Increasing the intelligibility of speech through multiple phonemic restorations

Outside of the laboratory, listening conditions are often less than ideal, and when attending to sounds from a particular source, portions are often obliterated by extraneous noises. However, listeners possess rather elegant reconstructive mechanisms. Restoration can be complete, so that missing segments are indistinguishable from those actually present and the listener is unaware that the signal is fragmented. This phenomenon, called temporal induction (TI), has been studied extensively with nonverbal signals and to a lesser extent with speech. Earlier studies have demonstrated that TI can produce illusory continuity spanning gaps of a few hundred milliseconds when portions of a signal are replaced by a louder sound capable of masking the signal were it actually present. The present study employed various types of speech signals with periodic gaps and measured the effects upon intelligibility produced by filling these gaps with noises. Enhancement of intelligibility through multiple phonemic restoration occurred when the acoustic requirements for TI were met and when sufficient contextual information was available in the remaining speech fragments. It appears that phonemic restoration is a specialized form of TI that uses linguistic skills for the reconstruction of obliterated speech.     

Initial experiences with cognitive therapy of schizophrenic patients

Based on earlier experiences of various groups of authors, we developed and modified a programme of cognitive therapy for schizophrenic patients. The aim of the application of the therapeutic programme to subacute patients was to decrease subjectively perceptible basic disorders and to improve the functions of performance. The present results and experiences with 4 groups consisting of a total of 31 patients encourage us to continue applying cognitive procedures of therapy. Problems of the ascertainment of measuring values and fundamental questions of therapeutic efficacy are discussed.     

Actions, intentions, and consequences: the doctrine of double effect

One interpretation of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) holds that in situations in which good can be secured for some only if others suffer harm, the pursuit of a good tends to be less acceptable when a resulting harm is intended as a means rather than when it is merely foreseen. The doctrine captures certain moral intuitions about pairs of cases which have the same consequential profiles but in which the character of the intention differs. Quinn examines the DDE using three pairs of contrasting cases, two of which are medical examples: the "Direction of Resources" case and the "Guinea Pig" case, both involving allocation of life-saving resources, and the "Craniotomy" case and the "Hysterectomy" case, both involving fetal vs. maternal life. He concludes that the DDE "embodies our sense that certain forms of forced strategic subordination are especially inappropriate among free and equal agents."     

The architecture of complexity: A new blueprint

The logic of scientific discovery is now a concern of computer scientists, as well as philosophers. In the computational approach to inductive inference, theories are treated as algorithms (computer programs), and the goal is to find the simplest algorithm that can generate the given data. Both computer scientists and philosophers want a measure of simplicity, such that simple theories are more likely to be true than complex theories. I attempt to provide such a measure here. I define a measure of simplicity for directed graphs, inspired by Herbert Simon's work. Many structures, including algorithms, can be naturally modelled by directed graphs. Furthermore, I adapt an argument of Simon's to show that simple directed graphs are more stable and more resistant to damage than complex directed graphs. Thus we have a reason for pursuing simplicity, other than purely economical reasons.This paper is based on part of my doctoral dissertation. Thanks to my thesis supervisor Professor Alasdair Urquhart for his encouragement, constructive criticism, and for directing me to several relevant articles; to my advisor, Professor Ian Hacking, for reminding me to concentrate on results that might have some application in the real world; to Professor Eric Mendelsohn for checking my use of graph theory; and to my friend Wendy Brandts for sharing her ideas on a closely related problem.Thanks to my friends and family (the latter being a (proper) subset of the former, and both including Dr. Louise Linney, of course) for ongoing support in my scholastic endeavors.Thanks to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for financial assistance. (Awards 452-86-5885 and 453-87-0513.) Thanks to the University of Toronto for financial assistance.     

Cognitive guidelines for simplifying medical information: Data framing and perception

In this paper, 1 describe psychological guidelines for simplifying medical information — methods to aid the perception and recognition of abnormalities in medical test reports. These techniques resemble natural human editing strategies outlined in prospect theory. The methods pre-edit data as humans do but to reduce human effort. I review empirical studies assessing these techniques and discuss needs for further research.     

