GENDER BIASES IN TEXTBOOKS FOR INTRODUCTORY PSYCHOLOGY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Because of spreading concerns about gender stereotypes in textbooks, in 1975 an American Psychological Association Task Force recommended changes in the type of language that should be used to report research findings and in the type of information that should be included in reports of psychological research. These recommendations also applied to the presentation of psychological information in textbooks. Studies in the subsequent 7 years indicated some decrease in the use of sex-stereotyped language and some decrease in gender-biased content. Researchers typically concluded, however, that although some improvements had occurred, gender biases and stereotypes still occurred in texts. The present study reports an extensive content analysis of current textbooks for introductory psychology and human development courses. Representation of the work, theory, and behavior of males continues to significantly exceed the representation of the work, theory, and behavior of females, and females continue to be portrayed in negative and gender-biased ways.     

Faking on Personality Measures: Implications for selection involving multiple predictors

The potential for faking on noncognitive measures in high stakes testing situations remains a concern for many selection researchers and practitioners. However, the majority of previous research examining the practical effects of faking on noncognitive assessments has focused on these measures in isolation, rather than the more common situation in which they are used in combination with other predictors. The present simulation examined the effects of faking on a conscientiousness measure on criterion‐related validity, mean performance of those selected, and selection decision consistency when hiring decisions were based on this measure alone vs in combination with two other predictors across a range of likely selection scenarios. Overall, results indicated that including additional predictors substantially reduced – but did not eliminate – the negative effects of faking. Faking effects varied across outcomes and selection scenarios, with effects ranging from trivial to noteworthy even for multiple‐predictor selection. Implications for future research and practice are discussed.     

Multiple perceptual strategies used by macaque monkeys for face recognition

Successful integration of individuals in macaque societies suggests that monkeys use fast and efficient perceptual mechanisms to discriminate between conspecifics. Humans and great apes use primarily holistic and configural, but also feature-based, processing for face recognition. The relative contribution of these processes to face recognition in monkeys is not known. We measured face recognition in three monkeys performing a visual paired comparison task. Monkey and humans faces were (1) axially rotated, (2) inverted, (3) high-pass filtered, and (4) low-pass filtered to isolate different face processing strategies. The amount of time spent looking at the eyes, mouth, and other facial features was compared across monkey and human faces for each type of stimulus manipulation. For all monkeys, face recognition, expressed as novelty preference, was intact for monkey faces that were axially rotated or spatially filtered and was supported in general by preferential looking at the eyes, but was impaired for inverted faces in two of the three monkeys. Axially rotated, upright human faces with a full range of spatial frequencies were also recognized, however, the distribution of time spent exploring each facial feature was significantly different compared to monkey faces. No novelty preference, and hence no inferred recognition, was observed for inverted or low-pass filtered human faces. High-pass filtered human faces were recognized, however, the looking pattern on facial features deviated from the pattern observed for monkey faces. Taken together these results indicate large differences in recognition success and in perceptual strategies used by monkeys to recognize humans versus conspecifics. Monkeys use both second-order configural and feature-based processing to recognize the faces of conspecifics, but they use primarily feature-based strategies to recognize human faces.     

Minds and Bodies: Human and Divine

Does God have a mind? Western theism has traditionally construed God as an intentional agent who acts on creation and in relation to humankind. God loves, punishes, and redeems. God's intentionality has traditionally been construed in analogy to human intentionality, which in turn has often presumed a supernatural dualism. Developments in cognitive science, however, render supernatural dualism suspect for explaining the human mind. How, then, can we speak of the mind of God? Borrowing from Daniel Dennett's intentional stance, I suggest that analogical reasoning regarding the mind of God be abandoned in favor of an ontologically agnostic approach that treats God as an intentional system. In this approach, God's purposive action is an explanatory feature of the believer's universe, a real pattern that informs our values and beliefs about the world and our place in it.     

Assaultive violence and the risk of posttraumatic stress disorder following a subsequent trauma

Breslau, Peterson, and Shultz (2008) reported that prior trauma alone, in the absence of PTSD, did not predict an increased PTSD risk, relative to no prior trauma. Only prior trauma that resulted in PTSD predicted an increased PTSD risk following a subsequent trauma. Recently, Cougle, Resnick, and Kilpatrick (2009) proposed that the effect of prior trauma might vary by type of prior trauma, a possibility not considered in Breslau et al. They report that childhood sexual or physical assault, in the absence of PTSD, increased the PTSD risk following a subsequent trauma. This report examines the PTSD effects of prior assaultive violence, using data from Breslau et al. (1998). The study assessed PTSD in relation to up to three events. Analysis was performed on the subset with PTSD assessment for two distinct events, the earliest trauma and a subsequent trauma (n = 967), using as reference persons with no prior trauma (n = 972). Neither prior assaultive violence nor other prior traumas, in the absence of PTSD, influenced the subsequent risk of PTSD. In contrast, prior PTSD increased considerably the PTSD risk of a subsequent trauma. The limitations in Cougle et al. (2009) and in this study and future research directions are discussed.     

Positive mood effects on delay discounting

Delay discounting is the process by which the value of an expected reward decreases as the delay to obtaining that reward increases. Individuals with higher discounting rates tend to prefer smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards. Previous research has indicated that personality can influence an individual's discounting rates, with higher levels of Extraversion predicting a preference for immediate gratification. The current study examined how this relationship would be influenced by situational mood inductions. While main effects were observed for both Extraversion and cognitive ability in the prediction of discounting rates, a significant interaction was also observed between Extraversion and positive affect. Extraverted individuals were more likely to prefer an immediate reward when first put in a positive mood. Extraverts thus appear particularly sensitive to impulsive, incentive-reward-driven behavior by temperament and by situational factors heightening positive affect.     

Children with autism can track others' beliefs in a competitive game

Theory of mind (ToM) development, assessed via ‘litmus’ false belief tests, is severely delayed in autism, but the standard testing procedure may underestimate these children's genuine understanding. To explore this, we developed a novel test involving competition to win a reward as the motive for tracking other players' beliefs (the ‘Dot‐Midge task’). Ninety‐six children, including 23 with autism (mean age: 10.36 years), 50 typically developing 4‐year‐olds (mean age: 4.40) and 23 typically developing 3‐year‐olds (mean age: 3.59) took a standard ‘Sally‐Ann’ false belief test, the Dot‐Midge task (which was closely matched to the Sally‐Ann task procedure) and a norm‐referenced verbal ability test. Results revealed that, of the children with autism, 74% passed the Dot‐Midge task, yet only 13% passed the standard Sally‐Ann procedure. A similar pattern of performance was observed in the older, but not the younger, typically developing control groups. This finding demonstrates that many children with autism who fail motivationally barren standard false belief tests can spontaneously use ToM to track their social partners’ beliefs in the context of a competitive game.