The limits of the just-too-different argument

According to moral non-naturalism, the kind of genuine or robust normativity that is characteristic of moral requirements cannot be accounted for within a wholly naturalistic worldview, but requires us to posit a domain of non-natural properties and facts. The main argument for this core non-naturalist claim appeals to what David Enoch calls the ‘just-too-different intuition’. According to Enoch, robust normativity cannot be natural, since it is just too different from anything natural. Derek Parfit makes essentially the same claim under the heading of ‘the normativity objection’, and several other non-naturalists have said similar things. While some naturalists may be tempted to reject this argument as methodologically or dialectically illegitimate, we argue instead that there are important limits to what the just-too-different intuition can show, even setting all other worries aside. More specifically, we argue that the just-too-different argument will backfire on any positive, independent specification of the distinction between the natural and the non-natural. The upshot is that the just-too-different argument can show significantly less than non-naturalists have suggested.     

Economic inequality is linked to biased self-perception

People's self-perception biases often lead them to see themselves as better than the average person (a phenomenon known as self-enhancement). This bias varies across cultures, and variations are typically explained using cultural variables, such as individualism versus collectivism. We propose that socioeconomic differences among societies--specifically, relative levels of economic inequality--play an important but unrecognized role in how people evaluate themselves. Evidence for self-enhancement was found in 15 diverse nations, but the magnitude of the bias varied. Greater self-enhancement was found in societies with more income inequality, and income inequality predicted cross-cultural differences in self-enhancement better than did individualism/collectivism. These results indicate that macrosocial differences in the distribution of economic goods are linked to microsocial processes of perceiving the self.     

Ethnic categorisation of faces is not independent of face identity

Is the extraction of a visually derived semantic code from faces (ethnicity) affected by face identity (familiarity) or not? The traditional view considers that this operation is made independently of face identity, and in parallel with the recognition of identity. However, some recent studies cast doubt on this parallel thesis regarding other visually derived semantic codes, namely: facial expression, facial speech, apparent age, and gender. Twenty-eight Caucasian participants were enrolled in an 'ethnic-decision' task on morphed faces made of an Asiatic source face and a Caucasian source face, in the proportion of 70%-30%. Half of the original faces were previously made familiar by a learning procedure (associating the face, surname, occupation, and city of residence of the person displayed), while the remaining half were unfamiliar. The results showed clearly that ethnic decision was affected by face familiarity. This adds support to the thesis according to which the identification of identity and the extraction of visually derived semantic codes are not made independently from each other and that the 'parallel-route' hypothesis becomes weakly supported.     

Distance estimation in a dynamic simulated environment: a visual field dependence problem?

Egocentric distance estimation implies that the subject perceives his own location in the environment. In a simulated environment, subjects have to transpose perceptively their own observation point in order to assume their virtual body position. As only visual information specifies this position, their ability to perceive the camera viewpoint should be linked to the field dependence independence factor (FDI). Field-independent subjects underestimated the mid-distance between their own virtual body position and a far-located target; their bisection was located between the projective (2-D) and the simulated (3-D) mid-distance which indicates their difficulty in considering the in-depth simulated spatial references. High correlations between the vertical estimation in the rod-and-frame test and the egocentric-distance-estimation task (with shifted camera) suggest a similar perceptive process in both tasks. This result is confirmed by the better performances of the field-dependent subjects in this condition. In conclusion, we discuss the relationship between FDI and the sense of presence in virtual environments.     

Why Young Men Drive Dangerously: Implications for Injury Prevention

Why is risk consistently underestimated, and why do young men in particular take exceptionally high risks and think of themselves as invulnerable? Two explanatory paths are proposed. The first is that risk taking in young males has been shaped by evolutionary forces to provide a fitness value. The second pathway is through myth and the other narrative forms that affirm the ego's immortality and invulnerability. Because of its evolutionary base, risk taking is emotionally driven: Emotions are preverbal and irrational, which means that persuasive prevention cannot be more than weakly successful. Three prevention challenges emerge from this analysis: to determine what it is that young drivers fear, to attach affectively experienced fears to defined driving behaviors, and to devise injury-prevention programs that acknowledge that young males' risk taking is not "stupid," but driven by adaptive needs that are as significant to today's young adults as they were to our distant ancestors.     

Ethical intuitionism and the linguistic analogy

It is a central tenet of ethical intuitionism as defended by W. D. Ross and others that moral theory should re?ect the convictions of mature moral agents. Hence, intuitionism is plausible to the extent that it corresponds to our well-considered moral judgments. After arguing for this claim, I discuss whether intuitionists o?er an empirically adequate account of our moral obligations. I do this by applying recent empirical research by John Mikhail that is based on the idea of a universal moral grammar to a number of claims implicit in W. D. Ross’s normative theory. I argue that the results at least partly vindicate intuitionism.     

Why Husserl is a Moderate Foundationalist

Foundationalism and coherentism are two fundamentally opposed basic epistemological views about the structure of justification. Interestingly enough, there is no consensus on how to interpret Husserl. While interpreting Husserl as a foundationalist was the standard view in early Husserl scholarship, things have changed considerably as prominent commentators like Christian Beyer, John Drummond, Dagfinn Føllesdal, and Dan Zahavi have challenged this foundationalist interpretation. These anti-foundationalist interpretations have again been challenged, for instance, by Walter Hopp and Christian Erhard. One might suspect that inconsistencies in Husserl’s writings are the simple reason for this disagreement. I shall argue, however, that the real question is not so much how to read Husserl, but how to define foundationalism and that there is overwhelming textual evidence that Husserl championed the most tenable version of foundationalism: a moderate foundationalism that allows for incorporating coherentist elements.