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41.
If a native of India asserts “Killing cattle is wrong” and a Nebraskan asserts “Killing cattle is not wrong”, and both judgments agree with their respective moralities and both moralities are internally consistent, then the moral relativist says both judgments are fully correct. At this point relativism bifurcates. One branch which we call content relativism denies that the two people are contradicting each other. The idea is that the content of a moral judgment is a function of the overall moral point of view from which it proceeds. The second branch which we call truth value relativism affirms that the two judgments are contradictory. Truth value relativism appears to be logically incoherent. How can contradictory judgments be fully correct? For though there will be a sense of correctness in which each judgment is correct — namely by that of being correct relative to the morality relative to which each was expressed — if contradictory, the judgments cannot both be true, and thus cannot both be correct in this most basic sense of correctness. We defend truth value relativism against this sort of charge of logical incoherence by showing it can be accommodated by the existing semantical metatheories of deontic logic. Having done this we go on to argue that truth value relativism is the best version of relativism.  相似文献   
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An analysis was conducted to assess whether individuals are more accurate in perceiving those personality characteristics of other' that have a larger genetic component. Adult monozygotic (MZ) twins (63 pairs) and same-sex dizygotic (DZ) twins (35 pairs) completed the Personality Research Form-E (PRF) and the Sibling Evaluation of Personality Characteristics (SEPC) which consists of 20 sets of adjectives corresponding to the 20 trait scales of the PRF. Subjects also evaluated their co-twin with the SEPC. Self-other agreement correlations were then correlated with the heritability estimates of the PRF traits calculated on the same twin sample. The results suggest that accuracy in perceiving the co-twin's personality does increase with the heritability component of the personality dimension.  相似文献   
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Philip Pettit 《Philosophia》1994,23(1-4):157-170
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Book reviews     
Scientific Discovery A. Kantorovich 1993 New York, State University of New York Press $17.95

A Model of the Universe Storrs McCall, 1994 Clarendon Press, Oxford 288pp. plus 15pp. appendices, plus 14pp. references plus index 0198240538 £30.00

Explanation David Hillel Ruben (ed. 1993) Oxford University Press pp vi + 365 ISBN 019875129X. Pb £9.95, Hb £27.50  相似文献   

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Philip Hefner 《Zygon》1994,29(1):67-73
Abstract. This piece challenges Michael Ruse on three points: (1) The charge that Christian myth and doctrine are incredible fails to take into account the scholarship that has clarified the genre to which myth belongs and its function. (2) Naturalistic explanations, like Ruse's, have fully as much difficulty dealing with questions of purpose and evil as religion does. (3) The concept of "deception" has a number of inherent problems that Ruse fails to consider, of which the chief is that it requires a certainty about truth and falsity that Ruse cannot and does not claim to possess.  相似文献   
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