Evaluation of a continuing computer conference on simulation

A 20-day computer conference was held in preparation for a face-to-face meeting to produce a computer simulation. The conferencing resulted in the generation of seven different models and was excellent preparation for the subsequent meeting. Computer conferencing appears to hold great value for faculty development in a period of reduced faculty mobility.     

Book reviews

Wyer, Robert S., Jr. Cognitive Organization and Change : an Information Processing Approach. Potomac, Maryland: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 1974. Pp. 502. £10.50.

Egan, J. P. Signal Detection Theory and ROC Analysis. New York: Academic Press. 1975. Pp. 277. £9.75. ISBN

Aldis, O. Play-Fighting. New York: Academic Press. 1975. Pp. 319. £8.75.

Warburton, D. M. Brain Behaviour and Drugs. London: John Wiley. 1975. Pp. 280. £6.95. ISBN 0471 91991 8.

Grieve, D. W., Miller, D., Mitchelson, D., Paul, J. and Smith, A. J. Techniques for the Analysis of Human Movement. London: Lepus Books. 1975. Pp. 177. £5.50.     

Cross-cultural model testing: toward a solution of the etic-emic dilemma

A model for the prediction of behavior from attitudinal components, developed by Triandis, was tested with samples of U.S. and Mexican women, and with fertility relevant behaviors. The elements of the model are etic, but the operationalizations of the various variables were done emically. Results support the model in both cultures. While the predictive utility of the model is equivalent in two cultures, there are social class differences on which component of the model is most emphasized. The U.S. upper-middle-class sample and the Mexican upper-middle-class sample emphasized the person's attitude toward the act, while the Mexican lower SES (socio-economic status) sample emphasized the person's normative beliefs (moral obligations).     

Putting the Ghost Back in the Machine: An Exploration of Somatic Dualism

In this article, I explore various views on which mind–body dualism is true, but the soul is located in the body. I argue that this sort of dualism (which I call ‘somatic dualism’) once was a not‐uncommon view in the philosophy of mind. I also argue that it has the resources to reply to some of the problems thought to affect Cartesian dualism.