Hope as a Predictor of Interpersonal Suicide Risk

The current study hypothesized that (1) hope would negatively predict burdensomeness, thwarted belongingness, and acquired capability to enact lethal injury; (2) hope would negatively predict suicidal ideation; and (3) the interpersonal suicide risk factors would predict suicidal ideation. Results indicated that hope negatively predicted burdensomeness and thwarted belongingness, but positively predicted acquired capability to enact suicide. Contrary to our second hypothesis, hope did not predict suicidal ideation, but interpersonal risk factors for suicide predicted suicidal ideation. Results are discussed in terms of implications for hope theory and Joiner's (2005) interpersonal risk factors for suicide, and for clinical practice.     

The Struggle to Prevent and Evaluate: Application of Population Attributable Risk and Preventive Fraction to Suicide Prevention Researach

Population attributable risk (PAR) estimates have been used in suicide research to evaluate the impact of psychosocial and socioeconomic risk factors, including affective disorders, traumatic life events, and unemployment. A parallel concept of preventive fraction (PF), allowing for estimation of the impact of protective factors and effectiveness of preventive interventions, is practically unknown in suicidology. The study authors discuss the application of both concepts to suicide research and prevention, and review literature on the subject. Despite several methodological and conceptual limitations, both PAR and PF are valuable instruments to inform development and evaluation of suicide prevention programs.     

Libertarianism,the Rollback Argument,and the Objective Probability of Free Choices

It is widely assumed that candidates for free, undetermined choices must have objective probabilities prior to their performance. Indeed although this premise figures prominently in a widely discussed argument against libertarianism, few libertarians have called it into question. In this article, I will investigate whether libertarians ought to reject it. I will conclude that doing so should not be tempting to event‐causal libertarians or most agent‐causal ones, because the added costs outweigh the benefits.