We all live in Germany but … Ingroup projection,group‐based emotions and prejudice against immigrants

Immigration, cultural diversity and integration are among the most central challenges for modern societies. Integration is often impeded by negative emotions and prejudices held by the majority members towards immigrants in a common society. Based on the ingroup projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), we examined the impact of perceived relative ingroup prototypicality on intergroup emotions and prejudice. Additionally, we examined whether this impact is causal and explored the issue of causality in more detail contrasting a linear causal model with bi‐directional or reciprocal causality. Hypotheses were tested in a study with a two‐wave panel of majority members (N=1085) in Germany. We examined the proposed relations between relative ingroup prototypicality, intergroup emotions and prejudice and determined the causal direction of these relationships. Results support the predictive power of relative ingroup prototypicality on intergroup emotions and prejudice. Moreover, most causal relations between our measures are reciprocally causal. We discuss the implications of these findings for the general conception of prejudice and intergroup emotions. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An exploratory study of the relationship between diverse life events and specific personality disorders in a sample of suicide attempters

Personality disorder (PD) increases risk for suicidal behavior. Certain life events (LE) can precipitate suicidal behaviors in patients with PD. A fundamental question is whether specific combinations of LE and PD increase suicidal risk. Four hundred forty-six suicide attempters (SA) were recruited from emergency rooms. We used a healthy control group (n = 515) to identify the best cut-off point for the instrument used to diagnose PD. We used the DSM-IV version of the International Personality Disorder Questionnaire-Screening Questionnaire, the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview, and the Social Adjustment Scale to assess PD, Axis I disorders, and LE, respectively. After controlling for Axis I disorders, we found that "Death of spouse" preceded suicidal acts in those with antisocial PD (FET p = 0.024) and patients with narcissistic PD attempted suicide after being Fired at work (FET p = 0.002), among others. Our data suggest the presence of particular LE-PD associations in suicide attempters. Some LE-PD relationships appear independent of Axis I disorders in suicide attempters. This may offer a basis for specific targeted therapies or prevention programs aimed at decreasing suicidal risk.     

Motivation to support a desired conclusion versus motivation to avoid an undesirable conclusion: The case of infra‐humanization

Social motivation has been shown to influence various cognitive processes. In the present paper, it is verified that people are motivated to view out‐groups as possessing a lesser degree of humanity than the in‐group (Leyens et al., 2000 ) and that this motivation influences logical processing in the Wason selection task. So far, studies on infra‐humanization have been shown to influence attribution of uniquely human characteristics to groups. Most of these studies focused on the attribution of secondary emotions. Results have shown that secondary emotions are preferentially attributed to in‐group members (Leyens et al., 2001 ). Also, people tend to react differently to in‐group and out‐group members displaying secondary emotions (Gaunt, Leyens, & Sindic, 2004 ; Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003 ). In the present paper, it is argued that infra‐humanization is a two‐direction bias and that it does influence logical processing among perceivers. Specifically, infra‐humanization motivation impacts logical processing in two different directions. First, most motivation is spent to reach the desirable conclusion that the in‐group is uniquely human. Second, least motivation occurs to support the undesirable conclusion that the out‐group is uniquely human. These hypotheses are tested in four cross‐cultural studies that varied the status and the conflicting relations between groups. Results were in line with the predictions and further confirmed that infra‐humanization biases can be obtained independently of status and conflict (but see Cortes, Demoulin, Leyens, & de Renesse, 2005 ). The discussion relates these findings with in‐group favouritism and out‐group derogation (Brewer, 1999 ) and underlines the importance of infra‐humanization in counteracting system justification biases (Jost & Banaji, 1994 ).     

The lay distinction between primary and secondary emotions: A spontaneous categorization?

