Some new results on factor indeterminacy

Some relations between maximum likelihood factor analysis and factor indeterminacy are discussed. Bounds are derived for the minimum average correlation between equivalent sets of correlated factors which depend on the latent roots of the factor intercorrelation matrix . Empirical examples are presented to illustrate some of the theory and indicate the extent to which it can be expected to be relevant in practice.     

Arousal and paired-associate learning

Walker and Tarte (1963) postulate that at short retention intervals high arousal paired-associates are reproduced more poorly than low arousal items. Walker and colleagues believe that this hypothesis is confirmed by their paired-associate learning studies. However, results of these paired-associate learning studies are position confounded artifacts. Better recall of low arousal items at short-term retention is caused by the coincidence of the recency effect and low arousal at the end of the trial. When these position effects are controlled there is no action decrement for the high arousal paired-associates. To test this assumption, the Kleinsmith and Kaplan study (1963) was replicated and two other variations were conducted. In these three studies with 76 subjects, which were tested at two minutes or 1 week, the action decrement occurs only when the two position effects coincide.     

A kinematic analysis of anticipatory coarticulation in the speech of anterior aphasic subjects using electromagnetic articulography

An investigation was made into the extent and time course of anticipatory coarticulation in the speech of two normal and two anterior aphasic, German-speaking subjects. Both labial and velar coarticulation gestures were investigated. Subjects produced sentences containing target words contrasting in postconsonantal vowel rounding (e.g., [geli:ge]/[gely:gel]) and in nasality (e.g., [ti:de]/[ti:ne]). Speech kinematics were monitored by means of electromagnetic articulography. The data revealed that for correct productions, aphasic speakers' coarticulatory patterns were more highly variable than those of control subjects. These differences, however, were found chiefly for spatial displacement characteristics, while the temporal aspects of articulator movement necessary for anticipatory coarticulation appeared largely intact. Articulator mistiming did not appear to explain a small corpus of stop/nasal substitution errors produced by one of the aphasic speakers.     

Toward a Process Analysis of Emotions: The Case of Surprise

Based on an earlier model of the processes elicited by surprising events, the present studies provide evidence for one of these processes, the evaluation of the surprising event's relevance for ongoing activities (action-relevance check). The central prediction tested was that, if unexpected events elicit among other processes an action-relevance check, then response delay on a concurrent task will be more pronounced in a condition where this process is more elaborate and hence takes more time. In accord with this prediction, Experiment 1 found that an unexpected appearance change of the imperative stimulus in a choice reaction time (RT) task caused greater response delay than an equivalent appearance change of a distractor stimulus. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and tested several additional predictions that concerned the effects on response delay of a second appearance change of either the imperative or the distractor stimuli. These predictions, which were also mostly confirmed, were derived by combining the logic underlying the first study with the assumption that once made, appraisals of unexpected events are stored as part of the situational schema and are reused when the same or similar events reoccur leading to an abbreviation of appraisal processes. Experiment 3 once more replicated the basic finding of the previous studies and ruled out a possible alternative explanation. It is suggested that the proposed RT method of process verification may be of broader interest as a tool to study appraisal processes in emotion.     

Input- and output-monitoring in implicit and explicit memory

Previous experiments have shown that the procedure of questioning subjects retrospectively about the input and output status of information (input and output monitoring) is a useful method for assessing the awareness states of subjects during implicit and explicit memory tasks. The main purpose of the present study was to investigate whether the previous findings could be extended to other implicit and explicit memory tasks. We were especially interested in whether differences in input- and output-monitoring performance can be observed when both the implicit and explicit memory tasks are conceptual ones. In a final test phase, the target items from the study phase and new distractor items were presented. In a recognition-like situation, subjects had to decide whether an item had been presented in the study phase (input status), as well as whether they had produced the item in the memory-test phase (output status). In all three experiments judgments about the input status - but only for those items that had been produced in the implicit or in the explicit memory test - were more precise after explicit than after implicit memory testings. This finding was not influenced by the distinction between perceptual and conceptual-memory tasks (Exp. 1), and was obtained under conditions in which the implicit and the explicit memory tasks were both conceptual and differed only in test instructions (Exps. 2 and 3). These results suggest that not only subjects performing a perceptual test of implicit memory, but also subjects in a conceptual implicit test were less aware of using information from a previous study episode than subjects who received memory instructions. It is concluded that requiring judgments about the input status of information is a good method for assessing subjects test awareness and is preferable to the use of a questionnaire (Exp. 3). In contrast, in all three experiments no differences were found with the output-monitoring measure between implicit and explicit test conditions.     

Axiomatic justifications of the utility principle: A formal investigation

It is argued that existing axiomatic theories of utility do not provide the utility principle or the principle of maximising expected utility with a formal justification. It is also argued that these theories only put mild constraints on a decision-maker in a decision-context. Finally, it is argued that the prospects are not particularly bright for finding formal non-circular arguments for the utility principle that do not rely on the law of large numbers.     

Early selective-attention effect on evoked potential reinterpreted

In a dichotic listening situation stimuli were presented one at a time and at random to either ear of the subject at constant inter-stimulus intervals of 800 msec. The subject's task was to detect and count occasional slightly different stimuli in one ear. In Experiment 1, these ‘signal’ stimuli were slightly louder, and in Experiment 2 they had a slightly higher pitch, than the much more frequent, ‘standard’, stimuli. In both experiments signals occured randomly at either ear. Separate evoked potentials from three different locations were recorded for each of the four kinds of stimuli (attended signals, unattended signals, attended standards, unattended standards). Contrary to Hillyard et al. (1973), no early (N₁ component) evoked-potential enhancement was observed to stimuli to the attended ear as compared with those to the unattended ear, but there was a later negative shift superimposed on potentials elicited by the former stimuli. This negative shift was considered identical to the N₁ enhancement of Hillyard and his colleagues which in the present study was forced, by the longer inter-stimulus interval used, to demonstrate temporal dissociation with the N₁ component. The ‘Hillyard effect’ was, consequently, explained as being caused by a superimposition of a CNV kind of negative shift on the evoked potential to the attended stimuli rather than by a growth of the ‘real’ N₁ component of the evoked potential.