Psychological conceptions of randomness

This article presents a critique of the concept of randomness as it occurs in the psychological literature. The first section of our article outlines the significance of a concept of randomness to the process of induction; we need to distinguish random and non-random events in order to perceive lawful regularities and formulate theories concerning events in the world. Next we evaluate the psychological research that has suggested that human concepts of randomness are not normative. We argue that, because the tasks set to experimental subjects are logically problematic, observed biases may be an artifact of the experimental situation and that even if such biases do generalise they may not have pejorative implications for induction in the real world. Thirdly we investigate the statistical methodology utilised in tests for randomness and find it riddled with paradox. In a fourth section we find various branches of scientific endeavour that are stymied by the problems posed by randomness. Finally we briefly mention the social significance of randomness and conclude by arguing that such a fundamental concept merits and requires more serious considerations.     

Further validity and normative data for the Malouff and Schutte belief scale

The present study provides further validity and normative data for the Malouff and Schutte (1986) Belief Scale. Belief Scale, Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-Neuroticism Scale, and Beck Depression Inventory scores of a sample of 197 adults were correlated, and evidence for both construct and discriminant validities and support for the RET model were obtained. The Belief Scale appears to be a promising instrument for clinical research and the assessment of irrational beliefs.Ricks Warren, Ph.D. is the Director of the Anxiety Disorders Clinic, Lake Oswego, Oregon, and Associate Clinical Professor at the Oregon Graduate School of Professional Psychology, Pacific University. George D. Zgourides, M.A., is a doctoral student in clinical psychology at Pacific University of Forest Grove, Oregon and an associate therapist at the Anxiety Disorders Clinic of Lake Oswego, Oregon.     

Covert visual orienting: Hemifield-activation can be mimicked by zoom lens and midlocation placement strategies

How is attention distributed over visual space when an observer expects a target to occur at one of several possible locations? Two experiments sought to understand the source of the conflict between studies leading to the notions of hemifield activation (Hughes and Zimba 1985) and attentional gradients (Downing and Pinker 1985; Shulman et al. 1985, 1986). Subjects were cued to attend one of the 4 corners of an imaginary square centered at fixation, allowing comparison of uncued locations in the cued and uncued hemifields. In one experiment marking of the 4 locations was varied to determine if providing a ‘target’ for attention is necessary to obtain within-hemifield gradients. RT was faster at the cued location than at the three uncued locations which had equivalent latencies, a pattern that was unaffected by marking of the potential target locations. This result, which is consistent with the notion of a gradient around the attended location is a strong disconfirmation of the hemifield activation hypothesis. The second experiment demonstrated that an unusual procedure for presenting the probe stimuli in Hughes and Zimba (1985) is at least partially responsible for their evidence for uniform hemifield activation. It is proposed that visual attention is directed to visuo-spatial channels with fixed structural properties, and that when attention to two locations is desired, the subject may attend a spatial channel located between them.     

Cognitive bias and irrational belief as predictors of avoidance

Cognitive bias, i.e. overestimates of subjective probability and cost of catastrophic events, and irrational belief were explored as predictors of avoidance. Three groups-anxiety disordered clients, a mixed group of clinic outpatients, and normals--were administered several self-report inventories. Multiple regression analyses were used to investigate a modified version of the Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire, the Belief Scale, and the Body Sensations Questionnaire as predictors of avoidance, as measured by the Mobility Inventory. It was hypothesized that frequency x probability x cost of catastrophic cognitions (and the occurrence of the events they represent) would be a better predictor of avoidance than frequency alone. It was also hypothesized that irrational thinking would be a significant predictor of avoidance. The results generally supported the hypotheses, with subjective probability emerging as a particularly potent predictor of avoidance. Theoretical and clinical implications are discussed.