Academic Citizenship: An Academic Colleagues’ Working Paper

Universities are facing a critical challenge; university citizenship has steadily declined over the last few decades. As a self-governing entity, most of the foundational elements of a university community are within its own control. As a result, the health and future welfare of the institution depends greatly on the quality of its leaders and robustness of its governing structure. These in turn depend on the quality of those undertaking leadership roles and serving on governing bodies and on the degree to which they reflect its values and aspirations. Maximising the probability that these desiderata will be achieved requires a broad-based faculty willingness to serve conscientiously on these bodies and to serve as administrators to be involved in selecting members, and to be involved on the myriad of sub-committees, task forces, departmental committees, and the like. It is not only an abdication of citizenship to leave governance and administration of the institution to a few willing faculty, it is dangerous and puts at risk the welfare of the institution. Even if these few were all able to place the welfare of the institution above their own particular agendas and their self-interest (not something on which to count), the process of self-selection could not be expected to result in a group that would adequately reflect, represent or understand the breadth and depth of the needs, aspirations and complex circumstances of the entire institution. The larger the pool of willing participants, the greater the probability that those selected will reflect best the institutional diversity. This paper draws out the rights and obligations of faculty citizens embedded in the structural arrangements common to universities in the western world. In part A we examine three fundamental components of those arrangements, components that collectively define certain rights and entail certain obligations of citizenship. These obligations flow in part from essential rights, and also in part from what is necessary to sustain the viability and vibrancy of the community. In Part B, we examine some of these essential obligations of citizenship. In Part C, we make recommendations about how to promote effective citizenship; these recommendations are collected after Part C under the heading “Recommendations.”     

In Defense of a Disputed Study of Construct Validity from South Africa

This analysis of a critique finds that the original study accurately showed that the items found easy or difficult by Black South African undergraduates were those found easy or difficult by their White and South Asian counterparts (r's=.90). There was no evidence of any culture‐specific effect. Instead, African/non‐African differences were found to be most pronounced on g. This was shown by item‐total correlations (estimates of the item's g loading), which predicted the magnitude of African/non‐African differences on those same items, and by a confirmatory factor analysis. The tests were equally predictive for Blacks and non‐Blacks on external criteria such as course grades. The results indicate the remarkable cross‐cultural generalizability of item properties across sub‐Saharan Africans, South Asians, and Europeans and that these reflect g more than culturally specific ways of thinking.     

From the Critique of judgment to the hermeneutics of nature: Sketching the fate of philosophy of nature after Kant

This paper proposes an interpretative framework for some developments of the philosophy of nature after Kant. I emphasize the critique of the economy of nature in the Critique of judgement. I argue that it resulted in a split of a previous structure of knowledge; such a structure articulated natural theology and natural philosophy on the basis of the consideration of the order displayed by living beings, both in their internal organisation and their ecological distribution. The possibility of a philosophical discourse on nature that is neither mathematical nor theological stemmed from this shift. I call “hermeneutics of nature” such a program, since it aims at unpacking an immanent meaning in nature that is not explicated by the sciences of nature, which are dealing with the laws of nature. The Naturphilosophie, undertaken by Schelling, as well as the philosophies of nature of Hegel and Schopenhauer, are several realizations of this program. I highlight the structural traits that they share, such as a pregnant sense of conflicts in nature, an emphasis on the riddles of gender, and above all a prominent status given to organisms as a clue to the meaning of nature. Finally, I try to sketch the ramifications of this hermeneutics of nature in contemporary philosophy, especially phenomenology, and argue that the coming philosophy of nature, as shown by the attempts of syntheses between phenomenology and ecology, seems to depart from this hermeneutical program.     

Unemployment and discrimination against youth of immigrant origin in Switzerland: When the name makes the difference

Although the percentage of foreigners residing in Switzerland is as high as 20%, it was not until the nineties that the country set up an official integration policy. Unemployment among immigrants was one of the main reasons that prompted this significant change. The policy accorded priority to newcomers. This article, which draws on two recent studies on integration of youth of immigrant descent conducted at the Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies, shows, however, that integration problems also concern established youth; despite holding the same qualifications as the locals, they face discrimination in entering the labour market.     

Demonstrative Concepts Without Re-Identification

Conceptualism in the philosophy of perception is the doctrine that perceptual experiences have a fully conceptualized content. Conceptualists have laid particular emphasis on the role demonstrative concepts play in experience, in order to deal with the objection that experiences are fine-grained. Normal perceivers, they point out, are able to form fine-grained demonstrative color concepts for the specific shades they perceptually discriminate. Recently, however, Sean Kelly (2001b: ‘Demonstrative concepts and Experience’, The Philosophical Review 110 (3), 397–420.) has argued that, in order to possess a particular demonstrative concept, a perceiver must be able to re-identify things which fall under that concept. Since normal perceivers typically fail at such re-identification, he concludes, they do not in fact possess demonstrative concepts for the specific shades of color they experience. In response to Kelly’s attempt to resurrect the objection from the fineness of grain of experience, I argue that his defense of this Re-identification constraint (i) is not as intuitive as it might seem, (ii) is ill-motivated, and (iii) appears to rest on a conflation between different kinds of concepts.     