In line with the psychological essentialism perspective, Leyens et al. ( 13 2000) have hypothesized that people attribute different essences to groups and that they attribute more uniquely human characteristics to their own group than to out‐groups. Leyens et al. have focused on two types of emotions, which in Roman languages have specific labels, such as sentimientos and emociones in Spanish. A cross‐cultural study showed that sentimientos (or secondary emotions) are considered uniquely human emotions whereas emociones (or primary emotions) are perceived as nonuniquely human emotions. The present study focuses on whether this categorization into primary and secondary emotions is a spontaneous distinction that people use in their everyday lives, or whether, on the contrary, it is the result of experimental demands. The paradigm “Who says what to whom” was used to test this question. Geometrical shapes of different colours were systematically associated with different stimuli that varied in meaningfulness. In a first condition, shapes were associated with small or large items of furniture (meaningful categories) and with primary and secondary emotions. In a second condition, the items of furniture were replaced by words ending with a vowel or a consonant (meaningless categories). Subsequently, participants had to recognize which shape was associated with each stimulus. Intra‐category errors were significantly more numerous than inter‐category errors, except for the words ending with a vowel or a consonant. Stated otherwise, types of emotions were recognized like the meaningful difference between items of furniture. These results show that the distinction between primary and secondary emotions is an implicit one that people use spontaneously, and not as a result of task demands. The findings are discussed from the perspective of psychological essentialism and inter‐group relations.     

Agent communication pragmatics: the cognitive coherence approach

Different approaches have investigated the syntax and semantics of agent communication languages. However, these approaches have not indicated how agents should dynamically use communications. Instead of filling this pragmatics gap, most approaches have mainly focused on the ‘structure’ of dialogues even though developers are more interested in agents’ capabilities of having ‘useful’ automated conversations with respect to their goals rather than in their abilities to structure dialogues. This led us to work on a theory of the use of conversations between agents. In this paper, we propose a pragmatics theory which extends and adapts the cognitive dissonance theory (a major theory of social psychology) to multi-agent systems by unifying it with the theory of coherence in thought and action that issues from computational philosophy of mind. Precisely, we show how this theory allows us to provide generic conceptual tools for the automation of both agent communicational behavior and attitude change processes. This new motivational model is formulated in terms of constraints and elements of cognition and allows us to define cognitive incoherences and dialogue utility measures. We show how these measures could be used to solve common problems and answer some critical questions concerning agent communication frameworks use. Finally, our exploration in applying the cognitive coherence pragmatics theory as a new communication layer over classical BDI agents is presented. It relies on our dialogue games based agent communication language (DIAGAL) and our dialogue games simulator toolbox (DGS). The resulting framework provides the necessary theoretical and practical elements for implementing our theory. In doing so, it brings in a general scheme for automatizing agents’ communicational behavior as it is exemplified in this article.     

Academic Citizenship: An Academic Colleagues’ Working Paper

Universities are facing a critical challenge; university citizenship has steadily declined over the last few decades. As a self-governing entity, most of the foundational elements of a university community are within its own control. As a result, the health and future welfare of the institution depends greatly on the quality of its leaders and robustness of its governing structure. These in turn depend on the quality of those undertaking leadership roles and serving on governing bodies and on the degree to which they reflect its values and aspirations. Maximising the probability that these desiderata will be achieved requires a broad-based faculty willingness to serve conscientiously on these bodies and to serve as administrators to be involved in selecting members, and to be involved on the myriad of sub-committees, task forces, departmental committees, and the like. It is not only an abdication of citizenship to leave governance and administration of the institution to a few willing faculty, it is dangerous and puts at risk the welfare of the institution. Even if these few were all able to place the welfare of the institution above their own particular agendas and their self-interest (not something on which to count), the process of self-selection could not be expected to result in a group that would adequately reflect, represent or understand the breadth and depth of the needs, aspirations and complex circumstances of the entire institution. The larger the pool of willing participants, the greater the probability that those selected will reflect best the institutional diversity. This paper draws out the rights and obligations of faculty citizens embedded in the structural arrangements common to universities in the western world. In part A we examine three fundamental components of those arrangements, components that collectively define certain rights and entail certain obligations of citizenship. These obligations flow in part from essential rights, and also in part from what is necessary to sustain the viability and vibrancy of the community. In Part B, we examine some of these essential obligations of citizenship. In Part C, we make recommendations about how to promote effective citizenship; these recommendations are collected after Part C under the heading “Recommendations.”     

