The numbers game: Gender and attention to numerical information

Research suggests that males outperform females on standardized tests of math ability from early adolescence onward. Several explanations for this difference focus on the different experiences of females and males with numerical information. We reasoned that males have more experience with numerical information than females because typical male interests (e.g., sports) are more likely to involve numerical information than typical female interests (e.g., physical appearance). Thus, we predicted that males would attend more to numerical information than would females, at least when the information was presented in a male-related or gender-neutral context. Females were expected to attend more than males when the context was female-related. Results using White/Caucasian subjects provided some support for these predictions. Implications for future research on the relationship between the gender-linkage of math materials and gender differences in math performance are discussed.     

Book reviews

Scientific Discovery A. Kantorovich 1993 New York, State University of New York Press $17.95

A Model of the Universe Storrs McCall, 1994 Clarendon Press, Oxford 288pp. plus 15pp. appendices, plus 14pp. references plus index 0198240538 £30.00

Explanation David Hillel Ruben (ed. 1993) Oxford University Press pp vi + 365 ISBN 019875129X. Pb £9.95, Hb £27.50     

ENTRUSTING THE LIFE THAT HAS EVOLVED: A RESPONSE TO MICHAEL RUSE'S RUSE

Abstract. This piece challenges Michael Ruse on three points: (1) The charge that Christian myth and doctrine are incredible fails to take into account the scholarship that has clarified the genre to which myth belongs and its function. (2) Naturalistic explanations, like Ruse's, have fully as much difficulty dealing with questions of purpose and evil as religion does. (3) The concept of "deception" has a number of inherent problems that Ruse fails to consider, of which the chief is that it requires a certainty about truth and falsity that Ruse cannot and does not claim to possess.     

Conditional Control of Fluid Consumption in an Occasion Setting Paradigm Is Independent of Pavlovian Associations

Drug states, flavors, and contextual cues were each trained as conditional discriminative stimuli to control a saccharin-LiCl association. In transfer tests, drug states transferred control over consumption to other flavored solutions and to food. Contexts and flavors transferred control only to other flavored solutions. Pavlovian control groups given direct pairings of context-LiCl or flavor-LiCl did not show reliable transfer. However, these control groups did show greater or the same aversion to the specific context or flavor predicting LiCl compared to the context or flavor discrimination groups. The dissociation of the discrimination and Pavlovian groups on transfer versus preference tests suggests that performance on the occasion setting task cannot be due to simple excitation or learning about a unique compound cue. Data from extinction procedures provide further support for the dissociation between simple excitation and occasion setting.     

Accountability amplifies the status quo effect when change creates victims

This study assesses the impact of accountability, the status quo, and anticipated costs and benefits on judgement of the acceptability of a drug in the US pharmaceuticals market. Several effects are documented: (1) subjects were more accepting of a drug, the lower the anticipated risks of side effects and the greater the anticipated benefits; (2) subjects were especially unwilling to accept risk when the drug was not yet on the market and when they felt accountable for their decisions; (3) accountable subjects confronted by an off-the-market drug that posed moderate or high risk were also especially likely to procrastinate, to buckpass, and to think in integratively complex ways about the problem, notwithstanding the fact that many more lives would be saved than lost. We explain these results by positing that perceptual-cognitive processes (loss aversion) and political processes (blame avoidance) mutually reinforce each other when decision makers are accountable for choices that raise the possibility of changing the status quo in ways that impose losses on identifiable constituencies. We conclude by commenting on the complex normative issues that arise in labelling response tendencies as biases. Choices that look irrational within one ethical or political framework sometimes appear quite reasonable with another.     

Mental models and probabilistic thinking

This paper outlines the theory of reasoning based on mental models, and then shows how this theory might be extended to deal with probabilistic thinking. The same explanatory framework accommodates deduction and induction: there are both deductive and inductive inferences that yield probabilistic conclusions. The framework yields a theoretical conception of strength of inference, that is, a theory of what the strength of an inference is objectively: it equals the proportion of possible states of affairs consistent with the premises in which the conclusion is true, that is, the probability that the conclusion is true given that the premises are true. Since there are infinitely many possible states of affairs consistent with any set of premises, the paper then characterizes how individuals estimate the strength of an argument. They construct mental models, which each correspond to an infinite set of possibilities (or, in some cases, a finite set of infinite sets of possibilities). The construction of models is guided by knowledge and beliefs, including lay conceptions of such matters as the “law of large numbers”. The paper illustrates how this theory can account for phenomena of probabilistic reasoning.