Suppression of corticosterone synthesis alters the behavior of hippocampally lesioned rats

The suppression of corticosterone synthesis with metyrapone (25 mg/kg) reduced the hyperactivity and altered the exploratory activity of hippocampally lesioned animals (HPC) in the open field to the level of cortical and sham controls (Experiment 1). In a second experiment, corticosterone (600 micrograms/kg) pretreatment 2 h, but not 1 h, before metyrapone partially restored the hyperactivity of HPC animals that had been decreased by the corticosteroid-suppressant drug. Alterations in exploratory behavior induced by metyrapone were also prevented by corticosterone pretreatment. The results suggest that the suppression of corticosterone in hippocampally lesioned animals produces a normalization of behavior that can be prevented by pretreatment with corticosterone.     

Parent-infant resemblance for general and specific cognitive abilities in the Colorado adoption project

Previous publications emanating from the Colorado Adoption Project have reported significant relationships between parental general cognitive ability (g) and infant Bayley MDI scores. The present study compared infant Bayley factor scores representing separable dimensions of infant cognition with parental general and specific cognitive abilities for 182 adoptive families and 164 nonadoptive families. Parent/offspring correlations between 12-month Bayley factors and parental cognitive abilities suggest only minimal relationships for both parental g and specific abilities. At 24 months, more parent/offspring resemblance was present; moreover, Bayley factors that were related to parental cognition tended to be related to parental g, not to specific abilities. The finding of significant parent/offspring relationships at 24 months between biological parents and their adopted-away infants, as well as between nonadoptive parents and their infants, suggests some genetic continuity from infancy to adulthood.     

Correlates of adult and child perceptions of social competency

In this study, the relationship between two commonly used measures of social competency, peer ratings of perceived status and adult ratings of assertiveness, were examined. In Phase I, high and low sociometric status children were videotaped responding to a series of role-play scenes; performance on these scenes was then rated retrospectively by adults for overall assertiveness. In Phase II, a second group of children who were unfamiliar with the videotaped children observed the taped scenes and provided ratings of likability, intelligence, working together, and attractiveness. In general, results revealed that children and adults differed in their ratings of the videotaped children. Further, boys used different cues in their ratings than did girls. More specifically, the sociometric status of girls was related to perceived attractiveness, whereas the sociometric status of boys was more closely related to perceived intelligence. Such findings suggest that children and adults look for and use different cues in their judgments. Given these differences, it is concluded that child and adult ratings should not be used interchangeably in the assessment of, and evaluation of, social competency in children.Portions of this research were supported by a grant from the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services.     

Changes in self-stimulatory behaviors with treatment

For four of six autistic children who underwent intensive behavioral treatment, the nature of their self-stimulatory behavior changed from initial lowlevel motor behaviors (such as rocking, spinning, twirling) to differing kinds of higher-level behaviors (such as lining of objects, echolalic speech, and preoccupation with spelling and numerical values). The children who changed to the highest levels of self-stimulatory behavior also showed the largest gains in treatment (as determined by IQ scores, school placement, etc.). The changes in self-stimulatory behaviors were attributed to the intense teaching of appropriate social behaviors and the explicit therapeutic suppression of low-level, self-stimulatory behaviors. The long-term therapeutic effects of changing from lower-to higher-level forms of self-stimulatory behavior were discussed.This study was supported by a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health (grant MH 11440). We want to express our thanks to the parents who allowed us to study their children. We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Maria Audero with the design of the weighted measure, and Tracee Parker with the collection of the data.     

Evidence for scanning with unilateral visual presentation of letters

When letters and words are presented tachistoscopically, material from the right visual field (RVF) can be reported more accurately than that from the left visual field (LVF). The RVF superiority may reflect either left hemispheric dominance for language or directional scanning. Previous studies have deliberately focused on the cerebral asymmetry factor while "controlling" scanning and, thus, have cast some doubt on the potency of the scanning factor. Two experiments were conducted to show that scanning can induce a RVF superiority comparable to that often associated with cerebral asymmetry. The first experiment required bilingual subjects to report six English or six Hebrew letters, shown briefly in either the LVF or RVF, with order of report controlled. A RVF superiority found with English characters was matched by an equal but opposite LVF effect with Hebrew. In a second experiment, five English characters were shown briefly in either the LVF or RVF, and subjects had to identify a single character indicated by a post exposural cue. Using a spatial cue to by pass scanning, there were no field differences; with an ordinal position cue--a procedure thought to force scanning--there was a strong RVF superiority. The results show clearly that scanning can induce visual field differences.     

