Prayer Behavior in Rural Kilimanjaro,Tanzania

Theories and empirical evidence regarding prayer behavior generally emerge from studies of survey respondents in developed countries. The research we describe here adds to the literature by exploring links between demographic characteristics and the frequency and content of prayers for respondents in rural Tanzania. We surveyed 349 Christian households from six villages in the country's Kilimanjaro region. In some aspects our findings match results from survey research conducted elsewhere, and in other aspects our results differ from those commonly reported in the literature. We suggest that local cultural and socioeconomic conditions may account for the differences in outcomes. These results suggest a need for caution in applying to poor countries theories and expectations drawn from the developed country context.     

Husserl and the Problem of Abstract Objects

One major difficulty confronting attempts to clarify the epistemological and ontological status of abstract objects is determining the sense, if any, in which such entities may be characterised as mind and language independent. Our contention is that the tolerant reductionist position of Michael Dummett can be strengthened by drawing on Husserl's mature account of the constitution of ideal objects and mathematical objectivity. According to the Husserlian position we advocate, abstract singular terms pick out weakly mind‐independent sedimented meaning‐contents. These meaning‐contents serve as the ‘thin’ referents of abstract singular terms, but are ultimately founded in prior acts of meaning‐constitution.     

Why Speciesism is Wrong: A Response to Kagan

In Animal Liberation I argued that we commonly ignore or discount the interests of sentient members of other species merely because they are not human, and that this bias in favour of members of our own species is, in important respects, parallel to the biases that lie behind racism and sexism. Shelly Kagan, in ‘What's Wrong With Speciesism’ misconstrues this argument, as well as the principle of equal consideration of interests, which I offer as an alternative to speciesism. Kagan also offers, as an alternative explanation of, and possible justification for, our discounting the interests of nonhuman animals, the suggestion that your interests count more if you are a member of a species whose typical adult members are persons. Although this view is not a form of speciesism, Kagan seems not to be aware of the fact that it is a view commonly defended by advocates of natural law ethics, on which there is already an extensive critical literature.     

Bernard Mandeville on Honor,Hypocrisy, and War

Authors from Cicero to Smith held honor to be indispensable to make people see and do what is right. As they considered honor to be a social motive, they did not think this dependence on honor was a problem. Today, we tend to see honor as a self‐regarding motive, but do not see this as problematic because we stopped seeing it as a necessary incentive. Bernard Mandeville, however, agreed with the older authors that honor is indispensable, but agreed with us moderns that it is a self‐interested motive. Honor might be necessary to keep society functioning, but that does not make it less self‐serving. Mandeville thus combined the classical preoccupation with honor and the modern view of man as self‐seeking. That our motivations are self‐serving is something we wish to hide from others and ourselves; society benefits because we generally behave well in order to live up to this inflated (self‐)image. Hypocrisy is the price we pay for living together peacefully. It is this sobering view on honor that sets Mandeville apart from later authors on the subject, particularly David Hume and Adam Smith.     

Affective variability in depression: Revisiting the inertia–instability paradox

How can depression be associated with both instability and inertia of affect? Koval et al. (2013, Emotion, 13, 1132) showed that this paradox can be solved by accounting for the statistical overlap between measures of affect dynamics. Nevertheless, these measures are still often studied in isolation. The present study is a replication of the Koval et al. study. We used experience sampling data (three times a day, 1 month) of 462 participants from the general population and a subsample thereof (N = 100) selected to reflect a uniform range of depressive symptoms. Dynamics measures were calculated for momentary negative affect scores. When adjusting for the overlap among affect dynamics measures, depression was associated with ‘dispersion’ (SD) but not ‘instability’ (RMSSD) or ‘inertia’ (AR) of negative affect. The association between dispersion and depression became non‐significant when mean levels of negative affect were adjusted for. These findings substantiate the evidence that the presumed association between depression and instability is largely accounted for by the SD, while the association between dispersion and depression may largely reflect mean levels of affect. Depression may thus not be related to higher instability per se, which would be in line with theories on the adaptive function of moment‐to‐moment fluctuations in affect.