cue-target location or the repetition of the response, but to adaptation to contingencies in the environment. Our results suggest a unifying view of attentional control that spans the concrete dimensions of control (e.g., determining the relative importance of red vs. blue) to the abstract (determining the relative importance of objects vs. locations in space). Attention closely tracks the short time scale structure of the environment and automatically adapts to optimize performance to this structure.     

Searching for two things at once: Establishment of multiple attentional control settings on a trial-by-trial basis

Recent work has demonstrated that attention can be configured to multiple potential targets in spatial search. However, this previous work relied on a fixed set of targets across multiple trials, allowing observers to offload attentional control settings to longer-term representations. In the present experiments, we demonstrate multiple attentional control settings that operate independently of space (Experiments 1 and 2). More important, we show that observers can be cued to different control settings on a trial-by-trial basis (Experiment 3). The latter result suggests that observers were capable of maintaining multiple control settings when the demands of the task required an attentional search for specific feature values. Attention can be configured to extract multiple feature values in a goal-directed manner, and this configuration can be can be dynamically engaged on a trial-by-trial basis. These results support recent findings that reveal the high precision, complexity, and flexibility of attentional control settings.