Priming uniquely human emotions and the in‐group (but not the out‐group) activates humanity concepts

Documenting the behavioural consequences of infra‐humanization, Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, and Giovanazzi ( 2003 ) found that, in comparison to in‐group members, out‐group members are discriminated against when they express uniquely human emotions. It was assumed that expressing a uniquely human emotion makes an in‐group member, at least tacitly, more human than an out‐group member. Two studies tested this assumption and found, as predicted, that the human concept was more activated in an in‐group compared to an out‐group context when group members were associated with uniquely human emotions. The possible impact of valence was controlled for, showing that both positive and negative emotions endorsed the same effects (Study 1) and that the activation of the human concept was not a side effect of increased positivity (Study 2). The discussion focuses on the implications of the present studies and suggests new avenues of research. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How self‐compassion moderates the effect of body surveillance on subjective happiness and depression among women

According to objectification theory (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997), being treated as an object leads women to engage in self‐objectification, which in turn increases body surveillance and body shame as well as impairs mental health. However, very little is known about what factors could act as buffers against the detrimental consequences of self‐objectification. This paper seeks to understand the role of self‐compassion (the ability to kindly accept oneself or show self‐directed kindness while suffering) in the perception that women have of their own bodies. Results indicate that self‐compassion moderated the effect of body surveillance on depression and happiness separately among women. More specifically, for women low in self‐compassion, body surveillance was negatively associated with happiness, which was explained by increased depression. In sum, our results indicate that self‐compassion protects against the detrimental consequences of body surveillance.     

The role of moral utility in decision making: An interdisciplinary framework

What decisions should we make? Moral values, rules, and virtues provide standards for morally acceptable decisions, without prescribing how we should reach them. However, moral theories do assume that we are, at least in principle, capable of making the right decisions. Consequently, an empirical investigation of the methods and resources we use for making moral decisions becomes relevant. We consider theoretical parallels of economic decision theory and moral utilitarianism and suggest that moral decision making may tap into mechanisms and processes that have originally evolved for nonmoral decision making. For example, the computation of reward value occurs through the combination of probability and magnitude; similar computation might also be used for determining utilitarian moral value. Both nonmoral and moral decisions may resort to intuitions and heuristics. Learning mechanisms implicated in the assignment of reward value to stimuli, actions, and outcomes may also enable us to determine moral value and assign it to stimuli, actions, and outcomes. In conclusion, we suggest that moral capabilities can employ and benefit from a variety of nonmoral decision-making and learning mechanisms.     

Emotional prejudice,essentialism, and nationalism The 2002 Tajfel lecture

In explaining differences between groups, people ascribe the human essence to their ingroup and consider outgroups as less human. This phenomenon, called infra‐humanization, occurs outside people's awareness. Because secondary emotions (e.g. love, hope, contempt, resentment) are considered uniquely human emotions, people not only attribute more secondary emotions to their ingroup than to outgroups, but are reluctant to associate these emotions with outgroups. Moreover, people behave less cooperatively (in terms of altruism, imitation, and approach) with an outgroup member who expresses himself through secondary emotions. Infra‐humanization occurs for high and low status groups, even in the absence of conflict between groups. It does not occur when the outgroup target is adequately individualized, by a complete name or through perspective taking, for instance. The differential familiarity with the ingroup and the outgroup cannot explain infra‐humanization. Yet, preliminary results show that subjective essentialism and ingroup identification may mediate the effects of infra‐humanization. A connection is made between nationalism and infra‐humanization. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When prototypicality makes ‘maybes’ look more certain: Another look at targets' vigilance towards prejudice cues

In previous research, targets' sensitivity to prejudice cues has been assessed on the basis of two types of information. Prototypical information renders the situation representative of discrimination encountered by the ingroup. Diagnostic information is a direct indication that prejudice possibly is operating in a given situation. We hypothesize that, when available and processed at the onset of an evaluation situation, prototypical information shapes targets' understanding of subsequent diagnostic information. In three experiments, participants were informed that they were to be evaluated by relevant outgroup members either before or after having performed a task. Diagnostic information was always provided at the same moment, i.e. after the task was completed, and was either uncertain (prejudice may bias the evaluation) or certain (prejudice certainly biases the evaluation). In the before condition, attributions to prejudice were as elevated whatever participants were told that prejudice might, or certainly did, bias the evaluation. Furthermore, in the case of uncertain diagnostic information, those who were readily informed of the evaluator(s)' identity attributed their failure to prejudice to a greater extent than those who received this information later. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.