In Defense of a Disputed Study of Construct Validity from South Africa

This analysis of a critique finds that the original study accurately showed that the items found easy or difficult by Black South African undergraduates were those found easy or difficult by their White and South Asian counterparts (r's=.90). There was no evidence of any culture‐specific effect. Instead, African/non‐African differences were found to be most pronounced on g. This was shown by item‐total correlations (estimates of the item's g loading), which predicted the magnitude of African/non‐African differences on those same items, and by a confirmatory factor analysis. The tests were equally predictive for Blacks and non‐Blacks on external criteria such as course grades. The results indicate the remarkable cross‐cultural generalizability of item properties across sub‐Saharan Africans, South Asians, and Europeans and that these reflect g more than culturally specific ways of thinking.     

From the Critique of judgment to the hermeneutics of nature: Sketching the fate of philosophy of nature after Kant

This paper proposes an interpretative framework for some developments of the philosophy of nature after Kant. I emphasize the critique of the economy of nature in the Critique of judgement. I argue that it resulted in a split of a previous structure of knowledge; such a structure articulated natural theology and natural philosophy on the basis of the consideration of the order displayed by living beings, both in their internal organisation and their ecological distribution. The possibility of a philosophical discourse on nature that is neither mathematical nor theological stemmed from this shift. I call “hermeneutics of nature” such a program, since it aims at unpacking an immanent meaning in nature that is not explicated by the sciences of nature, which are dealing with the laws of nature. The Naturphilosophie, undertaken by Schelling, as well as the philosophies of nature of Hegel and Schopenhauer, are several realizations of this program. I highlight the structural traits that they share, such as a pregnant sense of conflicts in nature, an emphasis on the riddles of gender, and above all a prominent status given to organisms as a clue to the meaning of nature. Finally, I try to sketch the ramifications of this hermeneutics of nature in contemporary philosophy, especially phenomenology, and argue that the coming philosophy of nature, as shown by the attempts of syntheses between phenomenology and ecology, seems to depart from this hermeneutical program.     

Unemployment and discrimination against youth of immigrant origin in Switzerland: When the name makes the difference

Although the percentage of foreigners residing in Switzerland is as high as 20%, it was not until the nineties that the country set up an official integration policy. Unemployment among immigrants was one of the main reasons that prompted this significant change. The policy accorded priority to newcomers. This article, which draws on two recent studies on integration of youth of immigrant descent conducted at the Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies, shows, however, that integration problems also concern established youth; despite holding the same qualifications as the locals, they face discrimination in entering the labour market.     

Demonstrative Concepts Without Re-Identification

Conceptualism in the philosophy of perception is the doctrine that perceptual experiences have a fully conceptualized content. Conceptualists have laid particular emphasis on the role demonstrative concepts play in experience, in order to deal with the objection that experiences are fine-grained. Normal perceivers, they point out, are able to form fine-grained demonstrative color concepts for the specific shades they perceptually discriminate. Recently, however, Sean Kelly (2001b: ‘Demonstrative concepts and Experience’, The Philosophical Review 110 (3), 397–420.) has argued that, in order to possess a particular demonstrative concept, a perceiver must be able to re-identify things which fall under that concept. Since normal perceivers typically fail at such re-identification, he concludes, they do not in fact possess demonstrative concepts for the specific shades of color they experience. In response to Kelly’s attempt to resurrect the objection from the fineness of grain of experience, I argue that his defense of this Re-identification constraint (i) is not as intuitive as it might seem, (ii) is ill-motivated, and (iii) appears to rest on a conflation between different kinds of concepts.