Levels of selection and capacity limits

Subjects performed a visual target-detection task in eight experiments. We examined the effects of word relevancy (word in relevant or irrelevant location) and display load (1-4 words) on physical, semantic, and controlled processing of nontargets. Interwoven with the detection task was a test-word identification task that was used to measure priming potency of nontargets. Physical and semantic levels of processing were measured in terms of identity and semantic priming, respectively. Nontarget primes were repeated as test words in identity priming. Nontarget primes were semantic associates of test words in semantic priming. Controlled processing of nontargets was measured in terms of recognition memory on a subsequent test. All measures increased with word relevancy and decreased with display load. The priming effects remained intact even when word presentation was speeded up and controlled processing was sharply curtailed. The data indicate that all levels of processing are selective and capacity limited.     

When selective adaptation and contrast effects are distinct: a reply to Diehl, Kluender, and Parker

Two alternative conceptualizations of selective adaptation with speech have recently received attention. The adaptation level theory (AL) outlined by Diehl (1981) and a two-stage model outlined by Sawusch and Jusczyk (1981) can both account for much of the adaptation and paired-comparison data. Recently, Diehl, Kluender, and Parker (1985) proposed that all adaptation and contrast data can be accounted for by AL theory. They reported the results of a study that showed evidence of streaming in selective adaptation and claimed that their results provide a counterdemonstration to recent studies that have argued against the AL approach. In the present article, an outline of how the Diehl et al. results can be accounted for by both the two-stage model and AL theory is presented. In addition, a new set of results comparing adaptation and paired-comparison procedures is presented. These results are precisely as predicted by the two-stage model, but they can not be handled by AL theory.     

How much is an icon worth?

We report a new technique for assessing the amount of information extracted from the icon that follows a briefly presented picture. The problem of how to measure such information was formulated in terms of how much physical exposure of a picture an icon is worth. Consider two types of stimulus presentations, each with a base duration of d ms. The first is a d-ms picture followed by an icon, and the second is a d + a-ms picture not followed by an icon. How large does a have to be so that equivalent amounts of information are extracted in the two cases? To answer this question, we showed people pictures and later tested their memory for the pictures. We found that the physical exposure duration needed to reach a particular level of performance was approximately 100 ms longer when an icon was not permitted versus when the icon was permitted. This value was independent of the base duration and the luminance of the picture. Moreover, the same value was obtained using three different kinds of memory test and four different sets of pictures. We conclude that an icon is worth approximately 100 ms of additional physical exposure duration. A reasonable explanation for this robust equivalence between icon and stimulus is that the same encoding processes are responsible for extracting information from the icon and from the physical stimulus. Therefore, any variable that affects these encoding processes must affect extraction of information from the icon and the physical stimulus in an identical manner. This prediction was confirmed for one such variable, picture luminance.     

A secondary-task analysis of a word familiarity effect

In three experiments we examined aspects of the word inferiority effect and word frequency disadvantage for letter detection. In Experiment 1 we tested a prediction derived from a hypothesis based solely on attentional factors. Adult subjects performed one of two secondary detection tasks while reading for comprehension. The inferiority effects were obtained only when the secondary task was letter detection, not when nonletter targets were used in the secondary task. This finding is inconsistent with the attentional hypothesis, but is consistent with the unitization hypothesis of Healy and Drewnowski (1983). In Experiments 2 and 3 we found that manipulation of the need to read for comprehension had little influence on the letter-detection inferiority effects, but a strong influence on the effects involving the detection of nonletter targets. These results are discussed in terms of their implications concerning processing system flexibility.     

Distributed memory and the representation of general and specific information

We describe a distributed model of information processing and memory and apply it to the representation of general and specific information. The model consists of a large number of simple processing elements which send excitatory and inhibitory signals to each other via modifiable connections. Information processing is thought of as the process whereby patterns of activation are formed over the units in the model through their excitatory and inhibitory interactions. The memory trace of a processing event is the change or increment to the strengths of the interconnections that results from the processing event. The traces of separate events are superimposed on each other in the values of the connection strengths that result from the entire set of traces stored in the memory. The model is applied to a number of findings related to the question of whether we store abstract representations or an enumeration of specific experiences in memory. The model simulates the results of a number of important experiments which have been taken as evidence for the enumeration of specific experiences. At the same time, it shows how the functional equivalent of abstract representations--prototypes, logogens, and even rules--can emerge from the superposition of traces of specific experiences, when the conditions are right for this to happen. In essence, the model captures the structure present in a set of input patterns; thus, it behaves as though it had learned prototypes or rules, to the extent that the structure of the environment it has learned about can be captured by describing it in terms of these abstractions.